‘Keeping the Russians out, the Balkans quiet, and Brussels on top’ : A Case Study of the Security Dimension of the EU Enlargement to Bulgaria of 2007 by Lund, Øyvin Rannem
	   
 
‘Keeping the Russians out, the 
Balkans quiet, and Brussels on top’ 
 
 
A Case Study of the Security Dimension of the 
EU Enlargement to Bulgaria of 2007 
 














Master’s thesis in Political Science 
Department of Political Science 
 





















	  ‘Keeping	  the	  Russians	  out,	  the	  Balkans	  
quiet,	  and	  Brussels	  on	  top’	  
 
 
A	  Case	  Study	  of	  the	  Security	  Dimension	  of	  the	  EU	  































‘Keeping the Russians out, the Balkans quiet, and Brussels on top’ 
A Case Study of The Security Dimension of the EU Enlargement to Bulgaria of 2007 
 




Trykk:  OKPrintShop (Oslo Kopisten AS)




To my grandfather, 
Birger Olai Lund.  
9.11.1926 – 4.9.2008 
  
	   	  II	  
 
	   	  III	  
Abstract	  The	  Eastern	  enlargement	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  to	  former	  communist	  dictatorships	  has	  seen	  scholarly	  interest	  from	  several	  disciplines	  of	  theoretical	  schools.	  The	  security	  implications	  of	  EU	  enlargement	  to	  the	  East	  has	  seen	  theoretical	  disagreement,	  as	  there	  are	  arguments	  that	  EU	  enlargement	  both	  worsens	  the	  security	  situation	  for	  the	  current	  EU	  members,	  and	  that	  security	  is	  an	  insufficient	  cause	  for	  explaining	  enlargement	  to	  the	  former	  communist	  countries.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  security	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  cited	  motivations	  for	  enlargement	  policy	  by	  scholars,	  EU	  officials	  and	  politicians.	  Thus,	  the	  security	  dimension	  of	  EU	  enlargement	  is	  unclear	  in	  terms	  of	  why	  it	  matters	  and	  how	  it	  matters.	  This	  project	  investigates	  the	  security	  dimension	  in	  EU	  enlargement	  through	  a	  case	  study	  of	  one	  of	  the	  latest	  additions	  to	  the	  Union,	  namely	  Bulgaria,	  and	  the	  empirical	  analysis	  of	  data	  acquired	  through	  in-­‐depth	  interviews.	  	  	  The	  analysis	  finds	  that	  the	  Union	  utilized	  enlargement	  for	  security	  purposes,	  following	  two	  distinct	  logics:	  one	  of	  realpolitik	  and	  geopolitical	  considerations,	  and	  one	  of	  democratic	  peace	  and	  the	  extension	  of	  the	  security	  community.	  There	  were	  evident	  security	  gains	  for	  member	  states	  that	  were	  decisive	  in	  their	  decision	  to	  enlarge	  to	  Bulgaria,	  both	  through	  exporting	  democratic	  governance,	  norms	  and	  values,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  establishment	  of	  many-­‐sided	  economic	  relations	  between	  Bulgaria	  and	  the	  Community,	  but	  also	  the	  presence	  of	  long-­‐term	  geopolitical,	  security-­‐political	  and	  strategic	  interests,	  such	  as	  the	  containment	  of	  Russian	  influence	  in	  Bulgaria,	  fighting	  transnational	  threats	  to	  internal	  security,	  energy	  security	  and	  regional	  stability,	  to	  name	  a	  few.	  The	  Union	  acted	  strategically	  in	  both	  the	  decision	  and	  in	  the	  execution	  of	  the	  enlargement	  strategy	  towards	  Bulgaria,	  taking	  risks	  and	  undermining	  reform	  efforts	  when	  needed,	  in	  order	  to	  reap	  both	  long-­‐and	  short-­‐term	  strategic	  benefits.	  The	  study	  therefore	  finds	  support	  for	  both	  models	  of	  democratic	  peace	  as	  well	  as	  realist	  assumptions.	  	  	  However,	  as	  the	  study	  shows,	  normative	  security	  considerations	  were	  less	  evident,	  and	  the	  Union	  promoted	  its	  own	  interests	  as	  primary	  interests	  when	  needed	  even	  at	  its	  own	  cost,	  often	  risking	  efforts	  to	  achieve	  normative	  goals	  such	  as	  implementing	  rule	  of	  law	  and	  fighting	  organized	  crime	  and	  corruption.	  Thus,	  the	  project	  finds	  that	  the	  security	  dimension	  of	  EU	  enlargement	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Bulgaria	  questions	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘normative	  power	  Europe’,	  and	  paints	  a	  picture	  of	  the	  EU	  as	  an	  actor	  that	  is	  uncommon	  in	  EU	  security	  studies.	  These	  findings	  can	  have	  implications	  for	  both	  traditional	  enlargement	  debates,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  study	  of	  the	  EU	  as	  a	  security	  actor,	  as	  the	  EU	  both	  actively	  and	  strategically	  exercised	  their	  power	  for	  security	  gains	  in	  the	  enlargement	  to	  Bulgaria	  in	  a	  way	  that	  up	  until	  now	  have	  been	  largely	  neglected	  by	  scholars	  of	  both	  enlargement	  and	  the	  EU	  more	  broadly.	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1 Introduction  The	  fourth	  and	  fifth	  rounds	  of	  enlargement	  in	  the	  European	  Union,	  that	  absorbed	  twelve	  new	  countries	  in	  the	  Union,	  ten	  of	  which	  were	  former	  Communist	  dictatorships,	  changed	  the	  European	  map	  and	  brought	  the	  borders	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  to	  new	  frontiers.	  Generally	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  ‘Eastern	  enlargement’,	  the	  process	  incorporated	  ten	  countries	  that	  were,	  by	  and	  large,	  very	  different	  from	  the	  existing	  members	  in	  terms	  of	  languages,	  culture,	  history,	  and	  governmental	  and	  economic	  structures.	  The	  first	  of	  the	  two	  rounds	  of	  Eastern	  enlargement	  saw	  the	  inclusion	  of	  Poland,	  Hungary,	  the	  Czech	  Republic,	  Slovakia,	  Slovenia,	  Estonia,	  Latvia	  and	  Lithuania	  in	  2004,	  while	  the	  last	  of	  the	  two	  rounds	  saw	  the	  extension	  of	  membership	  to	  the	  two	  poorest	  countries	  of	  all	  the	  Central	  and	  Eastern	  European	  countries1,	  namely	  Bulgaria	  and	  Romania.	  The	  very	  transformative	  nature	  of	  EU	  enlargement	  has	  earned	  it	  the	  name	  of	  ‘the	  EU’s	  most	  successful	  foreign	  policy’,	  mainly	  because	  it	  moves	  the	  internal	  market	  and	  policy	  cooperation	  to	  include	  new	  members,	  and	  induces	  behavioural	  changes	  in	  the	  new	  member	  states	  through	  the	  application	  of	  membership	  conditionality	  (Smith,	  2011;	  Sedelmeier,	  2010).	  Through	  the	  use	  of	  enlargement,	  the	  EU	  has	  changed	  its	  external	  environment	  and	  the	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  European	  order.	  Karen	  Smith	  writes:	  	  	   Enlargement	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  ….	  is	  the	  principle	  means	  by	  which	  the	  EU	  has	  tried	  to	  spread	  prosperity,	  democracy	  and	  security	  to	  the	  former	  communist	  countries	  of	  	  Central,	  Eastern	  and	  South-­‐eastern	  Europe.	  (…)	  	  …	  the	  EU	  has	  also	  used	  the	  promise	  of	  enlargement	  …	  to	  influence	  the	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  policies	  of	  membership	  aspirants	  and	  encourage	  political	  and	  economic	  reforms,	  which	  are	  seen	  as	  necessary	  to	  ensure	  security	  in	  Europe.	  	   (Smith	  2011:300).	  	  	  This	  kind	  of	  description	  is	  very	  common	  when	  describing	  the	  EU’s	  enlargement	  policies	  towards	  the	  CEECs,	  from	  experts,	  politicians	  and	  scholars	  alike.	  Fraser	  Cameron	  writes:	  “The	  enlargement	  has	  always	  been,	  and	  still	  is,	  a	  quintessential	  security	  policy”	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Hereafter	  referred	  to	  as	  ’CEECs’	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(Cameron,	  2007:62).	  He	  attracts	  support	  from	  the	  works	  of	  many	  scholars,	  who	  say	  that	  security	  considerations	  were	  one	  of	  the	  basic	  driving	  forces	  behind	  enlargement	  to	  Central	  and	  Eastern	  European	  countries	  (among	  others	  Smith,	  2011;	  Sedelmeier,	  2010;	  Zielonka,	  2006;	  Skålnes,	  2005;	  Lucarelli,	  2002;	  O’Brennan,	  2006;	  Stefanova,	  2005,	  Vachudova,	  2005).	  All	  though	  these	  characteristics	  are	  very	  common	  descriptions	  by	  EU	  scholars	  of	  the	  policy	  of	  enlargement	  towards	  the	  CEECs,	  surprisingly	  few	  scholarly	  studies	  have	  aimed	  to	  investigate	  the	  security	  dimension	  of	  enlargement	  in	  depth,	  and	  by	  the	  use	  of	  empirical	  data.	  As	  René	  Schwok	  writes,	  there	  is	  truly	  an	  astonishing	  paradox	  at	  play	  in	  the	  literature	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  defining	  the	  role	  of	  security	  in	  enlargement	  (Schwok,	  1999:153).	  In	  Alan	  Mayhew’s	  book	  it	  is	  stated	  that	  “…	  the	  security	  benefits	  of	  the	  accession	  of	  associated	  countries	  are	  often	  considered	  to	  be	  more	  important	  than	  the	  economic	  benefits”,	  and	  that	  “the	  value	  of	  increased	  security	  for	  the	  existing	  European	  Union	  from	  enlargement	  cannot	  be	  over-­‐stated”	  (Mayhew,	  1998:187,	  195).	  However,	  only	  3	  pages	  of	  Mayhew’s	  almost	  400-­‐page	  book	  on	  the	  Union’s	  policy	  towards	  Central	  and	  Eastern	  Europe	  are	  dedicated	  to	  the	  issue.	  	  Schwok	  points	  out	  that	  in	  spite	  of	  many	  scholars	  who	  support	  security	  as	  the	  very	  rationale	  of	  enlargement,	  very	  few	  investigate	  this	  dimension,	  compared	  to	  the	  cultural	  and	  economic	  factors	  in	  enlargement	  (Schwok,	  1999:153,	  154).	  While	  Schwok	  himself,	  after	  an	  argumentative	  analysis,	  comes	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  security	  arguments	  surrounding	  enlargement	  are	  not	  sufficiently	  convincing	  to	  support	  the	  CEECs	  as	  a	  security	  policy,	  the	  paradox	  remains	  (Schwok,	  1999:162).	  There	  seems	  to	  be	  few	  studies	  that	  by	  the	  virtue	  of	  empirical	  evidence	  decisively	  provide	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  nature	  and	  role	  of	  security	  in	  enlargement.	  	  A	  clear	  security	  dimension	  in	  enlargement	  should	  exist,	  and	  should	  have	  impact	  on	  the	  policies	  and	  motivations	  of	  the	  EU,	  if	  the	  kind	  of	  supportive	  statements	  presented	  here	  hold	  to	  be	  true,	  but	  empirical	  research	  into	  this	  dimension	  of	  enlargement	  has	  been	  limited.	  One	  reason	  may	  be	  that	  this	  is	  inherently	  difficult	  to	  actually	  research	  as	  an	  academic	  topic,	  especially	  because	  the	  security	  dimension	  is	  more	  of	  a	  politically	  sensitive	  issue	  than	  the	  economic	  or	  cultural	  dimension,	  and	  therefore	  is	  more	  difficult	  to	  provide	  evidence	  for.	  	  	  This	  thesis	  seeks	  to	  investigate	  the	  security	  dimension	  of	  the	  EU’s	  enlargement	  policy	  towards	  the	  CEECs,	  and	  understand	  how	  security	  issues	  have	  implications	  on	  the	  EU’s	  
	  	   4	  
decision-­‐making	  process	  in	  their	  decision	  to	  enlarge	  and	  execution	  of	  enlargement	  strategy	  towards	  a	  case	  of	  the	  CEECs.	  As	  far	  as	  I	  am	  aware,	  this	  has	  not	  been	  done	  before,	  neither	  for	  the	  case	  of	  Bulgaria,	  nor	  the	  role	  of	  security	  in	  enlargement.	  The	  study	  aims	  at	  understanding	  how	  security	  issues	  play	  into	  the	  enlargement	  strategy,	  how	  it	  affected	  the	  decision	  to	  enlarge,	  and	  what	  role	  it	  played	  in	  crafting	  the	  enlargement	  policy.	  It	  will	  do	  so	  by	  investigating	  one	  of	  the	  latest	  additions	  to	  the	  Community,	  and	  one	  of	  the	  least	  studied	  in	  security-­‐political	  terms,	  namely	  Bulgaria,	  who	  joined	  the	  Union	  in	  January	  of	  2007.	  	  In	  order	  to	  provide	  new	  insight	  in	  to	  this	  theme	  of	  EU	  policy,	  the	  study	  will	  draw	  on	  qualitative	  research	  interviews	  with	  key	  informants	  in	  order	  to	  generate	  new	  empirical	  evidence.	  	  	  While	  research	  has	  been	  limited,	  there	  are	  a	  few	  notable	  exceptions:	  Karen	  Smith	  investigates	  the	  EU’s	  foreign	  policy	  towards	  Eastern	  Europe	  as	  a	  whole	  in	  a	  cross-­‐theoretical	  examination,	  but	  concludes	  with	  the	  confirmation	  of	  constructivist	  explanations	  as	  to	  why	  the	  EU	  has	  worked	  towards	  a	  common	  foreign	  policy,	  including	  enlargement	  (Smith,	  2004).	  John	  O’Brennan	  also	  finds	  support	  for	  constructivist	  theories	  in	  his	  cross-­‐theoretical	  analysis	  of	  the	  2004	  Eastern	  enlargement	  in	  his	  book,	  and	  also	  analyses	  the	  security	  in	  an	  article	  from	  the	  same	  year,	  that	  focuses	  on	  the	  constructivist	  framework	  of	  ‘securitization’	  (O'Brennan,	  2006a;	  O'Brennan,	  2006b).	  Atsuko	  Higashino	  utilizes	  the	  same	  framework	  of	  ‘securitization’	  as	  a	  speech	  act,	  and	  applies	  it	  to	  the	  enlargement	  of	  2004	  in	  her	  article	  (Higashino,	  2004).	  Lars	  Skålnes	  applies	  a	  realist	  framework	  to	  the	  process	  of	  enlargement,	  and	  finds	  support	  for	  security-­‐	  and	  geopolitical	  interests	  as	  the	  key	  explanatory	  factor	  in	  the	  2004	  enlargement	  (Skålnes,	  2005).	  	  	  In	  addition,	  there	  have	  been	  many	  works	  that	  take	  EU	  enlargement	  into	  account	  or	  as	  a	  starting	  point	  when	  investigating	  policy	  responses	  to	  security	  issues.	  This	  can	  be	  argued	  for	  both	  internal	  security	  and	  Schengen	  studies,	  European	  energy	  security	  studies,	  as	  well	  as	  conflict	  studies	  in	  the	  Balkans.	  These	  works	  identify	  a	  specific	  security	  issue,	  but	  do	  not	  investigate	  the	  full	  width	  of	  the	  dimension	  in	  one	  analysis.	  A	  few	  of	  these	  works	  will	  be	  utilized	  through	  the	  course	  of	  the	  analysis	  when	  useful	  for	  the	  discussion.	  The	  study	  takes	  aim	  at	  contributing	  with	  empirical	  evidence	  from	  in-­‐depth	  studies,	  and	  will	  therefore	  primarily	  seek	  to	  test	  the	  hypotheses	  on	  the	  statements	  gathered,	  even	  if	  it	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will	  support	  the	  discussion	  with	  secondary-­‐literature,	  of	  which	  some	  have	  been	  mentioned	  here.	  	  
1.1 Research question Citing	  the	  knowledge	  gap	  of	  how	  and	  why	  security	  actually	  influences	  enlargement	  policy	  and	  the	  enlarged	  EU,	  the	  following	  research	  question	  will	  be	  investigated,	  through	  a	  case	  study	  of	  Bulgaria’s	  membership	  bid	  and	  process:	  	  	  
How	  did	  security	  concerns	  affect	  the	  enlargement	  decision	  and	  strategy	  of	  
the	  European	  Union,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Bulgaria?	  	  The	  thesis	  will	  not	  necessarily	  investigate	  security	  as	  an	  explanation	  of	  enlargement,	  but	  rather	  an	  investigation	  into	  the	  security	  dimension	  of	  how	  security	  affected	  the	  European	  Union	  in	  both	  its	  decision	  to	  enlarge,	  and	  its	  conduct	  in	  the	  enlargement	  process,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Bulgaria.	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  study	  will	  have	  no	  implications	  on	  the	  research	  field	  of	  why	  enlargement	  happens.	  Quite	  the	  contrary,	  it	  will	  have	  implications	  for	  the	  theoretical	  debate	  on	  how	  and	  why	  enlargement	  happens,	  but	  it	  will	  not	  seek	  to	  prove	  that	  security	  is	  the	  only	  explanatory	  variable	  of	  why	  enlargement	  took	  place.	  A	  research	  contribution	  such	  as	  this	  one	  has	  rarely	  been	  done	  in	  the	  past	  in	  enlargement	  research,	  and	  Bulgaria	  is	  one	  of	  the	  least	  studied	  cases	  of	  EU	  enlargement	  in	  security	  terms.	  Therefore,	  the	  aim	  of	  the	  study	  is	  to	  provide	  new	  insights	  into	  a	  specific	  theme;	  namely	  the	  nature	  and	  role	  of	  security	  in	  enlargement,	  by	  investigating	  case	  of	  Bulgaria,	  which	  as	  a	  case	  itself	  has	  seen	  little	  research	  in	  terms	  of	  enlargement,	  compared	  to	  the	  2004	  countries.	  	  	  1.2 Some	  definitions	  Before	  providing	  a	  structure	  of	  the	  thesis,	  this	  sub-­‐chapter	  will	  provide	  a	  few	  definitions,	  first	  of	  ‘enlargement’,	  and	  secondly	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  relevance	  of	  the	  comprehensive	  security	  concept	  for	  our	  study.	  The	  enlargement	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  complex	  processes	  of	  institutional	  integration	  one	  can	  find,	  and	  the	  Eastern	  enlargement	  saw	  the	  integration	  of	  10	  former	  Communist	  dictatorships	  into	  the	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common	  market	  and	  the	  political	  cooperation.	  According	  to	  Schimmelfennig	  and	  Sedelmeier,	  the	  enlargement,	  meaning	  the	  process	  of	  acquiring	  membership	  to	  an	  outsider	  state	  from	  the	  insider	  states,	  can	  be	  defined	  as	  “a	  process	  of	  gradual	  and	  formal	  horizontal	  institutionalization	  of	  organizational	  rules	  and	  norms”	  (Schimmelfennig	  and	  Sedelmeier,	  2005:5).	  This	  is	  a	  fairly	  general	  definition	  of	  extensions	  of	  membership	  to	  new	  members	  of	  organizations.	  The	  enlargement	  of	  the	  EU	  has	  formal	  requirements,	  after	  the	  1993	  Copenhagen	  Council	  criteria,	  which	  will	  be	  accounted	  for	  in	  sub-­‐chapter	  4.1,	  where	  the	  extension	  of	  membership	  as	  a	  policy	  tool	  will	  be	  explained.	  	  	  
1.2.1 The comprehensive security concept The	  concept	  of	  security,	  which	  this	  research	  will	  base	  itself	  on,	  can	  be	  classified	  as	  a	  relatively	  new	  security	  concept,	  as	  it	  is	  inherently	  different	  from	  the	  traditional	  state-­‐centric	  view	  on	  security,	  as	  being	  only	  concerned	  with	  military	  affairs	  and	  the	  perseverance	  and	  protection	  of	  sovereignty.	  In	  stead,	  the	  concept	  I	  will	  draw	  on	  is	  more	  concerned	  with	  the	  underlying	  causes	  of	  security	  issues	  instead	  of	  dealing	  with	  immediate	  threats,	  where	  politico-­‐military	  approaches	  may	  deal	  more	  efficiently	  with	  the	  immediate	  threat	  of	  violent	  conflict.	  Security	  is	  traditionally	  defined	  as	  “the	  condition	  of	  being	  protected	  from	  or	  not	  exposed	  to	  danger	  …	  a	  feeling	  of	  safety	  or	  freedom	  from	  or	  absence	  from	  danger”	  (Biscop,	  2004:3).	  As	  there	  are	  many	  different	  forms	  of	  danger	  other	  than	  violence,	  the	  very	  term	  is	  broad.	  I	  will	  operate	  with	  a	  definition	  of	  security	  policy	  based	  on	  comprehensive	  security,	  which	  is	  very	  different	  from	  what	  is	  often	  called	  security	  policy,	  implying	  the	  military	  tool.	  However,	  security	  policy	  in	  this	  thesis	  can	  be	  defined	  as	  “a	  policy	  aiming	  to	  keep	  an	  object,	  in	  this	  case	  the	  [citizens,]	  values	  and	  interests	  of	  the	  EU,	  safe”	  (Biscop,	  2004:3).	  	  This	  type	  of	  concept	  can	  be	  found	  in	  many	  works	  on	  European	  security,	  and	  is	  generally	  seen	  as	  being	  the	  core	  vision	  of	  the	  European	  Security	  Strategy	  from	  2003,	  as	  the	  strategy	  goes	  further	  than	  the	  identification	  of	  clear	  military	  threats	  (Biscop,	  2004:9,	  10;	  Quille,	  2004:3).	  While	  the	  traditional	  security	  concept	  may	  be	  described	  as	  one-­‐dimensional,	  the	  comprehensive	  security	  concept	  is	  best	  characterized	  as	  multi-­‐dimensional,	  meaning	  that	  all	  dimensions	  of	  security	  is	  interdependent	  and	  interlinked,	  both	  political,	  economic,	  ecologic,	  cultural	  and	  military	  (Biscop,	  2004:5).	  The	  security	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justification	  of	  enlargement	  has	  never	  really	  been	  based	  on	  ‘hard	  security’,	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  being	  a	  response	  towards	  military	  threats,	  whereas	  NATO	  enlargement	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  more	  effective	  instrument	  for	  ensuring	  European	  security	  (Nugent,	  2004:4).	  Rather,	  the	  EU	  enlargement	  has	  been	  justified	  by	  EU	  leaders	  and	  others,	  from	  a	  ‘soft	  security’	  rationale,	  meant	  as	  a	  response	  to	  threats	  such	  as	  organized	  crime,	  instability	  in	  the	  near	  neighbourhood	  and	  illegal	  immigration	  (Nugent,	  2004:4,	  5).	  As	  will	  be	  emphasized,	  there	  are	  two	  different	  types	  of	  security	  logics	  that	  member	  states	  are	  believed	  to	  follow	  under	  the	  theoretical	  framework	  of	  this	  study;	  namely	  the	  logic	  of	  democratic	  peace,	  and	  the	  logics	  of	  long-­‐term	  geopolitical	  considerations	  and	  security-­‐interests.	  	  	  
1.3 Structure of the study In	  order	  to	  investigate	  the	  proposed	  research	  question,	  the	  study	  will	  be	  structured	  in	  the	  following	  manner.	  The	  next	  chapter	  will	  provide	  the	  theoretical	  background	  for	  the	  project,	  first	  by	  briefly	  summarizing	  the	  theoretical	  debate	  surrounding	  EU	  enlargement.	  This	  will	  be	  done	  primarily	  because	  the	  study’s	  findings	  may	  have	  implications	  for	  the	  current	  debate	  over	  what	  explains	  enlargement,	  and	  not	  necessarily	  because	  the	  study	  aims	  at	  explaining	  enlargement	  in	  itself.	  After	  this	  summary	  of	  constructivist	  and	  rationalist	  explanations	  to	  enlargement,	  the	  theoretical	  framework	  and	  hypotheses	  will	  be	  presented.	  First,	  the	  hypothesis	  of	  democratic	  peace	  and	  security	  communities	  will	  be	  accounted	  for,	  and	  the	  utilitarian	  and	  normative	  justifications	  behind	  it	  will	  be	  explained.	  Secondly,	  the	  realist	  framework	  is	  discussed,	  and	  its	  hypothesis	  of	  geopolitical	  and	  strategic	  concerns	  will	  be	  presented.	  These	  two	  hypotheses	  will	  be	  tested	  through	  application	  to	  the	  empirical	  evidence	  in	  the	  analytical	  chapters.	  	  	  
The	  third	  chapter	  will	  provide	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  research	  design,	  the	  means	  of	  data	  collection	  and	  method	  of	  analysis.	  The	  primary	  objective	  of	  the	  chapter	  is	  justifying	  the	  use	  of	  the	  single	  case	  study,	  and	  outlining	  how	  and	  why	  it	  enables	  this	  study	  to	  withdraw	  inferences	  from	  the	  evidence.	  In	  addition,	  the	  particular	  choice	  of	  Bulgaria	  as	  a	  case	  will	  be	  discussed,	  how	  the	  interviewees	  were	  sampled,	  and	  how	  the	  data	  collection	  was	  carried	  out	  and	  the	  evidence	  analysed.	  The	  chapter	  will	  conclude	  with	  the	  strengths	  and	  weaknesses	  of	  the	  research	  design,	  by	  emphasizing	  the	  strong	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internal	  validity	  of	  the	  single-­‐case	  study,	  while	  underlining	  its	  limited	  external	  validity	  ability	  to	  generalize	  over	  a	  population	  of	  similar	  cases.	  The	  reliability	  of	  the	  study	  will	  also	  be	  addressed.	  	  	  
The	  fourth	  chapter	  proceeds	  to	  investigate	  the	  evidence	  collected	  through	  the	  interviews,	  starting	  at	  the	  original	  timeline	  of	  the	  historical	  background	  of	  the	  case,	  with	  the	  EU’s	  decision	  to	  enlarge	  to	  Bulgaria,	  and	  the	  accession	  criteria.	  The	  accession	  criteria	  is	  explained	  in	  the	  context	  of	  being	  a	  foreign	  policy	  tool	  for	  the	  EU.	  By	  investigating	  the	  decision	  to	  enlarge	  separately,	  it	  should	  be	  easier	  to	  see	  what	  the	  EU	  intended	  to	  gain	  from	  enlargement,	  or	  had	  as	  preliminary	  goals,	  before	  investigating	  the	  process	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  In	  other	  words,	  structuring	  the	  analysis	  in	  this	  way	  helps	  the	  study	  keep	  strategic	  goals	  and	  the	  execution	  of	  strategy	  apart.	  This	  chapter	  finds	  support	  for	  both	  hypothesis	  in	  the	  evidence	  concerning	  the	  decision	  to	  enlarge,	  and	  finds	  that	  the	  EU	  sought	  a	  variety	  of	  security	  gains	  through	  the	  enlargement	  to	  Bulgaria,	  in	  terms	  of	  conflict	  prevention,	  regional	  stability,	  containing	  Russian	  influence,	  ensuring	  long-­‐term	  prospects	  of	  energy	  security,	  as	  well	  as	  fighting	  internal	  security	  threats	  such	  as	  transnational	  crime	  and	  immigration.	  In	  its	  concluding	  remarks,	  the	  chapter	  argues	  that	  the	  lacking	  justification	  in	  the	  evidence	  give	  little	  support	  for	  a	  normative	  security	  dimension	  in	  the	  EU’s	  security	  thinking,	  while	  both	  utilitarian	  democratic	  peace	  logics	  and	  rationalist	  strategic	  security	  logics	  are	  present	  in	  the	  evidence.	  	  	  
The	  fifth	  chapter,	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  fourth,	  investigates	  the	  empirical	  evidence	  in	  order	  to	  explain	  the	  altering	  enlargement	  strategy	  of	  the	  EU	  towards	  Bulgaria.	  The	  chapter	  deals	  with	  two	  specific	  events:	  the	  granting	  of	  membership	  negotiations,	  the	  setting	  of	  an	  accession	  date,	  and	  will	  also	  deal	  with	  the	  period	  after	  membership,	  namely	  post-­‐accession	  conditionality.	  In	  this	  chapter,	  it	  is	  argued	  that	  the	  process	  was	  heavily	  influenced	  by	  geopolitical	  and	  strategic	  concerns,	  where	  promises	  were	  given,	  negotiations	  and	  accession	  dates	  granted,	  without	  the	  proper	  criteria	  fulfilled.	  A	  basic	  rationale	  in	  the	  empirical	  evidence	  is	  that	  premature	  enlargement	  was	  allowed	  to	  take	  place,	  and	  the	  EU’s	  most	  powerful	  tool	  was	  given	  up	  willingly,	  for	  basic	  geopolitical	  and	  strategic	  benefits,	  and	  immediate	  security	  interests.	  Thus,	  the	  realist	  theory,	  it	  is	  argued,	  explains	  the	  process	  better	  than	  its	  theoretical	  counterparts,	  because	  conditionality	  and	  democracy-­‐promotion	  was	  given	  up	  for	  the	  more	  pressing	  interests	  of	  the	  Union.	  In	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particular,	  it	  is	  argued	  that	  normative	  justifications	  in	  democratic	  peace	  theory	  cannot	  explain	  the	  decision	  to	  enlarge,	  primarily	  because	  the	  Union	  demoted	  normative	  considerations	  to	  second	  order	  concerns,	  drawing	  a	  distinct	  line	  between	  what	  is	  possible	  and	  what	  was	  deemed	  achievable	  at	  the	  time.	  	  	  In	  the	  sixth	  chapter,	  the	  study	  concludes	  with	  its	  findings,	  and	  confirms	  its	  realist	  hypothesis,	  as	  well	  as	  partially	  confirms	  the	  hypothesis	  of	  democratic	  peace.	  Both	  logics	  are	  present	  in	  the	  evidence	  analysed,	  and	  both	  utilitarian	  justifications	  of	  enlargement	  as	  a	  security	  policy	  is	  found,	  alongside	  evidence	  of	  rationalist	  strategic	  behaviour.	  The	  chapter	  will	  also	  provide	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  study’s	  limitations,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  implications	  these	  findings	  have	  for	  both	  the	  further	  study	  of	  EU	  enlargement,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  study	  of	  the	  EU	  as	  a	  security	  actor.	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2 Theory	  and	  hypotheses	  	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  to	  examine	  the	  security	  dimension	  of	  enlargement	  in	  three	  different	  stages.	  First	  of	  all,	  the	  project	  will	  seek	  to	  establish	  whether	  there	  are	  security	  benefits	  of	  enlargement	  to	  Bulgaria,	  and	  understand	  the	  nature	  of	  these	  benefits.	  Secondly,	  the	  project	  will	  investigate	  how	  security	  considerations	  affected	  decision-­‐makers	  in	  their	  decision	  to	  enlarge	  to	  Bulgaria.	  Thirdly,	  the	  project	  will	  display	  which	  kind	  of	  security	  theory	  explains	  this	  particular	  case	  of	  enlargement,	  and	  enhance	  the	  understanding	  of	  which	  kind	  of	  security	  logic	  the	  enlargement	  as	  a	  foreign	  policy	  is	  eventually	  based	  on.	  In	  order	  to	  do	  so,	  the	  study	  will	  base	  itself	  on	  a	  theoretical	  framework.	  This	  chapter	  will	  first	  briefly	  summarize	  the	  theoretical	  debates	  of	  EU	  enlargement	  research	  up	  until	  now,	  focusing	  on	  the	  rationalist/constructivist	  divide.	  It	  will	  also	  provide	  some	  overview	  of	  research	  literature	  in	  the	  field.	  Then	  the	  theoretical	  approaches	  of	  the	  study	  will	  be	  laid	  out,	  building	  on	  two	  differing	  security	  approaches;	  namely	  democratic	  peace	  theory	  and	  the	  emergence	  and	  expansion	  of	  security	  communities	  on	  one	  hand,	  and	  an	  approach	  based	  on	  realist	  assumptions	  on	  the	  other.	  	   	  
2.1 Traditional theoretical explanations of enlargement – 
state of research Theories	  of	  EU	  enlargement	  have	  been	  plentiful,	  and	  range	  from	  traditional	  International	  Relations	  theories	  to	  theories	  of	  European	  integration.	  While	  both	  the	  liberal	  intergovernmentalism	  of	  Andrew	  Moravcsik	  and	  neo-­‐functionalism	  have	  been	  employed,	  the	  most	  common	  theories	  of	  enlargement	  can	  broadly	  be	  placed	  in	  two	  camps,	  a	  rationalist	  and	  a	  constructivist	  school	  of	  enlargement	  (Schimmelfennig	  and	  Sedelmeier,	  2005:9,	  10).	  The	  debate	  between	  the	  two	  schools	  gained	  considerable	  momentum	  in	  the	  run-­‐up	  to	  the	  first	  Eastern	  enlargement	  of	  the	  European	  Union,	  as	  enlargements	  of	  the	  EU	  and	  NATO	  were	  simultaneously	  taking	  place,	  and	  because	  of	  the	  sheer	  sizes	  and	  scopes	  of	  the	  enlargements	  to	  come.	  These	  theoretical	  schools	  and	  their	  state	  of	  research	  will	  be	  described	  in	  the	  next	  sub-­‐chapters.	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2.1.1 Rationalist approaches Rationalist	  approaches	  to	  enlargement	  concerns,	  like	  most	  rationalist	  models	  of	  International	  Relations	  and	  the	  study	  of	  European	  integration,	  state	  that	  the	  expected	  individual	  costs	  and	  benefits	  of	  the	  member	  states	  determine	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  policy	  process	  (Schimmelfennig	  and	  Sedelmeier,	  2005:12).	  Hence,	  according	  to	  rationalism	  one	  can	  expect	  that	  	  	   …	  states	  favour	  the	  kind	  and	  degree	  of	  horizontal	  institutionalization	  that	  maximizes	  their	  net	  benefits.	  More	  specifically	  a	  member	  state	  favours	  the	  integration	  of	  an	  outsider	  state	  …	  under	  the	  conditions	  that	  it	  will	  reap	  positive	  net	  benefits	  from	  the	  enlargement,	  and	  that	  these	  benefits	  exceeds	  the	  benefits	  it	  would	  secure	  from	  an	  alternative	  form	  of	  horizontal	  institutionalization.	  	  	   	   	   	   	   (Schimmelfennig	  and	  Sedelmeier,	  2005:12)	  	  However,	  what	  these	  net	  benefits	  are	  may	  vary	  considerably,	  and	  different	  rationalist	  approaches	  will	  weigh	  different	  types	  of	  benefits	  as	  most	  important.	  While	  neo-­‐liberal	  institutionalists	  argue	  that	  states	  care	  most	  about	  their	  own	  absolute	  gains	  or	  losses,	  realists	  assume	  that	  state	  actors	  are	  more	  concerned	  with	  external	  autonomy	  and	  gains	  in	  power	  (Schimmelfennig	  and	  Sedelmeier,	  2005:13).	  Hence,	  the	  sources	  of	  enlargement	  preferences	  differ	  between	  theories,	  with	  the	  most	  important	  difference	  being	  found	  on	  the	  systemic	  level,	  regarding	  the	  specific	  material	  conditions	  that	  determine	  a	  state’s	  preferences.	  Neill	  Nugent	  writes	  that	  rationalist	  scholarship	  has	  mainly	  been	  preoccupied	  with	  two	  different	  sets	  of	  benefits	  that	  member	  states	  seek	  through	  the	  enlargement	  of	  the	  European	  Union:	  the	  pursuit	  of	  economic	  opportunity	  and	  the	  promotion	  of	  security	  (Nugent,	  2004:4,	  5,	  6).	  As	  noted	  in	  the	  first	  chapter,	  there	  is	  a	  knowledge	  gap	  in	  the	  enlargement	  literature	  about	  which	  specific	  security	  benefits	  are	  up	  for	  grabs,	  if	  they	  mattered,	  and	  which	  kind	  of	  security	  logic	  the	  member	  states	  pursue.	  	  	  Rationalist	  research	  on	  EU	  enlargement	  has	  tended	  to	  emphasize	  the	  economic	  dimension	  of	  enlargement,	  and	  is	  often	  criticized	  for	  this	  by	  constructivists	  and	  other	  enlargement	  scholars.	  Christina	  Schneider	  has,	  through	  her	  economic	  models,	  shown	  how	  the	  use	  of	  side-­‐payments	  and	  the	  nature	  of	  economic	  integration	  has	  made	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enlargement	  beneficial	  for	  all	  member	  states,	  and	  that	  the	  benefits	  therefore	  induce	  agreement	  (Hix	  and	  Høyland,	  2011:321,	  322).	  Heather	  Grabbe	  shows	  through	  her	  economic	  analysis	  that	  Eastern	  enlargement	  in	  general	  will	  neither	  be	  as	  costly	  nor	  as	  difficult	  as	  presumed,	  and	  that	  EU	  member	  states	  will	  benefit	  economically	  in	  the	  long	  run,	  despite	  the	  expenses	  in	  the	  short	  run	  (Grabbe,	  2001:61).	  While	  there	  exist	  important	  exceptions	  to	  this	  trend	  in	  rationalist	  scholarship	  on	  enlargement,	  other	  systemic	  level	  variables	  of	  rationalist	  theory,	  such	  as	  security	  environment	  and	  security	  interests	  of	  member	  states	  and	  the	  EU	  as	  a	  macro-­‐entity	  have	  often	  been	  neglected	  (Skålnes,	  2005:214).	  Liberal	  intergovernmentalists	  such	  as	  Andrew	  Moravcsik	  and	  Milada	  Vachudova	  argue	  that	  member	  states	  agree	  to	  enlargement	  because	  it	  is	  in	  their	  “long	  term	  economic	  and	  geo-­‐political	  interests”,	  but	  do	  emphasize	  the	  economic	  dimension	  of	  this	  argument	  (Moravcsik	  and	  Vachudova,	  2003:43).	  	  	  While	  it	  is	  important	  not	  rule	  out	  economic	  considerations	  in	  enlargement,	  Bulgaria	  is	  one	  of	  the	  more	  peculiar	  cases,	  as	  it	  was	  the	  poorest	  country	  to	  join	  the	  Union	  when	  it	  acceded	  in	  2007,	  with	  GDP	  pr.	  capita	  less	  than	  half	  of	  that	  of	  Greece	  and	  average	  wages	  only	  half	  of	  the	  CEEC	  average	  at	  the	  time	  of	  pre-­‐accession	  (Grabbe,	  2001:43,	  46).	  Hence,	  one	  can	  expect	  that	  the	  enlargement	  to	  Bulgaria	  was	  the	  costliest	  in	  economic	  terms,	  which	  makes	  materialist	  rationalism	  a	  less	  likely	  explanation	  for	  the	  case.	  	  	  Indeed,	  the	  rationalist	  research	  agenda	  on	  enlargement	  has	  been	  criticized,	  because	  for	  some	  countries,	  the	  projected	  economic	  benefits	  are	  marginal	  and	  the	  distribution	  of	  EU	  funds	  shift	  from	  benefiting	  the	  existing	  member	  states	  to	  the	  new	  acceding	  members.	  Especially	  constructivists	  argue	  that	  an	  overall	  cost-­‐benefit	  analysis	  cannot	  clearly	  and	  indisputably	  show	  that	  enlargement	  benefits	  the	  EU	  as	  a	  whole	  (Nugent,	  2004:7).	  The	  same	  goes	  for	  security,	  as	  the	  EU	  risks	  importing	  security	  threats	  if	  the	  new	  borders	  prove	  unstable	  and	  the	  cohesion	  of	  EU	  decision-­‐making,	  e.g	  enlargement	  may	  fragment	  the	  polity	  (Nugent,	  2004:7).	  Both	  Karen	  Smith	  and	  John	  O’Brennan	  find	  in	  their	  cross-­‐theoretical	  analysis	  of	  enlargement	  and	  foreign	  policies	  towards	  Eastern	  Europe,	  that	  security	  arguments	  in	  themselves,	  while	  absolutely	  present,	  are	  not	  convincing	  enough	  to	  support	  the	  CEECs	  membership	  (Smith;	  2004,	  O'Brennan,	  2006b).	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2.1.2 Constructivist approaches Constructivist	  theories	  of	  enlargement	  weigh	  member	  state	  interests	  and	  cost-­‐benefit	  analysis	  as	  less	  important,	  and	  claim	  that	  enlargement	  policies	  will	  be	  shaped	  by	  the	  degrees	  of	  ‘cultural	  match’	  between	  the	  member	  states	  and	  the	  candidate	  country	  and	  the	  sense	  of	  community	  in	  the	  Union,	  meaning	  “…	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  the	  actors	  inside	  and	  outside	  the	  organization	  share	  a	  collective	  identity	  and	  fundamental	  beliefs”	  (Schimmelfennig	  and	  Sedelmeier,	  2005:14).	  Hence,	  we	  can	  expect	  that	  	   …	  the	  more	  an	  external	  state	  identifies	  with	  the	  international	  community	  that	  the	  organization	  represents	  and	  the	  more	  it	  shares	  the	  values	  and	  norms	  that	  define	  the	  purpose	  and	  the	  policies	  of	  the	  organization,	  the	  stronger	  the	  institutional	  ties	  it	  seeks	  with	  this	  organization	  and	  the	  more	  member	  states	  are	  willing	  to	  pursue	  horizontal	  institutionalization	  with	  this	  state.	  	  	   	   	   	   (Schimmelfennig	  and	  Sedelmeier,	  2005:15)	   	  	  Constructivism	  has	  been	  applied	  to	  explain	  the	  Eastern	  enlargement	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  based	  on	  the	  common	  notion	  that	  rationalism,	  and	  especially	  materialist	  rationalism,	  which	  predicts	  economic	  benefits	  as	  the	  crucial	  variable	  in	  explaining	  enlargement,	  fails	  to	  explain	  Eastern	  enlargement.	  This	  is	  caused	  by	  the	  uneven	  distribution	  of	  costs	  and	  benefits	  among	  the	  member	  states,	  and	  the	  consensus-­‐based	  decision-­‐making	  process,	  where	  every	  member	  state	  has	  veto	  power	  (Sjursen,	  2002:497;	  Schimmelfennig,	  2005:166).	  Rather,	  it	  is	  the	  wish	  to	  reunite	  Europe	  as	  a	  cultural	  entity,	  and	  the	  rhetorical	  commitment	  given	  by	  the	  member	  states	  from	  early	  on	  makes	  it	  inherently	  difficult	  to	  reject	  the	  aspirant	  member	  states’	  wish	  to	  join	  the	  Union.	  While	  Schimmelfennig	  argues	  that	  this	  led	  the	  pro-­‐enlargement	  member	  states	  to	  ‘shaming’	  the	  sceptics	  into	  keeping	  past	  promises	  of	  re-­‐uniting	  Europe	  (Schimmelfennig,	  2005:166),	  this	  was	  not	  the	  case	  according	  to	  Helene	  Sjursen.	  As	  she	  writes	  in	  her	  discourse	  analysis	  of	  arguments	  related	  to	  Eastern	  enlargement:	  	  	   …	  norms	  do	  not	  matter	  because	  it	  costs	  something	  not	  to	  comply	  with	  them,	  but	  because	  they	  are	  ends	  in	  themselves.	  They	  appeal	  to	  principles	  or	  values	  that	  are	  considered	  valid,	  true	  or	  right.	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (2002:508)	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  Common	  criticism	  of	  social	  constructivism	  and	  other	  liberal-­‐idealist	  approaches	  in	  general,	  is	  also	  applicable	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  academic	  work	  on	  enlargement,	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  most	  enlargement	  scholars	  to	  some	  degree	  recognize	  and	  agree	  that	  norms	  are	  important	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  explaining	  European	  Union	  enlargement.	  However,	  enlargement	  scholars	  that	  hold	  identity,	  cultural	  match	  and	  rhetorical	  entrapment	  as	  the	  most	  important	  factors	  for	  the	  member	  states’	  decision	  to	  enlarge,	  face	  both	  normative	  and	  methodological	  challenges	  to	  be	  resolved.	  First	  of	  all,	  while	  public	  discursive	  evidence,	  which	  constructivist	  scholarship	  often	  rely	  on,	  like	  public	  statements,	  speeches	  and	  official	  documents	  delivered	  by	  decision-­‐makers,	  may	  contribute	  to	  a	  wider	  understanding	  of	  a	  phenomenon,	  it	  can	  be	  argued	  that	  constructivists	  who	  apply	  such	  evidence	  are	  ignoring	  the	  very	  nature	  of	  diplomatic	  and	  political	  discourse,	  and	  are	  “interpreting	  evidence	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  suits	  their	  case”	  (Nugent,	  2004:8).	  While	  much	  can	  be	  drawn	  from	  public	  discourse,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  keep	  in	  mind	  that	  it	  is	  in	  fact	  public,	  and	  therefore	  also	  directed	  at	  an	  audience.	  	  	  Secondly,	  the	  rhetorical	  entrapment	  argument	  may	  be	  based	  on	  political-­‐ethical	  grounds,	  but	  also	  involves	  legitimacy	  and	  interests.	  While	  states	  may	  keep	  promises	  on	  these	  grounds,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  ignore	  the	  fact	  that	  if	  they	  keep	  promises,	  they	  appear	  legitimate	  and	  trustworthy,	  which	  again	  may	  imply	  a	  cost-­‐benefit	  approach	  to	  decision-­‐making	  and	  promise-­‐keeping.	  While	  there	  might	  be	  a	  normative	  dimension	  to	  promises	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  international	  politics,	  research	  that	  makes	  these	  claims	  can	  itself	  be	  accused	  of	  being	  overly	  normative.	  This	  is	  a	  common	  criticism	  against	  constructivist	  research	  which	  is	  also	  applicable	  here.	  When	  discussing	  the	  EU	  as	  a	  power,	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  general	  idea	  among	  constructivists	  that	  spreading	  peace	  and	  democracy	  in	  Europe,	  human	  rights	  and	  gender	  equality	  is	  promoted	  without	  the	  involvement	  of	  interests	  or	  power,	  in	  a	  way	  Matlary	  describes	  as	  ‘post-­‐national’.	  She	  writes:	  	  	   This	  kind	  of	  scholarship	  is	  in	  itself	  highly	  normative,	  it	  is	  not	  the	  EU’s	  power	  which	  is	  normative.	  The	  problem	  is	  elementary:	  one	  mistakes	  political	  rhetoric	  for	  political	  results.	  Yet	  many	  scholars	  persist	  in	  analysing	  the	  EU	  empirically	  in	  these	  normative	  and	  rhetorical	  terms…	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (Matlary,	  2009:84)	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  While	  one	  should	  not	  rule	  out	  arguments	  based	  on	  solidarity,	  cultural	  match	  and	  community,	  there	  are	  clearly	  problematic	  areas	  for	  constructivism	  as	  a	  theoretical	  approach.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  recognize	  that	  the	  EU	  has	  an	  interest	  in	  spreading	  its	  common	  norms	  and	  values,	  and	  that	  the	  very	  nature	  of	  the	  Union’s	  approach	  to	  enlargement	  is	  in	  fact	  shaped	  by	  its	  power	  of	  attraction,	  and	  the	  exercise	  of	  membership	  conditionality	  (Hyde-­‐Price,	  2006:227).	  	  	  For	  constructivists,	  the	  case	  of	  Bulgaria	  is	  not	  as	  solid	  according	  to	  the	  ‘cultural	  match’	  argument	  as	  other	  CEECs	  might	  be.	  It	  is	  the	  only	  Slavic	  country	  that	  has	  been	  enlarged	  to,	  the	  only	  one	  that	  practices	  the	  Cyrillic	  alphabet	  exclusively,	  it	  is	  primarily	  Bulgarian-­‐orthodox,	  and	  has	  never	  been	  a	  part	  of	  the	  Austro-­‐Hungarian	  Empire,	  unlike	  Hungary,	  The	  Czech	  Republic,	  Romania	  and	  Slovakia,	  to	  name	  a	  few	  of	  the	  other	  CEECs	  who	  have.	  It	  was	  one	  of	  the	  countries	  most	  loyal	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  during	  the	  cold	  war,	  unlike	  other	  CEECs	  such	  as	  Romania	  (Katsikas,	  2012:5).	  In	  addition,	  it	  is	  the	  only	  country	  that	  has	  both	  been	  a	  part	  of	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire	  and	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Warsaw	  pact.	  Hence,	  if	  one	  looks	  at	  the	  historical	  background,	  Bulgaria	  is	  arguably	  the	  most	  deviant	  case	  according	  to	  this	  argument.	  	  	  
2.2 Two theories of security in enlargement This	  thesis	  seeks	  to	  investigate	  the	  role	  of	  security	  in	  enlargement,	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  the	  security	  dimension	  counted	  in	  the	  decision	  to	  enlarge.	  However,	  not	  only	  should	  it	  investigate	  to	  what	  extent	  security	  mattered,	  but	  more	  importantly	  how	  does	  it	  matter?	  As	  the	  scholarly	  disagreement	  demonstrates,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  knowledge	  gap,	  the	  nature	  and	  justification	  for	  security	  in	  enlargement	  is	  obscure.	  There	  are	  differing	  theoretical	  views	  on	  which	  kind	  of	  security	  logic	  the	  member	  states	  were	  guided	  by,	  to	  what	  extent	  norms	  and	  values	  matter	  in	  the	  enlargement	  process,	  and	  to	  which	  degree	  there	  was	  strategic	  behaviour	  from	  the	  member	  states	  in	  their	  decision.	  The	  two	  models	  of	  security	  that	  the	  thesis	  will	  draw	  upon	  are	  quite	  different	  in	  premises	  and	  logic,	  and	  fall	  into	  sharp	  divides	  in	  terms	  of	  being	  either	  idealist	  or	  realist	  in	  their	  prediction	  of	  member	  state	  behaviour.	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2.2.1 A model of Democratic peace theory and Democratic security 
communities From	  the	  philosophical	  writings	  of	  Immanuel	  Kant	  and	  up	  until	  today,	  the	  development	  of	  democratic	  peace	  theory	  has	  evolved	  substantially,	  with	  both	  qualitative	  and	  quantitative	  research	  on	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  inter-­‐democratic	  peace.	  This	  phenomenon,	  meaning	  that	  democratic	  states	  do	  not	  wage	  wars	  against	  each	  other,	  is	  not	  a	  new	  one,	  but	  has	  seen	  greater	  interest	  from	  researchers	  through	  the	  last	  decades	  as	  to	  what	  it	  is	  about	  democracies	  that	  makes	  them	  more	  peaceful	  than	  other	  forms	  of	  government	  (Lucarelli,	  2002:10).	  The	  phenomenon	  of	  inter-­‐democratic	  peace	  is	  one	  of	  the	  strongest	  theories	  of	  political	  science	  empirically,	  although	  many	  scholars	  differ	  on	  exactly	  what	  in	  democratic	  governance	  it	  is	  that	  makes	  them	  more	  peaceful.	  	  	  Sonia	  Lucarelli	  spells	  out	  a	  theoretical	  framework	  that	  mentions	  three	  types	  of	  justification	  as	  to	  why	  democracies	  do	  not	  fight	  each	  other.	  Two	  of	  them	  can	  be	  described	  as	  institutional,	  and	  one	  as	  normative.	  The	  first	  institutional	  explanation	  is	  democracies’	  responsiveness	  to	  its	  citizens,	  as	  citizens	  oppose	  war,	  and	  that	  the	  elected	  governments	  stand	  to	  lose	  elections	  if	  they	  do	  not	  respond	  to	  the	  electorate’s	  wishes	  (Lucarelli,	  2002:11).	  The	  second	  institutional	  explanation	  concerns	  the	  fact	  that	  democracies	  are	  built	  up	  with	  counter-­‐weights	  and	  complex	  decision-­‐making	  systems,	  which	  tends	  to	  make	  decision-­‐makers	  slower	  and	  constrained	  when	  facing	  the	  possibility	  of	  war.	  These	  constraints	  of	  the	  democratic	  process	  are	  also	  present	  in	  antagonist	  democracies,	  and	  therefore,	  democratic	  leaders	  do	  not	  fear	  attacks	  from	  other	  democracies	  (Lucarelli,	  2002:12).	  	  	  The	  normative	  dimension	  of	  the	  theory	  of	  inter-­‐democratic	  peace	  is	  probably	  the	  most	  important	  one,	  as	  it	  helps	  explain	  why	  democracies	  do	  not	  fight	  other	  democracies,	  while	  they	  might	  wage	  war	  on	  non-­‐democracies.	  According	  to	  these	  normative	  types	  of	  arguments,	  liberal	  democracies	  are	  not	  only	  constrained	  by	  the	  nature	  of	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  or	  electoral	  pressures,	  but	  are	  also	  guided	  by	  norms,	  values	  and	  procedures	  that	  have	  been	  institutionalized	  in	  the	  political	  culture	  and	  system	  of	  a	  democracy	  over	  a	  long	  period	  of	  time	  (Lucarelli,	  2002:12).	  As	  Thomas	  Risse	  points	  out,	  liberal	  democracies	  are	  more	  committed	  to	  respecting	  human	  rights,	  guaranteeing	  fundamental	  freedoms	  of	  its	  citizens,	  protecting	  the	  rights	  of	  its	  minorities	  precisely	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because	  of	  the	  presence	  of	  these	  norms	  and	  rules,	  and	  the	  peaceful	  conflict-­‐resolution	  in	  the	  internal	  political	  sphere	  (Lucarelli,	  2002:12).	  Hence,	  Lucarelli	  argues:	  	  	   …	  the	  third	  version	  of	  democratic	  peace	  argues	  …	  that	  the	  peaceful	  conduct	  of	  democracies	  towards	  similar	  regimes	  is	  an	  extension	  of	  the	  norms,	  rules	  and	  procedures	  that	  guide	  internal	  politics	  to	  relations	  with	  political	  regimes	  perceived	  to	  be	  similar.	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (Lucarelli,	  2002:12,	  13)	  	  These	  shared	  values	  and	  norms	  provide	  democracies	  with	  the	  necessary	  condition	  for	  self-­‐identification	  of	  themselves	  as	  members	  of	  a	  community.	  As	  Lucarelli	  claims,	  areas	  of	  democratic	  peace	  represent	  a	  ‘security	  community’,	  meaning	  an	  area	  where	  states	  neither	  expect	  or	  prepare	  for	  violent	  conflict	  with	  each	  other	  (Lucarelli,	  2002:13).	  There	  are	  three	  characteristics	  of	  a	  security	  community,	  according	  to	  Lucarelli:	  “(i)	  shared	  identities,	  values	  and	  meanings;	  (ii)	  many-­‐sided	  and	  direct	  relations	  amongst	  the	  units;	  (iii)	  diffuse	  reciprocity”	  (Lucarelli,	  2002:13).	  Hence,	  there	  are	  expectations	  in	  these	  communities	  that	  conflicts	  are	  resolved	  by	  peaceful	  means,	  and	  that	  violent	  conflict	  is	  unthinkable	  among	  the	  units.	  The	  security	  community	  concept	  can	  hence	  be	  merged	  with	  the	  concept	  of	  democratic	  peace	  if	  the	  shared	  norms,	  values	  and	  identity	  springs	  from	  liberal	  democracy	  (Lucarelli,	  2002:14).	  These	  communities	  can	  be	  described	  as:	  	  	  
• A	  community	  in	  which	  there	  are	  shared	  identities,	  values	  and	  meanings	  provided	  by	  liberal	  democracy	  	  
• Many-­‐sided	  and	  direct	  relations	  amongst	  the	  units	  that	  are	  greatly	  smoothed	  by	  the	  greater	  level	  of	  openness	  and	  permeability	  of	  liberal-­‐democratic	  societies	  
• Diffused	  reciprocity	  and	  dependable	  expectations	  of	  peaceful	  exchange	  depend	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  on	  the	  existence	  of	  an	  area	  of	  democratic	  peace	  (Lucarelli,	  2002:15)	  	  Adler	  and	  Barnett	  distinguish	  between	  tightly-­‐coupled	  and	  loosely-­‐coupled	  security	  communities,	  where	  tightly-­‐coupled	  communities	  go	  beyond	  a	  minimal	  definition	  of	  a	  security	  community,	  and	  also	  contain,	  among	  other	  things,	  a	  system	  of	  government	  that	  lies	  between	  sovereign	  states	  and	  a	  regional,	  centralized	  government	  (Lucarelli,	  2002:15).	  In	  this	  view,	  the	  supra-­‐national	  nature	  of	  the	  EU	  makes	  it	  an	  example	  of	  a	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tightly-­‐coupled	  democratic	  security	  community,	  while	  NATO	  is	  an	  example	  of	  a	  loosely-­‐coupled	  democratic	  security	  community	  (Lucarelli,	  2002:15).	  	  	  According	  to	  Lucarelli’s	  framework	  of	  liberal	  democratic	  security	  communities,	  one	  can	  expect	  that	  the	  advancement	  of	  security	  interests	  of	  the	  member	  states	  comes	  through	  the	  enlargement	  of	  the	  community	  to	  include	  new	  members	  in	  the	  fold,	  by	  helping	  establishment	  of	  institutions	  of	  liberal	  democracy,	  meaning	  “the	  formal	  democratic	  institutions	  and	  procedures,	  rule	  of	  law	  and	  respect	  for	  fundamental	  freedoms	  and	  rights”	  (Lucarelli,	  2002:19).	  The	  EU	  can	  be	  expected	  to	  enlarge	  in	  order	  to	  spread	  the	  norms	  and	  values	  of	  liberal	  democracy,	  because	  it	  is	  a	  ‘normative	  power’,	  meaning	  that	  it	  is	  not	  only	  a	  normative	  power	  because	  it	  is	  constructed	  on	  a	  normative	  basis,	  but	  because	  it	  “predisposes	  to	  act	  in	  a	  normative	  way	  in	  international	  relations”	  (Lucarelli,	  2002).	  The	  liberal	  democracies	  in	  the	  European	  Union	  promotes	  democracy	  because	  they	  get	  utility	  from	  it,	  meaning	  that	  it	  is	  expected	  to	  create	  peace,	  and	  therefore	  has	  a	  rationalist	  or	  utilitarian	  dimension.	  In	  addition,	  democratization	  is	  about	  spreading	  universal	  values,	  and	  contains	  a	  normative	  dimension,	  because	  promotion	  of	  democracy	  is	  the	  morally	  right	  thing	  to	  do,	  “a	  liberal	  mission”	  (Wolff	  and	  Wurm,	  2011:79,	  80,	  81).	  Thus,	  the	  spread	  of	  democracy	  and	  liberal	  values	  does	  not	  only	  bring	  about	  the	  benefits	  of	  peace	  and	  mutual	  interdependence,	  but	  it	  also	  good	  and	  valuable	  in	  it	  self.	  Therefore,	  the	  liberal-­‐idealist	  approach	  is	  by	  and	  large	  normative,	  because	  it	  identifies	  civilian	  and	  normative	  power	  as	  “a	  good	  thing”	  (Hyde-­‐Price,	  2006:218).	  	  Consequently,	  member	  states	  utilize	  enlargement	  for	  two	  distinct	  reasons	  in	  this	  hypothesis:	  	  	  	   H1:	   Member	  states	  make	  use	  of	  enlargement	  to	  Bulgaria	  in	  order	  to	  export	  liberal	  democracy,	  rule	  of	  law,	  human	  rights,	  democratic	  values	  and	  norms	  and	  establish	  many-­‐sided	  relations,	  through	  the	  use	  of	  their	  policy	  instruments,	  in	  order	  to	  enlarge	  the	  democratic	  security	  community	  of	  the	  EU,	  both	  because	  it	  secures	  liberal	  democratic	  peace	  between	  states	  and	  fosters	  regime	  stability,	  and	  because	  doing	  so	  is	  morally	  right	  2.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Hereafter	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  democratic	  peace	  hypothesis.	  The	  two	  logics	  in	  the	  hypothesis	  will	  be	  referred	  to	  as	  either	  the	  utilitarian	  security	  logic	  or	  the	  normative	  security	  logic.	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  Central	  to	  this	  assumption	  is	  that	  bringing	  democracy,	  market	  economy	  and	  many-­‐sided	  interdependence	  to	  new	  areas	  helps	  stabilizing	  the	  external	  milieu	  of	  the	  European	  Union,	  thus	  minimizing	  the	  risks	  of	  armed	  conflict,	  advancing	  human	  rights	  and	  the	  rights	  of	  minorities.	  This	  theory	  thus	  assumes	  that	  the	  Union	  seeks	  to	  do	  this	  through	  the	  application	  of	  the	  instruments	  at	  hand,	  namely	  enlargement	  and	  the	  tools	  that	  come	  with	  it;	  membership	  conditionality	  and	  power	  of	  attraction.	  These	  assumptions	  will	  help	  construct	  two	  hypotheses,	  with	  the	  differing	  justifications,	  will	  be	  tested	  in	  the	  empirical	  evidence	  gathered	  through	  in-­‐depth	  interviews.	  	  	  
2.2.2 A model of security- and geopolitical interests While	  the	  prevailing	  theory	  of	  security	  in	  enlargement	  is	  one	  of	  democratic	  peace	  and	  community-­‐building,	  other	  theories	  have	  emerged	  seeking	  to	  both	  widen	  and	  deepen	  the	  scope	  in	  which	  the	  security	  dimension	  is	  analyzed	  in	  the	  context	  of	  enlargement.	  While	  democratic	  peace	  theory	  and	  the	  literature	  on	  security	  communities	  have	  shown	  remarkably	  strong	  empirical	  standings,	  it	  can	  be	  criticized	  for	  ignoring	  the	  very	  nature	  of	  enlargement,	  namely	  the	  geographical	  expansion	  of	  the	  organization,	  and	  the	  moving	  of	  external	  borders	  that	  come	  along	  with	  it.	  The	  theories	  of	  democratization	  and	  community-­‐building	  may	  indeed	  be	  very	  useful	  for	  explaining	  the	  absence	  of	  war,	  but	  one	  might	  argue	  that	  there	  are	  numerous	  other	  security	  issues	  at	  hand	  in	  enlargement,	  that	  the	  theories	  do	  not	  fully	  account	  for	  or	  claim	  to	  matter.	  	  	  The	  other	  explanatory	  model	  in	  this	  study	  is	  based	  on	  expectations	  of	  rational	  behavior	  by	  EU	  member	  states	  in	  their	  decision	  to	  enlarge,	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  potential	  security	  gains	  to	  be	  achieved	  for	  the	  Union	  through	  the	  extension	  of	  membership	  to	  Bulgaria.	  While	  rational	  institutionalism	  is	  a	  wide	  theory	  of	  social	  science,	  the	  thesis	  draws	  specifically	  on	  the	  insights	  of	  realism	  in	  this	  theory,	  which	  is	  seldom	  employed	  in	  the	  study	  of	  the	  EU.	  Intergovernmentalism	  is	  an	  analytical	  approach	  where	  soft	  rationalism	  and	  other	  traditional	  assumptions	  of	  realism	  are	  applied	  to	  the	  study	  of	  European	  Union	  policy-­‐making	  (Pollack,	  2006:9,	  10).	  Hence,	  they	  are	  closely	  related	  in	  their	  core	  assumptions,	  except	  that	  intergovernmentalism	  recognizes	  that	  institutionalization	  matters	  in	  international	  politics,	  and	  that	  processes	  of	  domestic	  politics	  to	  some	  degree	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have	  an	  influence	  on	  state	  preferences	  (Rosamond,	  2000:201).	  Realism	  applied	  to	  the	  European	  Union	  rests	  of	  a	  few	  basic	  assumptions:	  	  	  
-­‐ The	  international	  system	  is	  basically	  anarchic,	  and	  states	  are	  the	  primary	  actors.	  This	  implies	  that	  states	  ensure	  their	  own	  safety	  in	  a	  self-­‐help	  system,	  and	  that	  the	  EU	  is	  not	  a	  sovereign	  actor	  per	  say,	  but	  rather	  that	  the	  EU	  serves	  as	  a	  ‘vehicle’	  for	  the	  member	  states’	  collective	  interests	  	  
-­‐ States	  are	  rational,	  unitary	  actors,	  meaning	  that	  they	  behave	  strategically	  based	  on	  cost-­‐benefit	  calculations,	  and	  that	  they	  pursue	  security,	  power	  and	  interest	  maximization	  	  
-­‐ States	  have	  an	  interest	  in	  their	  external	  environment,	  and	  this	  particularly	  goes	  for	  great	  powers	  who	  have	  the	  capability	  and	  strong	  interests	  in	  their	  milieu.	  Thus,	  states	  have	  interests	  in	  the	  stability	  of	  their	  environment,	  and	  the	  EU’s	  cooperation	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  attempt	  to	  collectively	  shape	  their	  own	  milieu,	  driven	  by	  the	  Union’s	  largest	  powers	  
-­‐ States	  are	  not	  exclusively	  engaged	  in	  security	  and	  power-­‐maximization	  under	  realism,	  they	  also	  engage	  in	  ‘ethical	  and	  normative	  policies’.	  However,	  these	  are	  second-­‐order	  concerns,	  and	  as	  long	  as	  they	  do	  not	  collide	  with	  core	  interests	  and	  security,	  they	  are	  pursued	  by	  member	  states	  	  (Hyde-­‐Price,	  2006:221,	  222,	  223;	  Hyde-­‐Price,	  2008:31,	  32)	  	  While	  the	  first	  theory	  of	  liberal	  democratic	  peace	  is	  both	  a	  normative	  and	  a	  utilitarian	  approach	  to	  security	  policy,	  the	  second	  theory	  of	  realism	  offers	  a	  rationalist	  approach.	  In	  this	  study,	  I	  wish	  to	  enhance	  the	  understanding	  of	  which	  kind	  of	  security	  logic	  the	  Union	  follows	  in	  enlargement,	  and	  what	  they	  view	  as	  the	  best	  way	  to	  achieve	  these	  benefits.	  Hence,	  democratic	  peace	  theory	  assumes	  that	  enlargement	  will	  lead	  to	  the	  abolition	  of	  violent	  resolutions	  of	  conflict,	  while	  the	  geopolitical	  approach	  assumes	  that	  the	  member	  states	  of	  the	  Union,	  and	  particularly	  Great	  Britain,	  France	  and	  Germany,	  seek	  security	  gains	  through	  geographical	  expansion,	  and	  hence	  leveraging	  the	  political	  control	  of	  the	  Union	  over	  vital	  resources	  and	  countering	  specific	  security	  risks.	  This	  approach	  focuses	  on	  the	  interests	  to	  be	  served	  in	  enlargement,	  and	  thus	  follows	  a	  strategic,	  non-­‐idealist	  security	  logic.	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  strategic	  and	  geo-­‐political	  approach	  exclude	  the	  importance	  of	  norms	  or	  values.	  States	  do	  pursue	  ethical	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and	  normative	  concerns,	  but	  they	  are	  ‘second-­‐order	  concerns’,	  meaning	  that	  the	  national	  interests	  of	  the	  state	  come	  first	  (Hyde-­‐Price,	  2006:222).	  	  	  While	  most	  scholars	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  put	  less	  emphasis	  on	  the	  geopolitical	  and	  security-­‐interest	  analysis	  of	  the	  European	  Union,	  there	  are	  reasons	  why	  interests,	  security	  issues	  and	  geography	  should	  matter	  in	  enlargement.	  Christopher	  Hill	  argues	  that	  if	  one	  accepts	  that	  the	  external	  border	  of	  the	  EU	  matters	  to	  the	  Union,	  and	  that	  enlargement	  is	  the	  major	  influence	  on	  the	  character	  of	  this	  boundary,	  one	  has	  to	  analyze	  the	  Union	  and	  its	  enlargement	  project	  in	  a	  geopolitical	  context	  (Hill,	  2002:98).	  With	  geopolitics	  I	  mean	  the	  influence	  of	  geographic	  factors	  such	  as	  demography,	  topography,	  resources,	  climate	  and	  physical	  size	  on	  politics,	  politics	  interpreted	  geographically	  (Harbo,	  2012:14),	  or	  the	  influence	  of	  “spatial	  organization	  of	  the	  world	  on	  international	  politics”	  (Hill,	  2002:98).	  	  The	  inclusion	  of	  a	  new	  member	  state,	  namely	  Bulgaria,	  means	  that	  the	  Union	  is	  adding	  to	  its	  weight	  in	  international	  politics,	  and	  physically	  adding	  a	  new	  territory	  and	  population	  to	  its	  own,	  extending	  its	  external	  borders	  to	  the	  Western	  Balkans,	  Turkey,	  and	  the	  Black	  Sea.	  In	  sum,	  the	  Union’s	  member	  states,	  if	  they	  are	  rational,	  may	  be	  expected	  to	  take	  these	  factors	  into	  consideration	  when	  they	  enlarge,	  because	  they	  seek	  to	  maximize	  their	  benefits	  and	  political	  opportunities,	  and	  reduce	  costs	  and	  risks,	  based	  on	  a	  complete	  assessment	  of	  the	  potential	  roadmap	  of	  decisions	  they	  face.	  In	  short,	  the	  consequences	  of	  their	  actions	  should	  be	  properly	  assessed	  and	  evaluated,	  before	  moving	  on	  with	  the	  policy.	  	  	  To	  understand	  which	  kind	  of	  security	  gains	  and	  security	  challenges	  member	  states	  stand	  to	  gain	  from	  enlargement,	  this	  thesis	  will	  identify	  potential	  threats	  and	  risks	  based	  on	  the	  recollection	  of	  the	  interviewees	  and	  their	  perceptions	  of	  security	  in	  enlargement,	  the	  comprehensive	  security	  concept	  and	  the	  European	  Security	  Strategy	  of	  2003.	  These	  potential	  challenges	  will	  be	  evaluated	  through	  the	  use	  of	  data	  acquired	  in	  the	  interviews.	  The	  geopolitical	  approach	  expects	  states	  to	  take	  the	  risks	  and	  opportunities	  into	  account	  when	  deciding	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  open	  their	  markets,	  borders	  and	  political	  systems	  to	  new	  geographic	  areas	  and	  the	  people	  who	  inhabit	  them.	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  As	  Christopher	  Hill	  argues,	  enlargement	  and	  its	  security	  and	  geopolitical	  nature	  has	  far	  too	  long	  been	  neglected	  among	  both	  students	  and	  scholars	  who	  study	  the	  European	  Union	  (Hill	  2002:98).	  While	  not	  a	  traditional	  superpower,	  nor	  a	  military	  one,	  the	  European	  Union	  is	  a	  dominant	  force	  in	  the	  world,	  and	  posits	  remarkable	  capabilities	  and	  tools	  to	  shape	  its	  environment.	  The	  traditional	  description	  of	  the	  EU	  as	  a	  ‘civilian	  power’	  or	  ‘normative	  power’,	  which	  forms	  a	  basic	  assumption	  in	  the	  theory	  of	  democratic	  peace,	  has	  led	  to	  the	  analytical	  approach	  to	  the	  European	  Union	  in	  foreign	  relations	  that	  often	  ignore	  interests,	  strategy	  and	  geopolitics,	  because	  it	  seems	  irrelevant	  to	  describe	  an	  actor	  with	  lacking	  military	  capabilities	  and	  little	  hard	  power	  (Hill	  2002:98).	  However,	  as	  Adrian	  Hyde-­‐Price	  points	  out	  in	  his	  realist	  critique	  of	  normative	  analyses	  of	  the	  EU,	  the	  EU	  does	  possess	  hard	  power	  and	  coercive	  capabilities,	  and	  does	  make	  use	  of	  them,	  especially	  in	  enlargement,	  with	  carrots	  and	  sticks,	  incentives	  and	  sanctions	  (Hyde-­‐Price,	  2006:226,	  227).	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  EU	  is	  a	  vehicle	  for	  member	  state	  interests	  and	  their	  pursuit	  of	  them.	  	  	  	  	  Therefore,	  based	  on	  realist	  assumptions,	  one	  can	  first	  assume	  that	  member	  states	  enlarge	  for	  net	  benefits,	  and	  that	  if	  costs	  exceed	  benefits,	  they	  would	  not	  agree	  to	  enlargement.	  Secondly,	  the	  theory	  assumes	  that	  the	  member	  states	  have	  strategic	  and	  security-­‐political	  interests	  in	  enlargement,	  and	  that	  these	  are	  critical	  to	  the	  decision	  to	  enlarge,	  because	  they	  are	  security	  benefits	  to	  all	  of	  the	  nation	  states.	  Thirdly,	  one	  can	  assume	  that	  the	  Union	  members	  through	  enlargement	  seek	  to	  reduce	  security	  risks	  and	  respond	  to	  threats	  to	  their	  own	  territory	  and	  citizens,	  as	  well	  as	  their	  own	  political	  interests,	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  comprehensive	  security	  concept	  above,	  and	  that	  the	  benefits	  of	  enlargement	  are	  primarily	  security-­‐political.	  Fourthly,	  in	  accordance	  with	  other	  rationalist	  scholarship	  in	  European	  Union	  decision-­‐making,	  the	  theory	  assumes	  that	  bargaining	  power	  matters.	  Hence,	  one	  can	  expect	  the	  largest	  states	  to	  be	  crucial	  players	  in	  enlargement,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  ones	  with	  the	  biggest	  stakes	  in	  the	  security-­‐political	  arena.	  If	  the	  largest	  states	  have	  interests	  in	  enlargement,	  we	  should	  expect	  them	  to	  be	  the	  drivers	  of	  the	  enlargement	  process.	  The	  strategic	  and	  geo-­‐political	  hypothesis	  goes	  as	  follows:	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H2:	  	   Member	  states	  seek	  to	  enhance	  their	  own	  security	  and	  pursue	  geo-­‐political	  and	  strategic	  interests	  through	  enlargement,	  because	  there	  are	  geopolitical	  and	  strategic	  benefits	  of	  enlarging	  to	  Bulgaria,	  and	  the	  extension	  of	  membership	  to	  Bulgaria	  helps	  reduce	  specific	  security	  risks	  to	  the	  EU3.	  	  	  The	  hypothesis,	  as	  realist	  theory	  in	  general,	  is	  arguably	  compatible	  with	  parts	  of	  the	  theory	  of	  democracy	  promotion	  and	  democratic	  peace	  theory	  under	  certain	  conditions.	  The	  utilitarian	  dimension	  and	  justification	  for	  democracy	  promotion	  makes	  it	  a	  powerful	  tool	  for	  serving	  security	  interests,	  if	  decision-­‐makers	  accept	  the	  empirical	  correlation	  between	  peace	  and	  democracy	  (Wolff	  and	  Wurm,	  2011:83).	  However,	  if	  the	  promotion	  of	  democracy	  is	  incompatible	  with	  other	  goals	  of	  security	  interests,	  the	  former	  must	  give	  way	  for	  the	  latter,	  as	  ethical	  or	  normative	  concerns	  are	  second-­‐order	  concerns	  for	  states	  under	  realist	  theory,	  while	  security	  is	  the	  primary	  (Wolff	  and	  Wurm,	  2011:83;	  Hyde-­‐Price,	  2008:31,	  32)	  	  It	  should	  be	  mentioned	  that	  this	  theory	  does	  not	  necessarily	  exclude	  economic	  interests	  as	  an	  important	  incentive	  for	  enlargement.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  it	  seems	  clear	  that	  security	  and	  economy	  are	  linked	  in	  the	  European	  Union’s	  approach	  to	  enlargement,	  and	  form	  two	  very	  important	  interdependent	  arms	  of	  foreign	  policy	  for	  the	  Union	  (Smith,	  2004).	  However,	  economic	  considerations	  will	  only	  be	  addressed	  in	  this	  capacity	  in	  instances	  where	  it	  is	  relevant	  for	  explaining	  the	  security	  dimension.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Hereafter	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  geopolitical	  or	  realist	  hypothesis.	  The	  inherent	  logic	  the	  hypothesis	  will	  be	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  realist	  or	  geopoliticial/strategic	  security	  logic.	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3 Methodology	  and	  research	  design	  The	  research	  design	  refers	  to	  the	  framework	  in	  which	  research	  is	  carried	  out,	  and	  is	  defined	  by	  Gerring	  as	  “the	  way	  in	  which	  empirical	  evidence	  is	  brought	  to	  bear	  on	  a	  hypothesis”	  (Gerring,	  2007:216).	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  design	  of	  a	  study	  can	  be	  described	  as	  a	  plan	  or	  strategy	  that	  encompasses	  the	  questions	  that	  will	  be	  answered,	  how	  we	  will	  answer	  them,	  and	  why	  we	  can	  provide	  answers	  to	  them.	  It	  needs	  to	  take	  into	  account	  the	  questions	  that	  will	  be	  asked,	  identify	  the	  relevant	  data	  material	  for	  the	  particular	  research	  project,	  include	  the	  appropriate	  method	  of	  analysis	  as	  well	  as	  evaluate	  the	  standards	  of	  scientific	  research	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  particular	  project.	  In	  addition,	  the	  design	  gives	  the	  study	  a	  sense	  of	  direction	  and	  time	  frame,	  and	  places	  the	  scientific	  contribution	  in	  a	  specific	  context,	  namely	  the	  area	  of	  research.	  	  	  This	  chapter	  will	  first	  explain	  the	  study’s	  approach	  to	  answering	  the	  research	  question,	  through	  discussing	  the	  usefulness	  of	  qualitative	  research	  in	  this	  study	  and	  the	  relevance	  of	  a	  case	  study.	  Under	  this	  section,	  the	  specific	  choice	  of	  case	  will	  also	  be	  discussed,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  advantages	  of	  the	  ‘congruence	  method	  case	  study’.	  It	  will	  also	  place	  the	  contribution	  in	  to	  the	  current	  research	  agenda,	  and	  discuss	  the	  usefulness	  of	  a	  qualitative	  case	  study	  of	  EU	  macro-­‐politics	  in	  the	  study	  of	  EU	  enlargement,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  theoretical	  approach.	  Secondly,	  the	  data-­‐collection	  and	  use	  of	  in-­‐depth	  interviews	  will	  be	  accounted	  for,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  sampling	  of	  interviewees,	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  interviews	  and	  the	  interview	  guide,	  and	  the	  recording	  of	  data.	  Thirdly,	  the	  method	  of	  analysis	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  terms	  of	  how	  the	  data	  material	  will	  be	  handled	  in	  order	  to	  draw	  inferences	  from	  it.	  In	  its	  conclusion,	  the	  chapter	  will	  offer	  some	  remarks	  concerning	  the	  validity	  and	  reliability	  concerns	  of	  the	  research	  design.	  	  	  
3.1 The case study In	  order	  to	  investigate	  the	  security	  dimension	  of	  EU	  enlargement	  to	  Bulgaria,	  the	  research	  design	  of	  this	  study	  will	  be	  based	  base	  on	  a	  single	  case	  study	  of	  the	  enlargement	  to	  Bulgaria.	  Case	  studies	  are	  often	  described	  as	  ‘small	  N’-­‐studies,	  because	  they	  focus	  on	  investigating	  a	  small	  number	  or	  even	  a	  single	  case	  of	  a	  phenomenon,	  in	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order	  to	  say	  something	  about	  this	  phenomenon	  in	  general.	  Gerring	  defines	  case	  studies	  as	  “an	  intensive	  study	  of	  a	  single	  unit	  or	  a	  small	  number	  of	  single	  units,	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  understanding	  a	  larger	  class	  of	  similar	  units	  (a	  population	  of	  cases)”	  (Gerring,	  2007:37).	  George	  and	  Bennett	  define	  a	  case	  as	  “an	  instance	  of	  a	  class	  of	  events”,	  meaning	  events	  that	  constitute	  phenomenon	  of	  scientific	  interest	  (George	  and	  Bennett,	  2005:17).	  This	  definition	  seems	  useful,	  as	  my	  case	  is	  the	  EU	  enlargement	  process	  towards	  Bulgaria,	  which	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  single	  case	  I	  investigate	  in	  order	  to	  enhance	  the	  understanding	  of	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  security	  in	  enlargement	  in	  general.	  Hence,	  the	  population	  of	  similar	  cases	  can	  be	  described	  as	  the	  Eastern	  enlargement	  process,	  where	  the	  enlargement	  to	  several	  other	  member	  states	  that	  can	  be	  said	  to	  be	  similar	  in	  many	  respects.	  	  	  There	  are	  several	  reasons	  why	  a	  case	  study	  is	  the	  most	  appropriate	  way	  to	  go	  about	  when	  investigating	  the	  role	  of	  security	  in	  European	  Union	  enlargement.	  First	  of	  all,	  a	  qualitative	  research	  method	  seems	  to	  yield	  the	  best	  inferences	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  researching	  enlargement,	  as	  case	  studies	  are	  generally	  stronger	  where	  statistical	  and	  quantitative	  research	  are	  weak	  (George	  and	  Bennett,	  2005:19).	  As	  European	  Union	  enlargement	  only	  concerns	  a	  very	  limited	  number	  of	  cases,	  statistical	  research	  designs	  seem	  irrelevant	  in	  investigating	  the	  research	  question.	  Thus,	  the	  single	  case	  study	  seems	  to	  be	  most	  appropriate	  in	  terms	  of	  scope,	  as	  a	  multi-­‐case	  study	  of	  several	  cases	  of	  enlargement	  would	  be	  more	  demanding	  in	  terms	  of	  workload.	  Secondly,	  the	  case	  study	  research	  design	  is	  the	  best	  equipped	  to	  investigate	  the	  research	  question	  as	  well	  as	  develop	  the	  theories	  of	  this	  study	  further,	  as	  there	  are	  several	  advantages	  for	  case	  studies	  in	  comparison	  to	  other	  research	  methods	  which	  are	  especially	  attractive	  for	  the	  study.	  	  	  George	  and	  Bennett	  identify	  four	  strong	  advantages	  for	  case	  studies	  that	  I	  will	  draw	  on	  in	  this	  study.	  These	  advantages	  make	  them	  valuable	  for	  hypotheses	  testing	  and	  theory	  development,	  something	  that	  fits	  the	  research	  design	  well.	  The	  theories	  need	  development	  and	  testing	  of	  its	  basic	  assumptions,	  and	  the	  findings	  in	  this	  thesis	  will	  contribute	  to	  this.	  First	  of	  all,	  case	  studies	  offer	  a	  high	  level	  of	  conceptual	  validity,	  meaning	  that	  they	  fare	  better	  in	  identifying	  and	  measuring	  indicators	  of	  the	  concepts	  we	  intend	  to	  measure(George	  and	  Bennett,	  2005:19).	  As	  the	  theoretical	  foundation	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involves	  diffuse	  concepts	  such	  as	  interests,	  democracy,	  security,	  threats,	  and	  risks,	  the	  indicators	  of	  these	  factors,	  which	  we	  wish	  to	  measure,	  are	  not	  suited	  for	  quantitative	  analysis,	  as	  quantitative	  analysis	  often	  utilize	  conceptual	  stretching	  for	  larger	  samples	  (George	  and	  Bennett,	  2005:19).	  	  Secondly,	  case	  studies	  are	  stronger	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  deriving	  new	  hypotheses	  and	  identifying	  new	  variables,	  especially	  through	  the	  use	  of	  interviews	  of	  experts	  (George	  and	  Bennett,	  2005:20).	  If	  during	  an	  interview,	  a	  question	  is	  posed	  about	  what	  motivation	  a	  decision-­‐maker	  had	  for	  a	  specific	  policy,	  and	  the	  answer	  from	  the	  expert	  contains	  a	  motivation	  not	  previously	  known	  to	  the	  researcher,	  this	  helps	  the	  researcher	  refine	  his	  questions	  and	  his	  hypotheses	  of	  what	  variables	  determine	  a	  special	  outcome.	  For	  this	  project,	  this	  is	  very	  useful,	  as	  we	  try	  to	  investigate	  how	  security	  affects	  the	  decision-­‐making	  and	  strategy	  of	  enlargement	  to	  Bulgaria,	  by	  applying	  theories	  that	  have	  rarely	  been	  applied	  before	  through	  a	  case	  study.	  	  	  Third,	  causal	  mechanisms	  are	  explored	  in	  detail	  in	  case	  studies,	  while	  in	  statistical	  studies	  contextual	  factors	  are	  omitted	  entirely(George	  and	  Bennett,	  2005:21).	  Cases	  such	  as	  this	  one	  often	  have	  complex	  outcomes	  with	  intervening	  variables,	  which	  the	  theoretical	  debates	  between	  constructivists	  and	  rationalists	  have	  shown.	  While	  correlations	  may	  occur,	  it	  does	  not	  necessarily	  mean	  that	  there	  exists	  a	  causal	  relationship	  between	  two	  variables	  (George	  and	  Bennett,	  2005:21).	  Say	  for	  example,	  for	  this	  case	  of	  enlargement,	  we	  may	  find	  many	  different	  security	  gains	  in	  enlargement,	  where	  the	  application	  of	  policy	  tools	  may	  yield	  gains	  in	  the	  member	  states’	  security,	  but	  that	  does	  not	  necessarily	  mean	  that	  these	  gains	  motivated	  decision-­‐makers.	  We	  wish	  to	  examine	  the	  security	  logic	  in	  enlargement	  and	  whether	  it	  mattered	  to	  decision-­‐makers	  in	  the	  EU,	  and	  the	  method	  of	  qualitative	  interviews	  and	  single-­‐case	  study	  research	  is	  well	  suited	  to	  investigate	  this	  possible	  cause,	  and	  thereby	  the	  possible	  causal	  link.	  	  	  Last,	  but	  not	  least,	  case	  studies	  are	  well	  suited	  for	  modelling	  and	  assessing	  complex	  causal	  relations,	  and	  making	  contingent	  generalizations.	  Because	  only	  one	  case	  of	  a	  phenomenon	  is	  investigated,	  making	  generalizations	  for	  the	  entire	  population	  is	  difficult.	  However,	  case	  studies	  may	  produce	  narrower,	  richer,	  and	  more	  contingent	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generalizations,	  that	  are	  fruitful	  for	  the	  development	  and	  testing	  of	  hypotheses	  (George	  and	  Bennett,	  2005:23).	  	  
3.1.1 The relevance of EU-macro politics case studies in enlargement Sedelmeier	  and	  Schimmelfennig’s	  useful	  book	  on	  the	  theories	  and	  state	  of	  research	  on	  EU	  enlargement,	  generally	  conclude	  that	  in	  order	  to	  enhance	  comparability,	  and	  move	  beyond	  the	  rationalist/constructivist	  divide,	  more	  comparative	  analysis	  is	  needed,	  and	  that	  there	  is	  limited	  use	  in	  single-­‐case	  studies	  (Schimmelfennig	  and	  Sedelmeier,	  2005:25).	  While	  this	  opinion	  is	  easy	  to	  agree	  to,	  the	  authors	  seem	  locked	  in	  comparing	  economic	  benefits	  and	  constructivist	  norms	  and	  identity	  as	  the	  two	  most	  important	  driving	  forces	  behind	  enlargement,	  while	  theories	  of	  security	  and	  geopolitics	  is	  left	  little	  room,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  Skålnes’	  contribution	  in	  the	  same	  book	  (Skålnes,	  2005:213).	  In	  order	  to	  develop	  theories	  of	  security	  further,	  a	  case	  study	  may	  indeed	  be	  the	  best	  way	  to	  go	  about.	  It	  can	  help	  us	  understand	  what	  type	  of	  security	  logics	  was	  at	  work	  in	  enlargement,	  and	  if,	  how	  and	  why	  they	  mattered.	  While	  single-­‐case	  studies	  are	  not	  equipped	  for	  generalizations	  over	  larger	  population,	  it	  may	  still	  be	  helpful	  in	  terms	  of	  developing	  theories	  and	  their	  applicability	  on	  a	  political	  process	  such	  as	  enlargement.	  	  	  If	  one	  takes	  the	  gap	  between	  how	  much	  attention	  is	  given	  to	  the	  security	  gains	  that	  are	  perceived	  to	  have	  served	  the	  Union	  since	  its	  Eastern	  enlargement,	  and	  how	  little	  empirical	  research	  on	  this	  dimension	  has	  actually	  been	  carried	  out,	  a	  case	  study	  seems	  like	  an	  adequate	  starting	  point	  in	  order	  to	  see	  if	  the	  theory	  holds	  when	  matched	  up	  to	  empirical	  evidence,	  and	  how	  the	  hypotheses	  may	  be	  refined	  to	  better	  resemble	  the	  real	  world.	  In	  such	  a	  view,	  the	  negligence	  of	  geopolitics	  and	  security	  concerns,	  and	  even	  the	  geographical	  factor	  in	  the	  European	  Union	  research	  agenda,	  as	  Christopher	  Hill	  writes,	  can	  no	  longer	  be	  sustained,	  and	  need	  to	  be	  addressed	  in	  research	  on	  EU	  politics	  (Hill,	  2002:98).	  	  	  
3.1.2 Case study design My	  single-­‐case	  study	  design	  is	  based	  on	  what	  George	  and	  Bennett	  refers	  to	  as	  the	  ‘congruence	  method’.	  As	  most	  case	  studies	  have	  more	  than	  one	  case	  to	  investigate,	  they	  often	  base	  themselves	  on	  methods	  of	  structured	  focused	  comparison,	  and	  find	  cases	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that	  are	  similar	  in	  all	  respects	  but	  one.	  However,	  as	  EU	  enlargement	  only	  contains	  a	  very	  limited	  number	  of	  cases,	  both	  if	  you	  count	  number	  of	  actual	  absorptions	  of	  new	  members	  or	  number	  of	  actual	  enlargement	  rounds,	  such	  a	  design	  seems	  more	  difficult	  to	  pursue.	  The	  study	  will	  therefore	  choose	  an	  alternative	  design	  that	  is	  “the	  within-­‐case	  method	  of	  causal	  interpretation,	  which	  may	  include	  congruence,	  process-­‐tracing,	  or	  both,	  which	  does	  not	  operate	  according	  to	  the	  structure	  or	  causal	  logic	  of	  experiments”	  (George	  and	  Bennett,	  2005:181).	  This	  is	  the	  method	  known	  as	  the	  congruence	  method,	  which	  starts	  with	  a	  theory	  and	  the	  attempts	  to	  investigate	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  theory	  is	  able	  to	  explain	  a	  certain	  outcome.	  There	  is	  an	  outcome	  of	  a	  case,	  i.e.	  the	  enlargement	  of	  the	  EU	  to	  Bulgaria,	  and	  this	  study	  bases	  itself	  on	  the	  predictions	  noted	  in	  the	  first	  chapter,	  that	  Bulgaria’s	  entry	  to	  the	  Union	  boosts	  the	  EU’s	  security	  situation.	  Hence,	  one	  expects	  a	  causal	  relationship	  between	  the	  security	  situation	  and	  perceptions	  of	  member	  states	  and	  their	  behaviour	  in	  the	  subsequent	  enlargement	  of	  the	  Union	  to	  Bulgaria.	  	  	  Congruence	  methods	  are	  based	  on	  the	  congruence	  of	  the	  hypothesized	  causes	  and	  the	  observed	  effects	  or	  outcomes.	  However,	  in	  this	  case,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  demonstrate	  how	  such	  a	  causal	  mechanism	  actually	  links	  the	  two.	  Without	  this	  causal	  mechanism,	  the	  effect	  may	  well	  be	  spurious	  and	  unrelated	  to	  the	  actual	  hypotheses.	  Hence,	  it	  is	  important	  not	  only	  to	  show	  that	  there	  is	  specific	  security	  benefits	  to	  be	  achieved	  for	  member	  states	  through	  the	  EU	  enlargement	  to	  Bulgaria,	  but	  also	  to	  provide	  evidence	  of	  if,	  why	  and	  how	  they	  mattered.	  To	  achieve	  this,	  we	  will	  utilize	  a	  method	  of	  process	  tracing,	  that	  identifies	  the	  manner	  which	  the	  independent	  variable	  (member	  state	  security	  logics)	  leads	  to	  the	  outcome	  on	  the	  dependent	  variable	  (behaviour	  in	  enlargement	  process).	  Just	  because	  the	  two	  variables	  might	  have	  congruence,	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  there	  is	  a	  causal	  link	  between	  them	  (George	  and	  Bennett,	  2005:181,	  182).	  In	  order	  to	  investigate	  this	  hypothesized	  causal	  link,	  I	  will	  collect	  and	  process	  data	  from	  informed	  professionals	  with	  knowledge	  about	  the	  process,	  and	  thereby	  trace	  the	  link	  between	  the	  two	  variables.	  	  	  
3.1.3 Choice of case As	  already	  explained,	  the	  study	  will	  focus	  on	  one	  case	  of	  European	  Union	  enlargement	  only,	  in	  stead	  of	  multiple	  cases.	  There	  are	  several	  reasons	  why	  this	  study	  will	  focus	  on	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only	  one	  case,	  and	  why	  this	  particular	  case	  is	  Bulgaria’s	  inclusion	  in	  the	  Union.	  This	  needs	  to	  be	  explained	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  the	  highest	  level	  of	  transparency	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  choice	  of	  case.	  Case	  study	  researchers	  are	  often	  criticized	  for	  biased	  case	  selection,	  as	  the	  research	  objects	  are	  not	  selected	  through	  probability	  selections	  or	  their	  level	  of	  representativeness	  (George	  and	  Bennett,	  2005:23,	  24).	  Indeed,	  case	  study	  researchers	  often	  deliberately	  choose	  cases	  that	  share	  or	  offer	  a	  particular	  outcome.	  This	  involves	  choosing	  explanatory	  richness	  over	  parsimony	  when	  explaining	  a	  case,	  in	  a	  trade-­‐off	  against	  the	  ability	  to	  generalize	  (George	  and	  Bennett,	  2005:31).	  	  This	  particular	  case	  does	  have	  certain	  attributes	  that	  are	  favourable	  when	  choosing	  a	  case	  for	  this	  particular	  project.	  Bulgaria	  is	  the	  last	  country,	  along	  with	  Romania,	  in	  the	  fifth	  enlargement.	  They	  were	  the	  last	  exactly	  because	  they	  were	  not	  deemed	  ready	  by	  the	  European	  institutions	  for	  enlargement	  in	  2004	  along	  with	  the	  eight	  other	  CEECs.	  In	  fact,	  many	  still	  see	  their	  readiness	  at	  accession	  as	  lacking,	  and	  argue	  that	  they	  were	  let	  in	  too	  early	  (Primatarova,	  2010;	  Brady,	  2009).	  This	  is	  advantageous	  for	  investigating	  this	  case,	  as	  there	  seemed	  to	  be	  a	  rationale	  for	  letting	  Bulgaria	  and	  Romania	  accede	  despite	  doubts	  of	  readiness,	  because	  it	  may	  point	  towards	  specific	  causes	  for	  the	  accession	  dates	  being	  set.	  Indeed,	  Romania	  and	  Bulgaria	  were	  given	  an	  accession	  date	  on	  beforehand,	  something	  which	  is	  very	  rare,	  because	  it	  is	  thought	  to	  hurt	  the	  EU’s	  influence	  over	  the	  reform	  process	  (Smith	  2004:193).	  	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  usual	  economic	  rationale	  of	  enlargement	  is	  significantly	  weaker	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Bulgaria	  and	  Romania	  than	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  CEECs.	  While	  all	  of	  the	  applicants	  which	  joined	  in	  2004	  were	  significantly	  poorer	  than	  the	  existing	  EU-­‐bloc,	  and	  thus	  could	  be	  expected	  to	  become	  net-­‐beneficiaries	  of	  EU	  budgets,	  Bulgaria	  and	  Romania	  were	  in	  a	  class	  of	  their	  own	  entirely.	  They	  are	  the	  two	  poorest	  countries	  in	  the	  EU,	  with	  a	  GDP	  per	  capita	  at	  their	  accession	  date	  of	  only	  33%	  of	  the	  EU	  average,	  while	  countries	  such	  as	  Poland	  had	  50%	  at	  their	  date	  of	  accession	  (BBC	  News	  Online,	  2007).	  This	  also	  involves	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  new	  consumers	  brought	  in	  to	  the	  internal	  market	  are	  more	  economically	  restricted,	  and	  less	  likely	  to	  buy	  more	  expensive	  goods	  from	  the	  richer	  already	  existing	  bloc,	  limiting	  the	  applicability	  of	  the	  pareto-­‐optimal	  market	  enlargement	  argument	  of	  Moravcsik	  and	  Vaduchova	  (Moravcsik	  and	  Vachudova,	  2003:49,	  50,	  51).	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  Thus,	  out	  of	  all	  the	  CEECs,	  Bulgaria	  is	  probably	  the	  least	  profitable	  country	  to	  enlarge	  to	  out	  off	  all	  the	  CEECs,	  economically	  speaking.	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  economics	  can	  be	  ruled	  out	  all	  together	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Bulgaria,	  but	  it	  does	  imply	  that	  logically,	  the	  economic	  argument	  is	  weaker	  in	  this	  particular	  case	  than	  in	  other	  cases	  of	  Eastern	  enlargement.	  Consequently,	  one	  might	  expect	  theories	  of	  security	  to	  fare	  better	  in	  explaining	  the	  behaviour	  of	  the	  EU	  in	  this	  case	  than	  in	  others.	  This	  should	  hold	  if	  one	  looks	  at	  Bulgaria’s	  history	  and	  geography	  as	  well.	  As	  a	  very	  loyal	  regime	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  during	  the	  Cold	  War,	  with	  a	  mixed	  history	  of	  democracy	  after	  the	  fall	  of	  communist	  dictatorship,	  it	  makes	  a	  good	  case	  for	  exploring	  the	  security	  dimension	  (Katsikas,	  2012:5).	  	  	  Geographically,	  enlargement	  to	  Bulgaria	  (and	  Romania)	  opens	  a	  new	  coast	  line	  for	  the	  Union	  to	  the	  Black	  Sea,	  and	  borders	  the	  Western	  Balkans	  with	  its	  fresh	  wounds	  of	  conflict	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  gradual	  accession	  process.	  Hence,	  it	  is	  also	  a	  useful	  case	  for	  exploring	  the	  geopolitical	  aspect.	  These	  factors	  all	  contribute	  to	  the	  choosing	  of	  Bulgaria	  as	  a	  ‘crucial	  case	  test’,	  as	  George	  and	  Bennett	  explain.	  Crucial	  case	  tests	  can	  be	  classified	  as	  ‘most	  likely’	  or	  ‘least	  likely’	  cases,	  both	  with	  different	  approaches	  to	  how	  to	  draw	  inferences	  from	  choices	  of	  case	  (George	  and	  Bennett,	  2005:24).	  The	  case	  of	  Bulgaria	  is	  a	  most	  likely	  test,	  because	  out	  of	  the	  population	  of	  CEECs,	  this	  case	  is	  the	  one	  where	  it	  most	  likely	  that	  there	  is	  a	  security	  dimension,	  if	  there	  is	  one,	  and	  the	  least	  likely	  to	  hold	  a	  strong	  economic	  rationale	  among	  the	  CEECs.	  	  	  As	  well	  as	  being	  a	  well-­‐suited	  case	  for	  investigating	  security’s	  role	  in	  enlargement,	  it	  is	  also	  a	  case	  I	  am	  personally	  very	  familiar	  with.	  I	  have	  lived	  and	  worked	  with	  political	  affairs	  there	  for	  nine	  months,	  and	  find	  myself	  to	  be	  in	  a	  unique	  position	  in	  regards	  to	  contacts	  and	  sources	  when	  investigating	  this	  question.	  This	  proved	  very	  helpful	  in	  getting	  interviewees	  for	  this	  thesis,	  as	  explained	  in	  chapter	  3.2.2.	  My	  knowledge	  of	  the	  country	  and	  its	  enlargement	  process,	  as	  well	  as	  my	  experience	  from	  working	  with	  political	  affairs	  in	  the	  country,	  may	  also	  provide	  methodological	  challenges.	  As	  George	  and	  Bennett	  writes,	  one	  of	  the	  main	  obstacles	  of	  case	  studies	  is	  biased	  case	  selection.	  However,	  preliminary	  knowledge	  of	  a	  case	  may	  give	  stronger	  research	  designs,	  as	  some	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knowledge	  of	  the	  case	  in	  question	  allows	  one	  to	  more	  easily	  apply	  tough	  tests	  of	  the	  case	  (George	  and	  Bennett,	  2005:23,	  24).	  	  
3.2 Data collection The	  research	  into	  enlargement	  has,	  by	  and	  large,	  been	  studies	  into	  discourse;	  argumentative	  studies	  as	  well	  as	  document	  analysis.	  Not	  many	  of	  them	  have	  been	  based	  on	  actual	  gathering	  and	  analysis	  of	  new	  data,	  mostly	  because	  quantitative	  studies	  in	  this	  area	  are	  insignificant.	  Of	  course,	  macro-­‐economic	  data	  has	  been	  gathered	  and	  analysed,	  by	  for	  example	  Heather	  Grabbe	  (2001)	  and	  Christina	  Schneider	  (2009),	  but	  very	  few	  have	  conducted	  data	  collection	  and	  analysis	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  member	  state	  political	  interests.	  Karen	  Smith	  is	  a	  useful	  exception,	  with	  her	  book	  The	  Making	  of	  EU	  Foreign	  
Policy	  –	  The	  case	  of	  Eastern	  Europe,	  where	  the	  EU’s	  political	  interests	  in,	  and	  subsequent	  policy	  towards,	  Eastern	  Europe	  is	  thoroughly	  analysed	  in	  different	  theoretical	  perspectives	  (Smith,	  2004).	  	  
	  An	  important	  distinction	  to	  be	  made	  is	  that	  while	  case	  studies	  and	  other	  types	  of	  research	  that	  are	  purely	  argumentative,	  logical,	  or	  based	  on	  secondary	  sources,	  it	  should	  remain	  a	  vital	  condition	  for	  research	  to	  investigate	  the	  sources	  as	  close	  to	  the	  decision-­‐maker	  as	  one	  can	  get.	  This	  means	  that	  while	  it	  is	  useful	  in	  this	  case	  to	  analyse	  the	  context	  or	  environment	  in	  which	  interests	  are	  formed	  and	  shaped,	  actually	  testing	  the	  hypotheses	  and	  assumptions	  in	  discussion	  with	  actual	  decision-­‐makers	  is	  of	  great	  importance.	  It	  allows	  us	  to	  fully	  understand	  not	  only	  what	  and	  how,	  but	  also	  why,	  without	  making	  a	  leap	  of	  faith	  from	  theory	  and	  context	  to	  inferences.	  	  	  	  Hence,	  it	  was	  important	  for	  me	  to	  collect	  data	  about	  the	  theme	  in	  question,	  exactly	  because	  it	  had	  not	  been	  done	  a	  lot	  of	  times	  before.	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  secondary	  sources	  will	  play	  no	  part	  in	  this	  research.	  Quite	  the	  contrary,	  the	  collected	  data	  will	  be	  analysed	  in	  the	  context	  of	  existing	  literature,	  compared	  and	  discussed	  in	  light	  of	  it,	  as	  it	  would	  seem	  wasteful	  not	  to	  take	  existing	  research	  into	  account.	  It	  also	  strengthens	  internal	  validity	  through	  the	  recommended	  method	  of	  triangulation,	  where	  several	  methods	  are	  combined	  in	  order	  to	  be	  able	  to	  draw	  stronger	  inferences	  (Gerring,	  2007:17).	  While	  the	  collection	  of	  data	  was	  both	  time	  consuming	  and	  was	  expensive	  in	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terms	  of	  finances,	  it	  was	  an	  important	  priority	  for	  this	  research	  project	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  field	  in	  a	  way	  that	  was	  somewhat	  new.	  Therefore,	  a	  qualitative	  interview	  design	  was	  chosen	  to	  collect	  the	  data.	  	  	  
3.2.1 The research interview As	  the	  research	  design	  is	  chosen	  for	  purpose	  of	  investigating,	  generating	  and	  even	  refining	  security-­‐political	  hypotheses	  of	  European	  Union	  enlargement,	  the	  most	  important	  reason	  for	  choosing	  the	  qualitative	  interview	  as	  the	  method	  of	  data	  collection	  is	  the	  flexibility	  of	  the	  method,	  compared	  to	  other	  structured	  interview	  types,	  and	  the	  insight	  it	  gives	  into	  the	  interviewees’	  experiences	  and	  thoughts	  on	  a	  given	  subject	  (Bryman,	  2004:319).	  I	  seek	  to	  investigate	  how	  and	  why	  the	  security	  dimension	  affects	  enlargement	  policies	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Bulgaria,	  even	  though	  there	  are	  clear	  theoretical	  approaches	  that	  project	  answers	  to	  the	  research	  question.	  The	  data	  collection	  design	  reflects	  this	  approach,	  as	  even	  though	  I	  have	  a	  clear	  idea	  about	  what	  the	  security	  dimension	  might	  look	  like,	  or	  how	  it	  influences	  the	  EU’s	  approach,	  it	  is	  inherently	  important	  that	  the	  sources	  are	  not	  biased.	  Yet,	  there	  are	  also	  clear	  hypotheses	  to	  investigate,	  and	  see	  if	  there	  is	  empirical	  support	  for	  them.	  A	  clear	  advantage	  of	  the	  qualitative	  interview	  is	  exactly	  this:	  one	  wants	  the	  interviewees	  to	  give	  us	  their	  side	  of	  the	  story,	  their	  impressions	  and	  thoughts,	  which	  can	  be	  utilized	  in	  research,	  but	  still	  have	  a	  clear	  direction	  and	  questions	  that	  can	  verify	  and/or	  falsify	  hypotheses.	  These	  two	  different	  considerations	  are	  reflected	  in	  the	  two	  types	  of	  qualitative	  research	  interviews,	  namely	  un-­‐structured	  and	  semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  (Bryman,	  2004:320,	  321).	  I	  chose	  to	  combine	  the	  two,	  as	  most	  qualitative	  researchers	  do	  when	  conducting	  interviews.	  	  	  	  While	  semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  give	  the	  advantage	  of	  asking	  the	  same	  questions	  to	  all	  interviewees,	  and	  a	  an	  opportunity	  of	  comparison,	  un-­‐structured	  interviews	  let	  the	  interviewees	  talk	  as	  much	  as	  possible,	  with	  only	  a	  short	  list	  of	  topics	  to	  be	  covered	  in	  the	  interview.	  In	  the	  interviews,	  it	  was	  important	  to	  have	  a	  clear	  structure,	  that	  all	  questions	  and	  topics	  were	  covered,	  yet	  it	  was	  vital	  not	  to	  lead	  the	  interviewee,	  and	  let	  their	  experiences	  and	  thoughts	  be	  the	  primary	  focus	  of	  the	  conversation.	  To	  make	  sure	  this	  was	  the	  case,	  and	  ensure	  maximum	  flexibility,	  the	  interviews	  were	  designed	  to	  
	  	   33	  
incorporate	  both	  these	  considerations,	  and	  the	  resulting	  interviews	  can	  be	  said	  to	  lie	  somewhere	  in	  between	  the	  two	  ideal	  models,	  namely	  the	  unstructured	  and	  the	  semi-­‐structured	  interview.	  	  	  
3.2.2 Interviewees In	  the	  case	  that	  this	  study	  seeks	  to	  investigate,	  the	  number	  of	  informed	  interviewees	  is	  small,	  and	  not	  necessarily	  easily	  accessible.	  A	  central	  question	  to	  be	  answered	  was	  ’who	  can	  provide	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  thinking	  behind	  the	  decision-­‐making	  of	  the	  EU?’,	  and	  ’who	  should	  one	  speak	  to	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  the	  fullest	  possible	  understanding	  of	  the	  member	  states’	  interests	  in	  enlargement’?	  An	  optimal	  situation	  would	  be	  to	  sample	  high-­‐level	  officials	  with	  knowledge	  about	  the	  enlargement	  process	  from	  both	  EU	  institutions,	  like	  the	  European	  Commission,	  as	  well	  as	  from	  each	  of	  the	  member	  states.	  However,	  as	  this	  would	  be	  both	  costly,	  time-­‐consuming	  as	  well	  as	  being	  difficult	  to	  coordinate,	  the	  limitations	  in	  time,	  costs	  and	  width	  of	  the	  project	  suggested	  that	  other	  ways	  of	  finding	  interviewees	  were	  necessary.	  	  	  This	  is	  a	  common	  problem	  to	  encounter	  in	  qualitative	  interviewing,	  where	  potential	  informants	  are	  difficult	  to	  find	  and	  not	  easily	  accessible,	  and	  qualitative	  researchers	  are	  therefore	  often	  forced	  to	  find	  alternative	  and	  convenient	  solutions	  in	  order	  to	  sample	  interviewees	  (Bryman,	  2004:333).	  Convenience	  sampling	  is	  much	  less	  transparent	  and	  more	  subjective	  than	  traditional	  probability	  sampling,	  and	  is	  also	  deemed	  necessary	  in	  qualitative	  studies	  where	  the	  population	  of	  informants	  is	  unknown	  (Bryman,	  2004:333).	  Therefore,	  in	  order	  to	  carry	  out	  the	  interview,	  I	  initially	  tried	  to	  reach	  out	  to	  Commission	  officials	  for	  interviews,	  as	  the	  Commission	  is	  responsible	  for	  negotiations	  and	  contact	  with	  member	  states	  during	  the	  process,	  and	  therefore	  can	  be	  expected	  to	  be	  fully	  informed	  on	  member	  state	  preferences	  and	  concerns.	  However,	  none	  of	  the	  officials	  I	  contacted	  was	  available	  or	  even	  replied	  to	  my	  requests.	  This	  hurts	  the	  representativeness	  of	  the	  interview	  sample,	  because	  the	  closer	  one	  gets	  to	  the	  decision-­‐makers	  in	  a	  study	  of	  EU-­‐enlargement,	  the	  more	  robust	  the	  findings	  might	  be.	  	  	  Sampling	  was	  therefore	  conducted	  also	  on	  the	  premise	  of	  convenience,	  where	  my	  own	  personal	  contacts	  and	  knowledge	  of	  Bulgaria,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  sampling	  method	  that	  is	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commonly	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘snowballing’,	  led	  me	  to	  the	  informants	  that	  ended	  up	  being	  interviewed.	  ‘Snowballing’	  refers	  to	  the	  method	  where	  one	  informant	  who	  is	  interviewed	  for	  the	  thesis	  uses	  his/her	  own	  contact	  network	  and	  recommends	  other	  informants	  that	  he/she	  believes	  may	  be	  useful	  for	  the	  researcher’s	  project	  (Bryman,	  2004:334).	  In	  my	  situation,	  my	  own	  contact	  network	  in	  Sofia,	  Budapest	  and	  Oslo	  provided	  me	  with	  almost	  all	  of	  the	  interviewees	  in	  this	  particular	  manner.	  While	  the	  selection	  of	  these	  was	  arguably	  subjective	  and	  less	  transparent,	  the	  snowballing	  process	  is	  still	  a	  very	  fruitful	  way	  to	  attract	  informed	  sources,	  and	  allowed	  me	  access	  to	  informants	  that	  I	  would	  not	  have	  had	  access	  to	  if	  I	  had	  not	  had	  contacts	  and	  correspondence	  with	  initial	  informants.	  It	  must	  still	  be	  underlined	  that	  the	  snowballing	  process	  was	  not	  alone	  in	  determining	  the	  key	  informants	  	  who	  were	  selected,	  and	  that	  several	  other	  criteria	  were	  important	  in	  the	  sampling	  process.	  	  	  A	  few	  considerations	  were	  vital	  in	  choosing	  relevant	  informants	  other	  than	  their	  availability.	  In	  particular,	  their	  level	  of	  knowledge	  about	  the	  issue	  and	  if	  they	  were	  in	  the	  position	  to	  contribute	  was	  an	  evident	  requirement.	  In	  addition,	  their	  background	  was	  crucial,	  and	  I	  intentionally	  sought	  to	  differentiate	  the	  type	  of	  interviewees	  to	  be	  included,	  because	  in	  the	  analytical	  method	  of	  comparison	  and	  categorization,	  the	  analysis	  would	  be	  more	  fruitful	  and	  the	  inferences	  more	  genuine	  and	  robust,	  if	  the	  selected	  interviewees	  had	  different	  nationalities	  and	  professional	  experience.	  If	  they	  all	  presented	  similar	  thoughts	  on	  one	  topic	  of	  interest,	  the	  inference	  is	  more	  robust,	  as	  it	  is	  not	  merely	  one	  type	  of	  decision-­‐maker,	  diplomat	  or	  analyst,	  or	  even	  a	  single	  nationality	  that	  is	  interviewed,	  but	  a	  broad	  spectrum	  of	  people,	  with	  different	  types	  of	  experience	  to	  draw	  from.	  	  	  After	  careful	  consideration,	  I	  included	  three	  Bulgarian,	  two	  Norwegian	  and	  one	  British	  citizen	  in	  the	  final	  sample,	  which	  is	  listed	  in	  table	  3.2.2.	  Three	  of	  them	  were	  career	  diplomats,	  two	  had	  been	  high-­‐level	  politicians,	  and	  one	  was	  a	  journalist	  and	  political	  analyst	  with	  experience	  from	  political	  analysis	  and	  journalistic	  reporting	  in	  Bulgaria	  and	  the	  Balkans.	  Out	  of	  the	  sample,	  three	  came	  from	  the	  decision-­‐making	  side	  in	  Bulgaria,	  where	  they	  handled	  the	  enlargement	  process	  from	  their	  own	  separate	  function	  in	  the	  government	  and	  the	  civil	  service.	  In	  addition,	  one	  of	  the	  Norwegian	  diplomats	  had	  been	  posted	  in	  Sofia,	  and	  had	  long	  experience	  there	  dealing	  daily	  with	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the	  matters	  at	  hand.	  The	  other	  had	  been	  the	  Norwegian	  ambassador	  to	  the	  EU.	  Hence,	  while	  I	  unfortunately	  could	  not	  include	  anyone	  from	  the	  Commission	  or	  from	  the	  EU-­‐side	  in	  the	  sample,	  it	  was	  vital	  that	  I	  sampled	  someone	  who	  could	  provide	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  process,	  with	  hands-­‐on	  information	  on	  the	  member	  states	  concerns	  and	  interests	  in	  enlargement,	  which	  could	  provide	  a	  macro-­‐perspective	  on	  the	  process.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  sampling	  both	  from	  the	  observer-­‐side	  and	  from	  the	  applicant-­‐side	  provided	  an	  overview	  with	  the	  entire	  process	  and	  their	  own	  experience	  with	  it	  that	  might	  even	  have	  been	  missing	  in	  sampling	  from	  specific	  member	  state	  officials,	  who	  could	  even	  have	  provided	  one-­‐dimensional	  views	  on	  enlargement.	  	  	  
Anonymity,	  recording	  and	  data	  protection	  Another	  initial	  concern,	  which	  may	  be	  a	  primary	  reason	  as	  to	  why	  interviewing	  and	  empirical	  research	  into	  the	  security	  dimension	  of	  enlargement	  has	  been	  scarce,	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  security	  is	  more	  of	  a	  politically	  sensitive	  issue	  than	  for	  example	  economics	  or	  culture,	  and	  is	  therefore	  often	  refrained	  from	  in	  diplomatic	  discourse.	  For	  politicians	  or	  diplomats	  in	  office	  to	  be	  outspoken	  about	  issues	  such	  as	  Russian	  influence	  in	  Bulgaria	  in	  the	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  strategic	  environment,	  or	  even	  their	  own	  personal	  experiences	  through	  official	  capacity,	  could	  prove	  difficult	  for	  them	  as	  professionals.	  Therefore,	  it	  was	  important	  to	  give	  the	  interviewees	  an	  opportunity	  to	  decline	  the	  use	  of	  recording	  devices	  during	  the	  interview.	  As	  Bryman	  writes,	  interviewees	  might	  often	  feel	  restrained	  by	  the	  use	  of	  recording	  devices	  (Bryman,	  2004:330,	  331).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  was	  important	  for	  me	  to	  be	  able	  to	  capture	  everything	  that	  was	  being	  said	  correctly,	  and	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  pay	  attention	  and	  prepare	  questions	  and	  follow	  up	  on	  comments	  as	  I	  went	  along,	  so	  I	  therefore	  chose	  to	  use	  a	  recorder,	  and	  this	  strengthens	  the	  reliability	  of	  the	  study.	  I	  also	  offered	  the	  use	  of	  total	  anonymity	  and	  partial	  anonymity.	  All	  of	  the	  interviewees	  declined	  the	  use	  of	  total	  anonymity,	  and	  half	  of	  them	  chose	  to	  have	  the	  possibility	  to	  remain	  anonymous	  when	  speaking	  of	  specific	  issues.	  All	  of	  them	  consented	  to	  the	  use	  of	  a	  recording	  device.	  The	  wishes	  and	  full	  consent	  of	  participation	  were	  given	  through	  a	  signed	  agreement	  between	  the	  interviewees	  and	  myself.	  	  When	  conducting	  research	  interviews,	  one	  often	  faces	  a	  situation	  where	  sensitive	  data	  concerning	  the	  people	  interviewed	  needs	  to	  be	  handled.	  Other	  than	  the	  actual	  information	  provided	  by	  the	  interviewees,	  the	  researcher	  often	  handles	  sensitive	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Table	  3.2.2	  	  List	  of	  interviewees	  	  
Name	   Current	  occupation	   Former	  occupation/experience	  of	  
relevance	  
Time	  and	  place	  of	  
the	  interview	  H.E.	  Dr.	  Solomon	  Passy	   Director	  of	  the	  Atlantic	  Club	  of	  Bulgaria,	  a	  Euro-­‐Atlantic	  integration	  NGO,	  and	  politician	  	  
Former	  Minister	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  of	  the	  Republic	  of	  Bulgaria,	  Chairman-­‐in-­‐office	  of	  the	  OSCE	  (2004),	  Chairman	  of	  the	  UN	  Security	  Council	  (2002/2003),	  former	  Member	  of	  the	  Bulgarian	  Parliament	  for	  the	  party	  National	  Movement	  for	  Stability	  and	  Progress	  
 
22.1.2013,	  at	  the	  offices	  of	  The	  Atlantic	  Club	  of	  Bulgaria,	  Sofia,	  Bulgaria	  
Mrs.	  Pavlina	  Popova	   Attorney	  at	  law	  and	  Director	  of	  Exlege	  Consulting	  Ltd.	  	   Former	  Foreign	  affairs	  adviser	  to	  the	  President	  of	  the	  Republic	  of	  Bulgaria	  H.E.	  Dr.	  Georgi	  Parvanov,	  former	  Deputy	  Director	  of	  the	  think	  tank	  European	  Policy	  Forum.	  Former	  politician	  for	  the	  Bulgarian	  Socialist	  Party	  
 
22.1.2013,	  at	  the	  Rila	  Hotel,	  Sofia,	  Bulgaria.	  	  
H.E.	  Mrs.	  Tove	  Skarstein	   Ambassador	  of	  the	  Kingdom	  of	  Norway	  to	  Hungary	  and	  the	  Republic	  of	  Slovenia	  
Former	  Ambassador	  of	  the	  Kingdom	  of	  Norway	  to	  the	  Republic	  of	  Bulgaria,	  former	  Ambassador-­‐at-­‐large	  for	  Trafficking	  issues/Senior	  adviser	  in	  the	  Norwegian	  Foreign	  Ministry,	  former	  Counsellor	  at	  the	  Norwegian	  Delegation	  to	  NATO,	  various	  diplomatic	  postings	  and	  experience	  in	  the	  Norwegian	  Foreign	  Ministry	  
 
27.2.1013,	  at	  the	  Norwegian	  Ambassador’s	  residence	  in	  Budapest,	  Hungary	  	  
H.E.	  Mrs.	  Biserka	  Benisheva	   Ambassador	  of	  the	  Republic	  of	  Bulgaria	  to	  Hungary	   Former	  Director	  General	  for	  European	  Affairs	  in	  the	  Bulgarian	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  former	  Ambassador	  of	  the	  Republic	  of	  Bulgaria	  to	  the	  Republic	  of	  Ireland,	  former	  Deputy	  Head	  of	  Mission/Permanent	  Representative	  with	  the	  rank	  of	  Ambassador	  in	  the	  Bulgarian	  Delegation	  to	  the	  European	  Union,	  as	  well	  as	  member	  of	  the	  negotiating	  team	  in	  the	  EU	  negotiations	  of	  Bulgaria	  
 
26.2.2013,	  at	  the	  Bulgarian	  Embassy	  in	  Budapest,	  Hungary	  	  
Mr.	  Andrew	  MacDowall	   Journalist	  and	  political	  analyst	  based	  in	  Belgrade,	  covering	  the	  Balkans	  and	  Eastern	  Europe,	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  South-­‐East	  Asia	  
 
Former	  Analyst	  with	  Oxford	  Business	  Group,	  a	  political	  and	  market	  analysis	  company,	  previously	  based	  in	  Istanbul,	  Bucharest	  and	  Sofia	  
20.1.2013,	  at	  Mr.	  MacDowall’s	  private	  residence,	  Belgrade,	  Serbia	  	  
H.E.	  Mr.	  Einar	  Bull	   Retiree	   Former	  Ambassador/Permanent	  Representative	  of	  the	  Kingdom	  of	  Norway	  to	  the	  European	  Union,	  former	  Ambassador	  of	  the	  Kingdom	  Norway	  to	  the	  Republic	  of	  Italy,	  former	  Deputy	  Secretary	  General	  of	  the	  Norwegian	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  various	  diplomatic	  postings	  and	  experience	  in	  the	  Norwegian	  Foreign	  Ministry	  
 
4.4.2013	  at	  Mr.	  Bull’s	  private	  residence,	  Oslo,	  Norway.	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information	  that	  can	  potentially	  identify	  interviewees	  that	  wish	  to	  remain	  anonymous,	  or	  even	  contact	  details	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  information	  that	  should	  be	  handled	  with	  care.	  In	  order	  to	  carry	  out	  the	  projects	  in	  line	  with	  Norwegian	  rules	  and	  legislation,	  as	  well	  as	  ethical	  guidelines	  in	  research,	  I	  submitted	  a	  research	  project	  notification	  specifying	  what	  questions	  I	  would	  ask,	  and	  what	  kind	  of	  information	  would	  be	  collected,	  to	  the	  Data	  Protection	  Official	  for	  Research,	  the	  institution	  responsible	  for	  data	  protection	  for	  more	  than	  140	  academic	  institutions	  in	  Norway.	  The	  project	  is	  subject	  to	  notification	  in	  Norway	  through	  the	  Personal	  Data	  Act,	  as	  it	  handles	  personal	  information	  such	  as	  names,	  contact	  details	  and	  occupation.	  On	  February	  1st	  2012	  the	  Data	  Protection	  Official	  declared	  that	  the	  project’s	  reported	  handling	  of	  personal	  information	  was	  deemed	  satisfactory	  according	  to	  the	  Personal	  Data	  Act’s	  §	  7	  –	  27,	  concluding	  that	  the	  project	  could	  be	  carried	  out	  (Personvernombudet	  for	  forskning,	  2013).	  	  
3.2.3 The interview guide As	  previously	  noted,	  the	  research	  interviews	  that	  were	  carried	  out	  in	  this	  study	  can	  be	  described	  as	  being	  something	  in	  between	  the	  forms	  of	  semi-­‐structured	  and	  unstructured	  interviews,	  two	  ideal	  types	  of	  qualitative	  research	  interviews.	  Almost	  all	  forms	  of	  qualitative	  interviewing	  will	  lie	  somewhere	  in	  between	  these	  two	  ideal	  types	  (Bryman,	  2004:321).	  The	  interview	  guide	  is	  less	  specific	  than	  the	  interview	  schedule,	  because	  the	  latter	  is	  more	  structured,	  and	  it	  offers	  rigour	  instead	  of	  flexibility	  (Bryman,	  2004:324).	  	  The	  interview	  guide	  was	  devised	  to	  carry	  out	  the	  interview	  in	  three	  parts.	  The	  first	  part	  was	  reserved	  for	  me	  to	  brief	  the	  interviewees	  on	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  thesis,	  without	  revealing	  theory	  or	  hypotheses,	  on	  their	  options	  in	  terms	  of	  anonymity	  and	  the	  use	  of	  recorder,	  and	  on	  their	  rights	  and	  terms	  of	  consent.	  This	  included	  an	  agreement	  in	  which	  all	  direct	  quotes	  would	  require	  written	  verification	  by	  the	  interviewees	  before	  use.	  After	  the	  formalities	  had	  been	  sorted	  out,	  the	  data	  collection	  could	  begin.	  	  	  The	  second	  part	  of	  the	  interview	  largely	  consisted	  of	  questions	  which	  had	  been	  sent	  in	  advance	  to	  the	  interviewees,	  and	  which	  they	  were	  prepared	  to	  answer.	  These	  questions	  were	  open-­‐ended,	  meaning	  that	  I	  had	  designed	  the	  questions	  so	  that	  the	  interviewees	  were	  to	  reply	  as	  freely	  and	  honestly	  as	  possible,	  without	  any	  prior	  knowledge	  of	  the	  study’s	  theories	  or	  hypotheses.	  The	  idea	  in	  this	  part	  is	  that	  the	  interviewees	  speak	  as	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much	  as	  possible,	  so	  that	  their	  impressions	  and	  opinions	  about	  the	  topic	  are	  extracted	  without	  guiding	  the	  informants.	  The	  questions	  had	  follow-­‐up	  questions	  attached	  for	  my	  own	  personal	  use,	  which	  were	  employed	  if	  the	  interviewee	  touched	  upon	  the	  study’s	  hypotheses	  and	  special	  areas	  of	  interests.	  The	  third	  part	  consisted	  of	  very	  direct	  hypotheses-­‐testing	  questions	  that	  were	  meant	  to	  be	  a	  safety	  mechanism,	  in	  order	  for	  all	  the	  areas	  to	  be	  covered	  through	  the	  interview.	  If	  some	  of	  the	  topics	  outlined	  in	  the	  hypotheses	  were	  not	  mentioned	  in	  the	  second	  part	  by	  the	  interviewees	  themselves,	  I	  asked	  a	  question	  to	  make	  sure	  the	  area	  was	  covered.	  In	  some	  interviews	  very	  few	  follow-­‐up	  questions	  were	  needed,	  while	  in	  one,	  almost	  all	  were	  asked	  in	  order	  to	  capture	  all	  the	  dimensions	  of	  the	  hypotheses.	  By	  dividing	  the	  interview	  guide	  into	  three	  sections,	  I	  tried	  to	  make	  use	  of	  the	  comparability	  of	  the	  more	  structured	  interview,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  having	  the	  flexibility	  of	  not	  guiding	  the	  interviewees	  too	  much	  in	  their	  replies.	  	  	  
3.2.4 Conducting the interviews All	  the	  interviews	  were	  recorded	  with	  two	  different	  recording	  devices,	  reducing	  the	  risk	  of	  technical	  failure	  to	  a	  minimum.	  In	  addition,	  I	  took	  notes	  during	  the	  course	  of	  the	  interviews,	  so	  as	  to	  more	  easily	  manoeuvre	  in	  the	  material	  later,	  as	  well	  as	  capture	  other	  dimensions	  of	  the	  interview	  situation,	  such	  as	  follow-­‐up	  questions	  and	  themes	  that	  had	  not	  been	  included	  in	  the	  guide	  on	  beforehand.	  I	  also	  took	  notes	  after	  the	  interview	  about	  how	  I	  felt	  the	  interview	  went,	  which	  themes	  and	  topics	  had	  been	  discussed,	  if	  new	  themes	  were	  brought	  up,	  and	  what	  the	  interviewees	  thought	  was	  most	  important	  in	  terms	  of	  hypotheses	  testing.	  This	  helped	  me	  tremendously	  when	  analysing	  the	  material	  at	  a	  later	  stage,	  and	  is	  highly	  recommended	  by	  Bryman	  in	  order	  to	  enhance	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  interview	  (2004:325).	  The	  interviews	  all	  took	  between	  45	  minutes	  and	  2	  hours	  to	  conduct,	  with	  one	  interview	  that	  was	  significantly	  shorter	  than	  the	  rest,	  and	  one	  that	  was	  significantly	  longer.	  The	  average	  time	  was	  little	  over	  than	  an	  hour.	  	  	  Almost	  all	  of	  the	  interviewees	  had	  asked	  to	  be	  briefed	  on	  the	  themes	  of	  the	  interview	  for	  preparation	  in	  advance,	  or	  to	  see	  the	  research	  questions	  on	  before	  the	  interview.	  As	  I	  did	  not	  wish	  to	  lead	  them	  in	  their	  answers,	  and	  wanted	  their	  honest	  and	  unbiased	  opinion	  on	  the	  topics	  at	  hand,	  this	  represented	  a	  dilemma	  for	  me.	  After	  all,	  it	  was	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important	  for	  me	  to	  withdraw	  the	  most	  fruitful	  answers	  from	  the	  interviews,	  and	  for	  this	  to	  be	  achieved,	  the	  interviewees	  needed	  some	  level	  of	  preparedness	  in	  terms	  of	  topics.	  As	  a	  compromise,	  after	  being	  advised	  by	  my	  supervisor,	  I	  sent	  the	  guide	  on	  beforehand,	  but	  only	  the	  part	  that	  had	  open-­‐ended	  questions,	  without	  the	  prepared	  follow-­‐up	  questions.	  This	  meant	  that	  I	  did	  not	  send	  the	  hypotheses-­‐testing	  questions,	  which	  would	  indicate	  the	  direction	  of	  my	  research	  project	  that	  could	  possibly	  bias	  the	  interviewees	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  study’s	  theoretical	  explanations.	  As	  almost	  all	  of	  the	  interviewees	  asked	  for	  the	  interview	  guide,	  I	  decided	  that	  all	  the	  interviewees	  were	  given	  the	  selected	  questions	  before	  the	  interview,	  so	  they	  would	  all	  have	  the	  same	  level	  of	  preparedness	  and	  their	  answers	  could	  more	  easily	  be	  compared.	  	  	  
3.2.5 Managing the data collection All	  interviews	  were	  recorded,	  and	  the	  informants	  agreed	  to	  this	  in	  the	  consent	  form.	  For	  those	  who	  chose	  partial	  anonymity,	  they	  verbally	  notified	  me	  of	  this	  during	  the	  course	  of	  the	  interview	  when	  touching	  upon	  specific	  topics	  where	  they	  wished	  not	  to	  be	  quoted.	  This	  only	  happened	  once,	  and	  the	  interviewee	  was	  anonymously	  quoted.	  I	  then	  made	  a	  note	  of	  this	  in	  my	  written	  notes.	  The	  digital	  audio	  files	  were	  stored	  in	  two	  copies,	  one	  on	  my	  computer	  and	  one	  on	  an	  external	  hard	  drive.	  	  	  The	  recordings	  all	  added	  up	  to	  over	  seven	  hours	  of	  audio	  data,	  which	  represented	  a	  huge	  challenge	  in	  terms	  of	  transcription.	  As	  many	  researchers	  recommend,	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  transcribe	  the	  interviews	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  the	  correctness	  of	  the	  data,	  before	  analysing	  it.	  However,	  as	  Bryman	  points	  out,	  this	  is	  very	  time-­‐consuming,	  and	  is	  much	  more	  difficult	  than	  just	  writing	  down	  what	  is	  being	  said.	  One	  should	  at	  least	  plan	  5-­‐6	  hours	  of	  transcription	  time	  for	  each	  hour	  of	  recorded	  data,	  without	  counting	  the	  hours	  of	  organizing	  and	  analysing	  the	  data	  (Kvale,	  1997;	  Bryman,	  2004:331).	  	  	  This	  is	  a	  common	  problem	  for	  researchers	  who	  make	  use	  of	  the	  qualitative	  research	  interview.	  Therefore,	  after	  consultation	  with	  my	  supervisor	  and	  the	  research	  literature,	  I	  decided	  to	  only	  partially	  transcribe	  some	  of	  the	  interviews	  I	  had,	  and	  to	  employ	  a	  method	  for	  categorizing	  the	  answers	  in	  relation	  to	  my	  hypotheses	  without	  transcribing	  all	  the	  full	  answers.	  The	  very	  nature	  of	  qualitative	  interviews,	  as	  in	  my	  interviews,	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opens	  up	  for	  rich	  detailed	  answers,	  as	  interviewees	  are	  encouraged	  to	  talk	  as	  much	  as	  possible.	  This	  means	  that	  many	  of	  the	  answers	  you	  record	  are	  not	  necessarily	  useful	  for	  your	  project,	  as	  was	  the	  case	  with	  my	  interviews.	  Enlargement	  is	  a	  very	  technical	  and	  all-­‐consuming	  process	  for	  member	  states,	  and	  therefore	  the	  informants	  often	  had	  answers	  that	  were	  less	  relevant,	  or	  even	  irrelevant	  to	  my	  research	  question.	  Bryman	  suggests	  that	  transcription	  can	  selectively	  be	  carried	  out,	  meaning	  that	  transcription	  is	  only	  carried	  out	  on	  the	  relevant	  parts	  of	  the	  interview	  (Bryman,	  2004:332).	  This	  hurts	  the	  reliability	  of	  the	  project,	  but	  considering	  the	  time-­‐consuming	  activity	  to	  transcribe	  information	  that	  was	  not	  going	  to	  be	  utilized	  anyway,	  I	  chose	  to	  only	  transcribe	  the	  useful	  parts.	  	  	  
3.3 Method of analysis After	  the	  successful	  transcription	  and	  recording	  of	  data	  material,	  the	  replies	  given	  by	  the	  interviewees	  was	  categorized	  by	  specific	  topic,	  hypotheses	  and	  statement.	  For	  example,	  a	  reply	  given	  by	  an	  interviewee	  about	  the	  Kosovo	  war’s	  implications	  for	  EU	  enlargement	  was	  shortened	  to	  capture	  the	  essence	  of	  the	  statement,	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  person	  thinks	  this	  mattered	  or	  not	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  research	  question,	  and	  the	  statements	  relevance	  to	  support,	  reject	  or	  refine	  the	  hypotheses.	  After	  the	  categorization	  was	  done,	  the	  data	  material	  will	  be	  presented	  and	  discussed	  in	  chapters	  4	  and	  5	  of	  this	  thesis.	  The	  existing	  research	  literature	  on	  the	  topic	  will	  be	  widely	  utilized	  to	  back	  up	  or	  refute	  claims,	  and	  strengthen	  our	  insight	  into	  the	  topics	  at	  hand.	  Findings	  will	  deal	  with	  the	  decision	  and	  process	  separately,	  and	  address	  the	  topics	  projected	  by	  the	  hypotheses,	  and	  what	  the	  interviewees	  thought	  important	  themselves.	  	  	  
3.4 Validity, reliability and generalization  
Reliability	  is	  a	  difficult	  criterion	  to	  meet	  for	  qualitative	  researchers,	  as	  it	  refers	  to	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  a	  study	  can	  be	  replicated	  and	  correct	  measurement	  (Bryman,	  2004:273).	  Replication	  is	  difficult	  for	  two	  reasons,	  as	  I	  must	  take	  into	  account	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  individuals	  and	  their	  participation	  in	  this	  study,	  which	  affects	  the	  way	  I	  store	  and	  use	  my	  data,	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  freezing	  a	  social	  setting	  is	  difficult	  (Bryman,	  2004:273).	  In	  order	  to	  ensure	  reliability,	  I	  recorded	  and	  transcribed	  the	  interviews,	  so	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measurement	  would	  be	  as	  accurate	  as	  possible.	  I	  also	  validated	  the	  quotes	  with	  the	  respondents	  before	  use,	  to	  ensure	  that	  I	  understood	  them	  correctly,	  made	  the	  list	  of	  respondents	  public	  in	  full	  understanding	  with	  the	  interviewees,	  and	  will	  quote	  them	  with	  name	  when	  possible.	  To	  be	  certain	  that	  distortion	  of	  quotes	  did	  not	  take	  place	  in	  translation,	  as	  two	  interviews	  were	  carried	  out	  in	  Norwegian,	  these	  two	  interviewees	  validated	  their	  own	  quotes	  after	  the	  translation	  to	  English	  had	  taken	  place.	  	  	  
Validity	  incorporates	  both	  internal	  and	  external	  validity.	  Internal	  validity	  is	  a	  strength	  of	  the	  case	  study,	  as	  it	  offers	  insight	  to	  causal	  mechanisms	  (Gerring,	  2007:43).	  These	  strengths	  have	  been	  addressed	  earlier	  in	  the	  chapter.	  In	  order	  to	  strengthen	  the	  internal	  validity	  of	  the	  study	  further,	  a	  method	  of	  triangulation	  was	  employed,	  meaning	  that	  alternative	  sources,	  such	  as	  EU	  documents,	  news	  articles	  and	  statements	  from	  decision-­‐maker	  was	  also	  drawn	  upon,	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  existing	  literature	  and	  interviews.	  By	  triangulating	  the	  sources	  and	  data,	  as	  well	  as	  validating	  the	  quotes	  with	  the	  interviewees	  before	  utilizing	  them,	  one	  can	  draw	  inferences	  of	  a	  higher	  quality	  (Bryman,	  2004:274,	  275).	  A	  challenge	  for	  the	  case	  study	  is	  external	  validity,	  as	  the	  findings	  of	  a	  single	  case	  study	  may	  not	  be	  generalized	  over	  a	  population	  of	  similar	  cases	  (Gerring,	  2007:43).	  This	  study	  choose	  explanatory	  richness	  and	  the	  ability	  of	  drawing	  strong	  causal	  mechanisms	  over	  the	  ability	  to	  generalize	  in	  a	  trade-­‐off	  (Gerring,	  2007:43).	  When	  interpreting	  the	  findings	  of	  this	  study,	  it	  must	  be	  kept	  in	  mind	  that	  the	  findings	  do	  not	  necessarily	  mean	  that	  the	  conclusions	  are	  valid	  for	  other	  CEECs,	  but	  that	  findings	  in	  this	  case	  may	  provide	  grounds	  for	  fruitful	  testing	  of	  hypotheses	  and	  theories	  at	  a	  later	  stage.	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4 The	  security	  rationale	  behind	  the	  decision	  to	  enlarge	  to	  Bulgaria	  This	  chapter	  will	  analyse	  the	  data	  material	  and	  relevant	  literature	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  hypotheses	  concerning	  democratic	  peace	  and	  the	  geopolitical	  approach	  in	  the	  EU’s	  decision	  to	  enlarge	  to	  Bulgaria.	  First,	  the	  policy	  tools	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  will	  be	  accounted	  for,	  especially	  membership	  conditionality	  and	  the	  Union’s	  power	  of	  attraction.	  Special	  emphasis	  will	  be	  placed	  on	  how	  the	  Union	  utilizes	  enlargement	  as	  a	  policy	  tool	  in	  order	  to	  bring	  about	  certain	  outcomes	  that	  the	  Union	  desires.	  After	  the	  explanation	  of	  conditionality,	  the	  hypotheses	  will	  be	  tested	  through	  application	  to	  the	  data	  material,	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  decision	  to	  enlarge	  to	  Bulgaria.	  This	  will	  be	  done	  in	  parts,	  by	  looking	  at	  the	  evidence	  in	  each	  theme	  that	  came	  up	  during	  the	  interviews	  regarding	  the	  decision	  to	  enlarge.	  	  	  The	  chapter	  will	  conclude	  with	  some	  preliminary	  findings	  and	  their	  implications	  for	  theory,	  namely	  that	  the	  utility	  dimension	  of	  democratic	  peace	  theory	  and	  a	  rationalist	  geopolitical	  approach	  both	  find	  support	  in	  the	  evidence.	  However,	  as	  will	  be	  argued	  in	  the	  concluding	  chapter,	  democratic	  peace	  theory	  projects	  a	  one-­‐dimensional	  aspect	  of	  security,	  and	  does	  not	  fully	  take	  into	  account	  the	  security	  issues	  in	  which	  the	  EU	  had	  interests,	  other	  than	  conflict	  prevention.	  The	  rationalist	  geopolitical	  approach	  finds	  much	  broader	  support	  in	  the	  evidence,	  as	  security	  issues	  are	  multi-­‐dimensional	  in	  EU	  enlargement.	  In	  addition,	  the	  case	  for	  a	  normative	  dimension	  of	  democratic	  peace	  theory	  only	  finds	  marginal	  support	  in	  the	  empirical	  evidence,	  and	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  the	  concluding	  sub-­‐chapter.	  	  	  
4.1 Enlargement as a policy tool – membership 
conditionality and power of attraction Since	  the	  last	  stages	  of	  the	  2004	  enlargement,	  commonly	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘the	  Big	  Bang	  Enlargement’,	  the	  enlargement	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  has	  been	  frequently	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  Union’s	  ‘most	  powerful	  foreign	  policy	  tool’	  by	  both	  academics	  and	  EU	  officials	  (Sedelmeier,	  2010:421).	  Sedelmeier	  writes	  that	  through	  the	  last	  two	  rounds	  of	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enlargement,	  enlargement	  can	  broadly	  be	  described	  as	  a	  policy	  tool	  in	  two	  ways:	  Firstly,	  because	  it	  “anchors	  the	  fragile	  democracies	  that	  have	  emerged	  from	  authoritarian	  rule	  within	  a	  prosperous	  and	  democratic	  international	  community”	  (Sedelmeier,	  2010:421).	  Secondly,	  it	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  policy	  tool	  because	  the	  EU	  makes	  strategic	  use	  of	  the	  incentive	  of	  membership	  “in	  order	  to	  induce	  or	  preserve	  specific	  policy	  changes	  in	  non-­‐member	  states”	  (Sedelmeier,	  2010:421).	  	  	  The	  latter	  function	  is	  what	  is	  generally	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘accession	  conditionality’.	  Conditionality	  ties	  the	  reward	  of	  membership	  to	  conditions	  that	  acceding	  states	  have	  to	  meet	  before	  accession	  can	  take	  place.	  This	  can	  “change	  the	  incentive	  structure	  for	  candidate	  countries	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  trigger	  domestic	  changes	  that	  the	  member	  states	  desire”	  (Sedelmeier,	  2010:421).	  This	  power	  over	  the	  acceding	  countries	  comes	  from	  the	  EU’s	  ‘power	  of	  attraction’,	  meaning	  that	  as	  long	  as	  the	  EU	  is	  an	  attractive	  organization	  for	  potential	  member	  states	  to	  join,	  they	  will	  be	  able	  to	  exert	  considerable	  influence	  over	  the	  acceding	  countries	  (Smith,	  2011:300).	  This	  implies	  coercive	  power	  that	  may	  still	  be	  described	  as	  civilian,	  meaning	  that	  the	  EU	  member	  states	  may	  punish	  unwanted	  behaviour	  by	  the	  use	  of	  ‘sticks’,	  e.g.	  postponement	  of	  membership	  or	  other	  coercive	  options,	  or	  rewarding	  wanted	  behaviour	  ‘carrots’,	  such	  as	  granting	  membership	  negotiations,	  closing	  negotiation	  chapters,	  or	  awarding	  membership	  to	  countries	  that	  reform	  and	  meet	  the	  accession	  criteria.	  	  	  Decisions	  of	  enlargement	  was	  an	  evolving	  process	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  CEECs,	  as	  the	  former	  communist	  countries	  wanted	  clear	  perspectives	  on	  membership	  after	  the	  fall	  of	  communism	  in	  the	  early	  1990’s.	  Their	  wish	  for	  membership	  talks	  and	  eventual	  accession	  became	  impossible	  to	  resist	  for	  EU	  member	  states,	  which	  in	  1993	  at	  the	  Copenhagen	  Council	  opened	  for	  membership	  for	  those	  countries	  who	  fully	  met	  certain	  criteria,	  namely	  the	  Copenhagen	  criteria	  (Smith,	  2011:304;	  Tatham,	  2009:87).	  The	  Copenhagen	  criteria	  were	  the	  basic	  accession	  criteria	  for	  new	  member	  states,	  including	  Bulgaria.	  It	  states	  that	  member	  countries	  must	  achieve:	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• Stability	  of	  institutions	  guaranteeing	  democracy,	  the	  rule	  of	  law,	  human	  rights,	  and	  respect	  and	  protection	  of	  minorities4;	  
• A	  functioning	  market	  economy	  with	  the	  capacity	  to	  cope	  with	  competitive	  pressures	  and	  market	  forces	  in	  the	  EU5;	  
• The	  ability	  to	  take	  on	  the	  obligations	  of	  EU	  membership	  including	  adherence	  to	  the	  aims	  of	  economic	  and	  political	  union	  (the	  acquis	  communautaire)6	  (Smith,	  2011:306)	  	  Through	  the	  application	  of	  these	  criteria	  as	  a	  prerequisite	  for	  membership,	  the	  Union	  wields	  the	  power	  to	  induce	  wanted	  behaviour	  and	  reforms	  from	  the	  acceding	  states	  that	  wish	  to	  join.	  As	  the	  chapter	  will	  show,	  it	  has	  been	  wielded	  in	  order	  to	  boost	  the	  security	  of	  the	  Union	  through	  the	  democratization	  of	  Bulgaria,	  and	  including	  Bulgaria	  in	  the	  security	  community,	  but	  also	  for	  other	  security-­‐related	  purposes.	  	  
4.2 Extending the ‘Security Community’ To	  which	  degree	  was	  the	  conflict	  prevention	  a	  basic	  reason	  for	  the	  enlargement	  to	  Bulgaria?	  If	  any	  security	  rationale	  of	  the	  EU	  enlargement	  finds	  support	  in	  the	  existing	  research	  literature,	  it	  is	  this	  one,	  as	  the	  EU	  is,	  by	  and	  large,	  considered	  a	  security	  community	  (Schwok,	  1999:154,	  155;	  O'Brennan,	  2006a:159,	  160;	  Buzan	  and	  Wæver,	  2003:375;	  Kavalski,	  2008:43).	  Stefanova	  writes:	  	  	   It	  is	  a	  widely	  held	  proposition	  that	  the	  history	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  represents	  a	  security	  community,	  which	  continuously	  extends	  the	  zone	  of	  peace	  in	  Europe.	  The	  eastward	  enlargement	  is	  currently	  the	  principal	  mode	  institutionalizing	  this	  process.	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (Stefanova,	  2005:53)	  	  The	  rationale	  that	  the	  geographical	  area	  of	  the	  EU	  represents	  a	  zone	  of	  peace	  and	  stability	  was	  reflected	  by	  almost	  all	  of	  the	  interviewees,	  in	  some	  form	  or	  another,	  and	  Bulgaria’s	  membership	  bid	  was	  viewed	  as	  an	  extension	  of	  this	  security	  community	  to	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Hereafter	  referred	  to	  as	  ’the	  political	  criteria’	  5	  Hereafter	  referred	  to	  as	  ’the	  economic	  criteria’	  6	  Hereafter	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  ’acquis	  communautaire’	  or	  simply	  ‘the	  acquis’.	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new	  territory.	  First	  of	  all,	  Bulgaria’s	  membership	  in	  the	  EU	  was	  viewed	  as	  a	  deterrent	  for	  future	  conflict,	  and	  a	  continuation	  of	  the	  EU’s	  peace	  project	  through	  the	  democratization	  of	  Bulgaria,	  as	  well	  as	  of	  the	  process	  of	  establishing	  complex,	  and	  primarily	  economic,	  interdependence	  between	  the	  current	  and	  new	  EU	  member	  countries	  and	  Bulgaria.	  This	  was	  carried	  out	  primarily	  to	  avoid	  future	  conflict	  and	  instability.	  Ambassador	  Benisheva,	  a	  former	  negotiator	  for	  Bulgaria	  in	  their	  EU	  membership	  negotiations	  and	  Bulgaria’s	  former	  ambassador	  to	  the	  EU,	  reflected	  that	  enlargement	  was	  a	  tool	  for	  member	  states	  to	  advance	  the	  values	  of	  the	  Union	  and	  liberal	  democracy	  through	  conditionality	  and	  the	  Copenhagen	  criteria.	  She	  said,	  when	  asked	  why	  enlargement	  to	  Bulgaria	  took	  place:	  	  	   	  (….)	  this	  was	  the	  reunification	  of	  Europe.	  This	  is	  the	  reason	  why	  first	  the	  Europe	  agreements	  were	  signed	  with	  these	  countries	  (…)	  and	  then	  in	  1993	  the	  Copenhagen	  Council	  defined	  the	  accession	  criteria.	  The	  accession	  criteria,	  if	  you	  look	  at	  the	  details,	  you	  have	  the	  whole	  process	  in	  four	  paragraphs.	  The	  political	  criteria,	  and	  that	  is	  actually	  a	  translation	  of	  the	  values	  from	  the	  treaty,	  is	  actually	  the	  political	  criteria	  for	  the	  applicants.	  And	  that’s	  very	  clear.	  Stability	  of	  institutions,	  democracy,	  rule	  of	  law,	  respect	  for	  HR,	  protection	  of	  minorities.	  And	  these	  are	  the	  values	  on	  which	  the	  European	  Union	  is	  founded.	  And	  that	  was	  the	  motivation	  for	  reform,	  in	  all	  the	  CEECs	  (….)	  You	  extend	  the	  area	  of	  values	  and	  democracy	  to	  project	  stability	  and	  security,	  and	  not	  leave	  it	  (Bulgaria)	  in	  a	  grey	  area.	  	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (Benisheva,	  2013)	  	  The	  logic	  of	  consequentiality	  and	  the	  expectations	  of	  an	  empirical	  relationship	  between	  the	  effects	  of	  membership,	  the	  internalization	  of	  liberal	  democratic	  values	  through	  the	  accession	  criteria	  on	  one	  hand	  and	  the	  utility	  of	  peace,	  security	  and	  stability	  on	  the	  other,	  is	  evident	  in	  this	  statement.	  Ambassador	  Benisheva	  also	  underlined	  the	  very	  reason	  for	  enlarging	  to	  the	  CEECs,	  including	  Bulgaria,	  that	  is	  was	  to	  extend	  the	  zone	  of	  security,	  peace	  and	  stability	  through	  the	  application	  of	  the	  criteria	  and	  the	  integration	  of	  Bulgaria	  into	  the	  European	  Community	  (Benisheva,	  2013).	  This	  was	  the	  very	  rationale	  behind	  the	  decision	  to	  enlarge,	  according	  to	  the	  ambassador,	  and	  had	  less	  to	  do	  with	  economics	  or	  duty,	  it	  was	  security	  dimension	  that	  prevailed	  in	  deciding	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  enlarge:	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(…)	  it	  was	  a	  political	  project.	  It	  was	  not	  just	  another	  enlargement.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  economic	  considerations	  did	  not	  prevail	  at	  that	  time.	  Of	  course	  the	  extension	  of	  the	  market	  and	  the	  addition	  of	  new	  consumers,	  but	  it	  was	  not	  the	  prevailing	  argument.	  The	  prevailing	  argument	  was	  the	  political	  one.	  It	  was	  the	  reunification,	  and	  the	  extension	  of	  the	  area	  of	  security	  and	  stability	  to	  another	  region.	  And	  that	  counts	  for	  all	  the	  applicants,	  not	  just	  Bulgaria.	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (Benisheva,	  2013)	  	  Thus,	  the	  extension	  of	  norms	  and	  values	  of	  liberal	  democracy	  was	  an	  important	  incentive,	  because	  it	  secures	  stability	  and	  peace,	  according	  to	  Ambassador	  Benisheva.	  This	  notion	  was	  reflected	  in	  many	  of	  the	  interviews,	  though	  not	  all.	  Former	  Norwegian	  ambassador	  to	  the	  EU,	  Ambassador	  Bull,	  when	  asked	  if	  the	  integration,	  democratization	  and	  establishment	  of	  many-­‐sided	  relations	  between	  states	  was	  an	  incentive,	  emphasized	  that	  economic	  interdependence	  was	  the	  very	  foundation	  of	  the	  EU,	  as	  it	  is	  a	  peace	  project:	  	   The	  whole	  starting	  point	  of	  the	  EU	  was	  ‘never	  again	  war	  in	  Europe’,	  getting	  Germany	  and	  France	  into	  a	  structured	  cooperation,	  getting	  the	  economic	  cooperation	  working,	  and	  creating	  economic	  interdependence.	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (Bull,	  2013)	  	  Such	  a	  view	  corresponds	  well	  with	  Erik	  Holm’s	  statement	  “it	  cannot	  be	  repeated	  often	  enough:	  the	  raison	  d’être	  of	  the	  European	  project	  is	  to	  maintain	  stability,	  peace	  and	  prosperity	  in	  Europe”	  (Stefanova,	  2005:51).	  The	  idea	  of	  extending	  the	  peace	  project	  to	  new	  member	  countries	  was	  indeed	  found	  in	  the	  recollection	  of	  the	  other	  interviewees	  (Bull,	  2013;	  Skarstein,	  2013;	  Benisheva,	  2013;	  Popova,	  2013;	  MacDowall,	  2013).	  The	  expected	  outcome	  of	  peace	  was	  not	  only	  argued	  to	  be	  a	  direct	  result	  of	  the	  spread	  of	  values,	  but	  also	  as	  a	  direct	  consequence	  of	  many-­‐sided	  and	  primarily	  economic	  relations	  with	  the	  countries:	  	  	  	   There	  was	  a	  security-­‐political	  aspect;	  the	  more	  these	  countries	  (Bulgaria	  and	  Romania)	  are	  integrated	  in	  the	  EU,	  and	  a	  part	  of	  the	  EU’s	  integration	  project,	  the	  more	  security	  and	  stability	  it	  will	  give	  to	  an	  area	  that	  has	  always	  been	  unstable….	  So	  enlargement	  is	  a	  part	  of	  the	  EU’s	  peace	  thinking,	  the	  peace	  project.	  You	  achieve	  peace	  and	  stability	  through	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economic	  integration.	  (…)The	  economic	  agenda	  supports	  the	  peace	  project	  (…)	  The	  overall	  idea	  for	  the	  EU	  is	  that	  one	  cannot	  achieve	  peace,	  stability	  and	  security	  in	  Europe	  with	  a	  divided	  Europe.	  Neither	  geographically	  nor	  economically	  speaking.	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (Skarstein,	  2013)	  	  In	  fact,	  former	  Norwegian	  ambassador	  to	  Bulgaria	  Tove	  Skarstein’s	  statement	  exemplifies	  an	  important	  trend	  in	  the	  interviews:	  Even	  stronger	  than	  the	  logic	  of	  spreading	  norms	  and	  values,	  was	  the	  economic	  dimension	  and	  the	  establishment	  of	  direct	  many-­‐sided	  relations	  between	  the	  countries.	  Bulgaria	  as	  such	  is	  not	  a	  special	  case	  out	  of	  the	  group	  of	  countries	  in	  the	  Eastern	  enlargement,	  when	  talking	  about	  spreading	  liberal	  democratic	  values	  and	  norms,	  and	  establishing	  many-­‐sided	  relations	  between	  the	  countries.	  In	  fact,	  almost	  all	  the	  informants	  spoke	  very	  generally	  about	  the	  Eastern	  enlargement	  as	  extending	  the	  security	  community,	  without	  special	  emphasis	  on	  Bulgaria	  per	  say.	  However,	  Bulgaria	  stood	  out	  as	  a	  necessary	  enlargement,	  primarily	  because	  of	  its	  geographical	  location	  and	  proximity	  to	  unstable	  countries	  during	  the	  course	  of	  the	  decision-­‐making	  procedures.	  	  	  
4.2.1 Regional stability Bulgaria’s	  location	  in	  Europe	  is,	  as	  will	  be	  argued	  in	  chapter	  4.3,	  is	  generally	  seen	  as	  an	  advantage	  for	  the	  Union	  members	  by	  many	  of	  the	  interviewees,	  and	  is	  said	  to	  be	  of	  strategic	  value.	  However,	  while	  Bulgaria	  borders	  Romania	  in	  the	  north,	  Greece	  in	  the	  south,	  and	  Turkey	  in	  the	  southeast,	  it	  borders	  Macedonia	  and	  Serbia	  in	  the	  west.	  Through	  its	  proximity	  to	  the	  Western	  Balkans,	  Bulgaria	  was	  affected	  by	  the	  break-­‐up	  of	  Yugoslavia,	  and	  the	  recurring	  crises	  of	  ethnic	  violence	  in	  the	  region	  through	  the	  last	  decade	  of	  the	  20th	  century	  (Pantev,	  2008:102).	  The	  Western	  Balkans	  demonstrated	  the	  volatile	  nature	  of	  relations	  between	  the	  countries	  of	  the	  region,	  and	  confirmed	  the	  view	  of	  the	  regions	  as	  one	  of	  historical	  grievances	  on	  territorial	  borders,	  the	  treatment	  of	  ethnic	  minorities,	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  governance	  capacity	  to	  handle	  such	  issues	  (O'Brennan,	  2006b:126,	  127).	  How	  did	  Bulgaria’s	  geographical	  proximity	  to	  the	  conflict-­‐ridden	  region	  of	  the	  Western	  Balkans	  play	  in	  to	  the	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  going	  on,	  on	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  enlarge	  to	  Bulgaria?	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First,	  it	  can	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  EU	  had	  little	  incentive	  for	  enlarging	  to	  a	  troubled	  neighbourhood.	  Potential	  spill-­‐over	  effects	  of	  conflicts	  may	  affect	  the	  Union’s	  member	  countries	  if	  they	  are	  close	  to	  the	  conflict,	  making	  the	  EU	  cautious	  of	  enlargement	  (O'Brennan,	  2006b:127).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  there	  	  	   seems	  to	  be	  a	  consensus	  in	  the	  political	  and	  academic	  world:	  the	  pan-­‐European	  effects	  of	  regional	  conflicts	  and	  instability	  mean	  that	  the	  medium-­‐	  and	  long-­‐term	  stabilization	  of	  Southeastern	  Europe	  is	  in	  Europe’s	  foreign,	  stability	  and	  security	  policy	  interests.	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (Varwick,	  2000:157)	  	  	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  Union	  both	  feared	  enlargement	  to	  unstable	  regions,	  but	  also	  had	  incentives	  to	  stabilize	  the	  very	  same	  regions,	  because	  it	  counters	  the	  very	  threats	  it	  fears.	  The	  logic	  of	  caution	  was	  only	  reflected	  by	  one	  of	  the	  interviewees	  when	  discussing	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  Western	  Balkan	  conflicts.	  Former	  Foreign	  Minister	  of	  Bulgaria,	  Dr.	  Solomon	  Passy,	  explained,	  when	  asked	  how	  the	  Western	  Balkans	  affected	  Bulgaria’s	  membership	  bid	  in	  the	  Union:	  “I’m	  sure	  that	  that	  if	  you’re	  coming	  from	  a	  troublesome	  region,	  this	  makes	  your	  task	  more	  difficult,	  not	  easier.”	  (Passy,	  2013).	  	  The	  other	  interviewees,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  all	  expressed	  the	  need	  for	  projecting	  stability	  into	  this	  troublesome	  region,	  and	  emphasized	  that	  Bulgaria’s	  enlargement	  to	  the	  EU	  would	  do	  just	  that.	  Referring	  to	  the	  outbreak	  of	  ethnic	  violence	  in	  the	  early	  1990s,	  and	  the	  wars	  after	  the	  independence	  of	  Bosnia	  Herzegovina,	  Slovenia,	  Croatia,	  and	  Macedonia	  through	  1992-­‐93,	  Ambassador	  Benisheva	  said	  that	  the	  EU	  had	  a	  direct	  interest	  in	  stabilizing	  the	  region,	  and	  that	  this	  strengthened	  the	  rationale	  for	  enlargement	  which	  came	  up	  at	  the	  Copenhagen	  Council	  in	  1993:	  	  	   (…)	  the	  political	  instability	  of	  the	  region	  was	  a	  major	  concern	  at	  the	  time	  (…)	  after	  the	  crisis	  in	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia.	  And	  when	  you	  have	  this	  enclave	  of	  instability,	  then	  you	  surround	  it	  with	  stability	  to	  handle	  the	  issue.	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (Benisheva,	  2013)	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Ambassador	  Bull	  expressed	  much	  of	  the	  same	  logic,	  saying	  that:	  	   (…)	  the	  Balkans	  was	  an	  unstable	  corner	  of	  Europe,	  and	  projecting	  stability	  into	  this	  region	  has	  been	  a	  primary	  concern	  for	  a	  long	  time.	  When	  the	  developments	  unfolded	  in	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia,	  it	  was	  quite	  difficult	  to	  handle,	  and	  the	  EU	  did	  not	  handle	  it	  particularly	  well.	  Then	  you	  got	  that	  experience.	  Therefore	  the	  political	  incentives	  came	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  incorporating	  these	  countries	  into	  a	  system,	  and	  it	  was	  claimed	  on	  both	  sides	  that	  this	  was	  the	  only	  way	  of	  stabilizing	  the	  political	  conditions,	  by	  giving	  them	  this	  carrot	  and	  letting	  them	  join	  the	  Community.	  Or	  you	  risked	  having	  new	  Yugoslavian	  conditions	  on	  your	  hands,	  and	  a	  lot	  of	  this	  was	  behind	  the	  decision.	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (Bull,	  2013)	  	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  rationale	  behind	  enlargement	  to	  Bulgaria	  in	  terms	  of	  projecting	  stability	  is	  the	  same	  as	  the	  utilitarian	  expectations	  of	  democratic	  peace,	  and	  the	  regional	  stability	  was	  significant	  in	  the	  original	  decision	  to	  enlarge.	  Mrs.	  Popova,	  former	  long-­‐time	  Foreign	  affairs	  adviser	  to	  the	  former	  President	  of	  Bulgaria,	  H.E.	  Mr.	  Georgi	  Parvanov,	  put	  special	  emphasis	  on	  this,	  and	  said	  that	  the	  regional	  stability	  of	  the	  Balkans	  may	  even	  have	  been	  the	  primary	  reason	  for	  including	  Bulgaria	  and	  Romania	  in	  the	  enlargement	  rounds	  in	  the	  first	  place:	  	   Security	  incentives	  were	  very	  important.	  Having	  in	  mind	  the	  process	  in	  former	  Yugoslavia.	  The	  beginning	  of	  the	  1990s	  a	  very	  complicated	  process	  started	  there.	  This	  was	  a	  very	  strong	  reason	  to	  enlarge	  to	  Bulgaria.	  To	  ensure	  regional	  stability,	  because	  we	  [Bulgaria]	  are	  very	  close	  to	  Europe.	  The	  attitude	  towards	  the	  Central	  European	  countries	  have	  always	  been	  more	  positive,	  than	  towards	  Bulgaria	  and	  Romania.	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (Popova,	  2013)	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Ambassador	  Bull’s	  and	  Ambassador	  Benisheva’s,	  as	  well	  as	  Mrs.	  Popova’s	  comments	  do	  not	  only	  imply	  that	  enlargement	  to	  the	  countries	  in	  close	  proximity	  to	  the	  unstable	  regions	  would	  increase	  security,	  and	  that	  this	  was	  an	  important	  incentive,	  but	  they	  also	  impliy	  that	  the	  events	  demanded	  response	  in	  a	  timely	  fashion.	  Ambassador	  Skarstein	  reflected	  the	  same,	  and	  told	  me	  that	  the	  experience	  from	  the	  Bosnia	  crisis	  was	  that	  conflicts	  easily	  spill	  over	  to	  neighbouring	  countries,	  and	  that	  the	  influx	  of	  refugees	  from	  Bosnia	  to	  the	  West	  was	  an	  example	  of	  this	  (Skarstein,	  2013).	  This	  was	  also	  the	  case	  for	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the	  Kosovo	  crisis,	  which	  strengthened	  the	  need	  for	  including	  Bulgaria	  and	  Romania	  in	  the	  fold,	  as	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  Indeed,	  the	  Kosovo	  crises	  and	  geopolitical	  aspects	  did	  not	  only	  reinforce	  the	  rationale	  for	  including	  Bulgaria	  in	  the	  Union,	  but	  significantly	  altered	  the	  Union’s	  approach	  to	  enlargement	  to	  Bulgaria.	  	  	  	  
4.3 Bulgaria’s geographical location and its significance for 
membership As	  noted	  in	  previous	  chapters,	  the	  geopolitical	  analysis	  of	  the	  EU	  and	  its	  enlargement	  policies	  has	  been	  lacking	  (Hill,	  2002:98).	  The	  study	  of	  geographical	  factors	  and	  their	  impact	  on	  the	  EU	  have	  seen	  little	  attention	  given	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  EU	  effectively	  incorporate	  large	  territories,	  shores,	  infrastructure	  and	  resources	  into	  their	  own	  political	  union	  and	  internal	  market.	  So	  to	  which	  degree	  did	  the	  geographical	  location	  of	  Bulgaria	  matter	  for	  Union	  members	  in	  deciding	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  enlarge?	  Dr.	  Passy	  was	  undoubtedly	  sure	  during	  our	  interview	  when	  asked	  what	  Bulgaria	  brought	  to	  the	  table	  that	  made	  enlargement	  attractive	  for	  the	  Union.	  He	  replied:	  “We	  brought	  the	  Black	  Sea	  …	  My	  impulsive	  answer	  is	  the	  Black	  Sea”	  (Passy,	  2013).	  Geopolitical	  factors	  seemed	  to	  matter	  quite	  a	  lot	  for	  the	  union	  in	  enlargement,	  and	  the	  favourable	  geographical	  location	  of	  Bulgaria	  was	  no	  different,	  as	  the	  interviewees	  made	  quite	  clear	  that	  this	  was	  undoubtedly	  important	  for	  Bulgaria’s	  accession	  to	  the	  Union.	  Ambassador	  Skarstein	  told	  me	  that	  	  “…	  a	  very	  important	  aspect	  was	  the	  opportunity	  for	  the	  EU	  and	  NATO	  to	  get	  to	  the	  Black	  Sea.	  Bulgaria	  and	  Romania	  has	  a	  strategic	  location,	  politically	  and	  economically	  speaking.”	  (Skarstein,	  2013).	  	  	  Why	  was	  this	  important?	  Two	  different	  types	  of	  reasoning	  came	  through	  during	  the	  interviews,	  as	  both	  economic	  perspectives	  and	  security	  perspectives	  mattered,	  according	  to	  the	  interviewees.	  The	  economic	  argument	  concerns	  the	  ability	  to	  access	  markets	  and	  develop	  infrastructure	  in	  order	  to	  efficiently	  boost	  trade	  relations	  and	  secure	  supplies	  of	  imports.	  Ambassador	  Benisheva	  said	  that:	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The	  decision	  to	  enlarge	  to	  Bulgaria	  and	  Romania	  was	  not	  only	  the	  region,	  but	  also	  the	  geographical	  location,	  because	  the	  Union	  was	  extending	  its	  borders	  to	  the	  Black	  Sea,	  and	  then	  access	  to	  the	  next	  geographical	  regions,	  of	  Asia	  and	  the	  Caucasus.	  So	  it	  was	  not	  only	  regional,	  but	  also	  geopolitical	  reasoning	  behind	  the	  decision.	  Which	  is	  also	  economically	  motivated.	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (Benisheva,	  2013)	  	  Extending	  the	  territory	  of	  the	  Union	  to	  Bulgaria,	  and	  also	  Romania,	  was,	  according	  to	  some	  of	  the	  informants,	  a	  goal	  in	  itself,	  in	  economic	  and	  strategic	  terms.	  The	  former	  Foreign	  Minister	  of	  Bulgaria,	  Dr.	  Passy,	  told	  me	  that	  keeping	  Bulgaria	  out	  of	  enlargement	  would	  not	  make	  sense	  geographically	  speaking,	  as	  that	  would	  leave	  a	  gap	  between	  the	  newly	  acceded	  EU	  state	  of	  Hungary	  and	  EU	  member	  Greece:	  	  	  	   If	  you	  look	  at	  the	  map,	  it	  was	  absolutely	  illogical	  to	  keep	  Greece	  isolated	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  Europe.	  If	  Greece	  is	  Europe,	  and	  Hungary	  is	  Europe...	  There	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  keep	  a	  blank	  spot	  between	  Hungary	  and	  Greece.	  	   (Passy,	  2013)	  	  The	  logic	  behind	  this,	  he	  explained,	  much	  as	  with	  NATO,	  is	  that	  having	  continuous	  geographical	  expansion	  is	  pareto-­‐optimal	  in	  terms	  of	  costs,	  and	  serves	  long-­‐term	  strategic	  benefits	  to	  the	  Union.	  While	  it	  is	  easier	  to	  defend	  a	  common	  border,	  as	  was	  the	  logic	  of	  NATO	  enlargement,	  and	  a	  solid	  piece	  of	  land,	  it	  is	  also	  cheaper	  in	  terms	  of	  infrastructure	  to	  have	  continuous	  geographic	  space	  (Passy,	  2013;	  Skarstein,	  2013).	  The	  rationale	  also	  makes	  sense	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  enlargement	  of	  the	  Schengen	  territory,	  where	  internal	  border	  controls	  are	  abolished,	  and	  external	  border	  control	  of	  the	  Schengen	  space	  is	  strengthened.	  “It	  is	  a	  win-­‐win	  game.”	  said	  Dr.	  Passy	  (Passy,	  2013).	  This	  rationale	  is	  also	  reflected	  in	  some	  of	  the	  literature.	  Plamen	  Pantev	  writes	  that	  	  	   (…)	  as	  an	  EU	  member,	  the	  Black	  Sea	  state	  of	  Bulgaria	  will	  help	  fill	  the	  geopolitical	  gap	  between	  Hungary	  and	  Greece,	  and	  further	  solidify	  the	  ‘arc	  of	  stability’	  in	  Southeast	  Europe.	  	   (2008:101).	  	  	  
	  	   52	  
4.3.1 Energy security and the geopolitical incentives Bulgaria’s	  location	  carries	  enormous	  importance	  in	  one	  particular	  area	  of	  comprehensive	  security,	  and	  that	  is	  energy	  security.	  The	  issue	  has	  seen	  increasing	  importance	  on	  the	  EU’s	  security	  agenda,	  and	  is	  cited	  in	  the	  EU’s	  Security	  Strategy	  as	  a	  special	  security	  challenge	  for	  the	  Union’s	  citizens	  and	  industries	  (Solana,	  2003).	  Energy	  security	  must	  be	  seen	  in	  connection	  to	  the	  Russian	  influence	  in	  the	  Black	  Sea	  region,	  as	  there	  are	  fears	  that	  Russia	  will	  blackmail	  European	  countries	  by	  the	  threat	  of	  shutting	  off	  supplies	  (Cameron,	  2010).	  In	  terms	  of	  geopolitical	  consequences	  of	  enlargement,	  few	  have	  had	  such	  impact	  on	  the	  security	  of	  the	  EU	  as	  energy	  dependency,	  as	  almost	  all	  of	  the	  acceded	  CEECs	  have	  an	  unfavourable	  dependency	  on	  single-­‐source	  natural	  gas	  imports	  from	  Russia.	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  Eastern	  enlargements	  of	  the	  Union	  in	  2004	  and	  2007	  have	  significantly	  worsened	  the	  energy	  security	  of	  the	  EU,	  and	  increased	  the	  need	  for	  enhancing	  it	  (Buchan,	  2010:368;	  Belyi,	  2003:357).	  	  	  Bulgaria	  is	  no	  exception	  to	  this	  trend.	  Out	  of	  all	  the	  candidate	  countries	  for	  membership	  in	  1998,	  Bulgaria	  was	  99,7	  %	  dependent	  on	  gas	  imports,	  and	  especially	  Russian	  natural	  gas	  (Belyi,	  2003:357).	  Enlargement	  to	  Bulgaria	  therefore	  significantly	  worsens	  the	  EU’s	  dependency	  on	  imports	  of	  Russian	  natural	  gas.	  The	  2006	  and	  2009	  gas	  disputes	  between	  Russia	  and	  the	  Ukraine	  saw	  that	  through	  shutting	  down	  the	  gas	  supplies	  for	  the	  Ukraine,	  Eastern	  European	  countries,	  as	  well	  as	  Bulgaria,	  was	  deeply	  affected	  by	  natural	  gas	  shortage	  (BBC	  News	  Online,	  2009).	  The	  disputes	  at	  the	  time	  were	  thought	  to	  be	  much	  more	  political	  than	  economic	  in	  nature,	  and	  gave	  fears	  that	  Russia	  could	  exert	  considerable	  influence	  through	  their	  power	  of	  dependency	  (Bradshaw,	  2009:1930;	  Cameron,	  2010).	  So	  how	  did	  energy	  security	  play	  into	  the	  decision	  to	  enlarge	  to	  Bulgaria?	  	  	  Paradoxically,	  while	  the	  EU	  suffers	  greater	  dependency	  on	  foreign	  imports	  of	  single-­‐sourced	  natural	  gas	  from	  Russia	  through	  enlargement	  to	  Bulgaria,	  some	  of	  the	  interviewees	  argued	  that	  increasing	  energy	  security	  served	  as	  an	  incentive	  for	  enlargement	  to	  Bulgaria.	  Short-­‐term	  risks	  were,	  to	  some	  extent,	  accepted	  for	  long-­‐term	  benefits,	  as	  the	  largest	  diversification	  projects	  run	  through	  Bulgarian	  territory.	  As	  figure	  4.3.1	  shows,	  both	  the	  planned	  Nabucco	  and	  the	  South	  Stream	  pipelines	  run	  through	  the	  country.	  While	  the	  Nabucco	  pipeline	  project	  is	  the	  EU-­‐backed	  proposal	  for	  diversifying	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energy	  imports	  by	  transiting	  from	  the	  Caspian	  Sea	  from	  non-­‐Russian	  gas	  hubs,	  South	  Stream	  is	  the	  Russian	  alternative	  for	  the	  new	  southern	  corridor	  that	  bypasses	  the	  Ukraine	  (Cameron,	  2010;	  Pantev,	  2008:107).	  	  	  
	  
Figure	  4.3.1:	  Natural	  gas	  pipelines	  in	  Europe	  (from	  Bradshaw,	  2009:1929).	  	  These	  projects	  according	  to	  Ambassador	  Skarstein,	  were	  a	  significant	  incentive	  for	  enlargement:	  	  	   One	  should	  not	  discount	  the	  necessity	  of	  bringing	  these	  two	  countries	  (Bulgaria	  and	  Romania)	  into	  the	  European	  Community	  because	  it	  was	  already	  clear	  that	  the	  large	  energy	  infrastructure	  projects	  would	  go	  through	  their	  territories	  from	  east	  to	  west.	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  large	  investments,	  such	  as	  energy	  supply	  routes	  demand;	  require	  long-­‐term	  stability	  and	  a	  politically	  predictable	  environment	  in	  the	  countries,	  and	  EU	  and	  NATO-­‐membership	  functions	  as	  a	  guarantee	  for	  this.	  So	  the	  energy	  aspect,	  even	  though	  it	  has	  never	  really	  openly	  been	  discussed,	  must	  have	  been	  significant,	  I	  think,	  because	  they	  were	  looking	  ahead.	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (Skarstein,	  2013)	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Several	  others	  supported	  this	  claim	  and	  the	  need	  for	  diversification	  as	  an	  incentive	  for	  enlargement	  to	  Bulgaria.	  Ambassador	  Benisheva	  told	  me	  about	  the	  impact	  of	  energy	  that	  	   …	  it	  was	  also	  an	  important	  incentive,	  definitely,	  not	  only	  [for]	  goods	  and	  services,	  but	  also	  the	  energy	  infrastructure.	  It	  was	  clear	  that	  the	  economy	  of	  the	  Union	  needed	  diversification	  of	  energy	  supplies,	  using	  alternative	  supply	  routes.	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (Benisheva,	  2013)	  	  So	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  somewhat	  ambiguous	  case	  for	  energy	  security	  in	  enlargement.	  While	  in	  the	  short	  term,	  one	  might	  run	  expenses	  and	  risks	  as	  disruptions	  in	  energy	  supply	  could	  very	  well	  have	  serious	  security	  implications	  for	  citizens	  in	  the	  EU,	  as	  they	  did	  in	  2006	  and	  2009;	  there	  are	  indeed	  strategic	  interests	  in	  the	  long	  term.	  However,	  not	  all	  of	  the	  interviewees	  placed	  much	  emphasis	  on	  the	  subject.	  While	  some	  placed	  emphasis	  on	  the	  long-­‐term	  energy	  security	  interests	  of	  the	  EU	  in	  enlargement	  (Skarstein,	  2013;	  Benisheva,	  2013;	  Popova,	  2013;	  MacDowall,	  2013),	  others	  were	  more	  careful	  in	  their	  assessment	  of	  the	  long-­‐term	  interests.	  	  	   I	  believe	  it	  had	  some	  influence	  at	  the	  time,	  but	  it	  really	  escalated	  later,	  with	  the	  situations	  where	  Russia	  cut	  off	  supplies	  to	  Eastern	  Europe	  over	  the	  squabbles	  with	  the	  Ukraine,	  and	  after	  the	  new	  findings	  of	  natural	  gas	  in	  Azerbaijan,	  having	  a	  diversifying	  route	  that	  does	  not	  cross	  Russian	  territory.	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (Bull,	  2013)	  	  In	  summary,	  there	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  a	  priority	  for	  the	  Union	  to	  enlarge	  to	  Bulgaria	  in	  order	  to	  have	  the	  possibility	  of	  boosting	  its	  own	  energy,	  and	  making	  sure	  they	  had	  influence	  in	  the	  planned	  infrastructure	  projects.	  In	  the	  long-­‐term,	  this	  might	  help	  reduce	  the	  EU’s	  dependency	  on	  Russian	  natural	  gas,	  a	  vital	  policy	  for	  minimizing	  Russian	  influence	  in	  Europe.	  	  	  
4.4 Containing Russian influence in Bulgaria An	  assumption	  according	  to	  some	  scholars	  concerning	  enlargement	  to	  CEECs	  in	  power-­‐structural	  terms,	  as	  well	  as	  security-­‐politically,	  was	  that	  after	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	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and	  the	  regime-­‐changes	  in	  the	  CEECs,	  the	  European	  Union	  enlarged	  in	  order	  to	  contain	  Russian	  influence	  in	  these	  countries,	  and	  make	  sure	  that	  they	  aligned	  with	  the	  West.	  Leon	  Brittan,	  former	  Commissioner	  for	  External	  Relations,	  argued	  in	  1994	  that	  if	  the	  acceding	  countries	  which	  had	  concluded	  Europe	  agreements	  did	  not	  receive	  a	  clear	  promise	  of	  accession,	  they	  would	  fall	  under	  Russian	  influence	  (Higashino,	  2004:356).	  Karen	  Smith	  writes	  that	  in	  the	  early	  days	  of	  enlargement	  decision-­‐making,	  in	  the	  run-­‐up	  towards	  the	  Copenhagen	  Council	  of	  1993,	  Russia’s	  more	  assertive	  politics	  towards	  the	  former	  communist	  countries	  “sparked	  fears	  that	  Russia	  might	  try	  to	  re-­‐establish	  a	  sphere	  of	  influence	  in	  Eastern	  Europe”	  (Smith,	  2004:107,	  108).	  Indeed,	  the	  EU	  and	  Russia	  can	  be	  argued	  to	  be,	  after	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  Berlin	  Wall,	  as	  potential	  security	  threats	  to	  each	  other,	  and	  competitors	  in	  power-­‐structural	  terms	  (O'Brennan,	  2006b:124).	  The	  weakness	  and	  potential	  instability	  of	  the	  Russian	  regime,	  and	  the	  perceived	  strengthened	  nationalism	  gave	  worries	  that	  the	  Russians	  might	  try	  to	  re-­‐establish	  their	  empire	  (O'Brennan,	  2006a:165,	  166).	  	  So	  how	  would	  enlargement	  counter	  the	  perceived	  Russian	  threat?	  René	  Schwok	  puts	  emphasis	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  broad	  alignment	  with	  the	  West	  for	  CEECs	  would	  be	  a	  potential	  scare-­‐off	  for	  Russia	  to	  exert	  pressure	  towards	  the	  countries,	  because	  it	  would	  involve	  “locking	  horns	  with	  the	  West”	  (Schwok,	  1999:158).	  However,	  such	  arguments	  are	  unfounded,	  he	  argues,	  as	  Russia	  did	  not	  show	  any	  imperialist	  intentions	  over	  the	  past	  decade.	  In	  addition,	  he	  argues	  that	  containing	  Russia	  would	  not	  make	  sense,	  because	  the	  EU	  would,	  by	  admitting	  the	  CEECs,	  also	  take	  responsibility	  for	  any	  problems	  that	  arose	  with	  Russia	  in	  these	  countries.	  If	  enlargement	  is	  a	  response	  to	  the	  very	  weakness	  of	  the	  Russian	  regime,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  understand	  how	  the	  enlargement	  would	  counter	  such	  a	  development	  inside	  Russia	  (Schwok,	  1999:158,	  159).	  	  	  In	  the	  light	  of	  the	  disagreement	  portrayed	  in	  the	  literature,	  it	  is	  interesting	  to	  examine	  the	  evidence	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Bulgaria,	  because	  it	  strongly	  confirms	  the	  fact	  that	  preventing	  Russian	  influence	  was	  a	  key	  incentive	  for	  member	  states	  in	  their	  decision	  to	  enlarge,	  and	  especially	  from	  the	  non-­‐Bulgarian	  interviewees.	  Mr.	  MacDowall,	  an	  experienced	  journalist	  and	  analyst	  of	  Bulgaria,	  the	  Western	  Balkans	  and	  Eastern	  Europe,	  described	  that	  the	  decision	  to	  enlarge	  eastwards	  was	  also	  justified	  by	  the	  wish	  “to	  bring	  countries	  such	  as	  Bulgaria	  and	  other	  Eastern	  European	  countries	  out	  of	  the	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Russian	  orbit.”	  (MacDowall,	  2013).	  The	  diplomats	  put	  even	  stronger	  emphasis	  on	  this	  type	  of	  reasoning.	  Ambassador	  Bull	  described	  the	  EU’s	  reaction	  as	  he	  recalled	  it	  from	  his	  ambassadorship	  in	  Brussels:	  	  	   We	  had	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  and	  a	  vacuum	  emerged.	  How	  were	  we	  supposed	  to	  handle	  that?	  If	  they	  became	  a	  member	  of	  the	  EU,	  they	  would	  be	  able	  to	  develop	  democratic	  institutions	  much	  faster.	  The	  membership	  creates	  democracy	  and	  growth,	  and	  there	  is	  a	  common	  interest	  in	  this.	  This	  was	  urgent,	  because	  we	  did	  not	  know	  when	  Russia	  would	  get	  back	  on	  its	  feet.	  	  Russia	  had	  collapsed	  and	  was	  going	  through	  a	  very	  dramatic	  period	  at	  the	  time,	  and	  in	  this	  period	  it	  was	  important	  to	  act	  quickly.	  The	  Russians	  were	  clearly	  not	  happy	  with	  the	  development	  that	  had	  taken	  place	  when	  they	  got	  back	  on	  their	  feet.	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (Bull,	  2013)	  	  The	  ambassador’s	  recollection	  fits	  well	  with	  the	  other	  interviews	  that	  were	  carried	  out,	  where	  almost	  all	  of	  them	  claimed	  this	  a	  primary	  cause	  for	  enlargement	  to	  the	  CEECs	  in	  general,	  but	  also	  to	  Bulgaria	  especially,	  because	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  historic	  Russian-­‐Bulgarian	  relationship.	  Dr.	  Passy	  told	  me	  that	  “Bulgaria	  was	  known	  to	  be	  the	  closest	  ally	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union”,	  and	  Mrs.	  Popova	  added	  that	  Bulgaria	  has	  always	  had	  a	  strong	  relationship	  to	  Russia,	  because	  Russia	  liberated	  Bulgaria	  from	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire	  (Passy,	  2013;	  Popova,	  2013).	  There	  were	  even	  fears	  that	  if	  Bulgaria	  was	  held	  back	  from	  EU	  membership	  for	  to	  long,	  Bulgaria	  might	  be	  pressured	  by	  Russia	  to	  join	  a	  ’counter-­‐alliance’	  (Smith,	  2004:141)	  	  What	  is	  most	  interesting	  about	  the	  statements	  regarding	  the	  need	  for	  containing	  Russian	  influence,	  and	  bringing	  these	  countries	  out	  of	  the	  Russian	  orbit	  was	  the	  urgency	  that	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  statements.	  Reflecting	  Ambassador	  Bull’s	  thoughts	  on	  the	  need	  to	  move	  quickly	  while	  the	  Russians	  had	  limited	  abilities	  to	  act,	  Ambassador	  Skarstein	  added	  that:	  	  	   A	  very	  important	  reason	  was	  to	  get	  (Bulgaria	  and	  Romania)	  away	  from	  Russian	  influence.	  (….)	  They	  had	  a	  window	  of	  opportunity,	  because	  there	  was	  little	  Russia	  could	  do	  about	  it	  at	  the	  time.	  If	  you	  were	  to	  enlarge,	  it	  was	  advantageous	  that	  it	  was	  while	  Russia	  was	  still	  weak.	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   (Skarstein,	  2013)	  	  Ambassador	  Benisheva	  confirmed	  that	  this	  was	  a	  major	  concern,	  when	  asked	  if	  containing	  Russian	  influence	  served	  as	  a	  reason	  for	  enlargement,	  and	  cited	  that	  the	  decision	  to	  open	  negotiations	  with	  Bulgaria	  in	  1999	  was	  not	  only	  justified	  because	  of	  the	  situation	  in	  Kosovo,	  but	  also	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  the	  Russian	  invasion	  that	  was	  going	  on	  in	  Chechnya:	  “Yes.	  That	  was	  why	  I	  mentioned	  the	  decision	  in	  1999,	  not	  only	  Kosovo,	  but	  also	  Chechnya.	  It	  could	  destabilize	  Georgia,	  and	  we	  are	  on	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  Black	  sea”	  (Benisheva,	  2013).	  	  In	  summary,	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  strong	  rationale	  for	  enlargement	  in	  order	  to	  contain	  Russian	  influence	  in	  Bulgaria	  in	  the	  empirical	  evidence,	  despite	  the	  research	  literature,	  which	  says	  that	  such	  a	  perceived	  structural	  threat	  should	  not	  be	  exaggerated.	  The	  risk	  of	  non-­‐enlargement	  seemed	  too	  great,	  according	  to	  Ambassador	  Bull,	  who	  reflected	  that	  for	  the	  Union,	  this	  was	  the	  primary	  reason	  for	  enlargement	  eastwards,	  not	  only	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Bulgaria:	  “It	  was	  crucial,	  seen	  through	  the	  ‘eyes	  of	  the	  Cold	  War’…	  	  absolutely	  crucial.	  It	  was	  the	  old	  way	  of	  thinking	  that	  dominated.”	  (Bull,	  2013).	  Ambassador	  Skarstein	  emphasized	  the	  connection	  of	  Russian	  influence	  with	  other	  distinct	  security	  issues,	  namely	  organized	  crime	  and	  corruption,	  as	  well	  as	  energy	  security	  and	  power-­‐structural	  competition.	  There	  was	  a	  distinct	  need,	  according	  to	  Ambassador	  Skarstein,	  to	  limit	  Russian	  influence	  by	  reforming	  the	  old	  the	  internal	  security	  structures	  in	  Bulgaria,	  which	  were	  closely	  linked	  to	  transnational	  organized	  crime,	  as	  well	  as	  ensure	  energy	  security	  and	  limit	  Russian	  influence	  in	  power-­‐structural	  competition	  (Skarstein,	  2013).	  	  	  
4.5 The internal dimension of external security in 
enlargement to Bulgaria The	  nature	  of	  EU	  enlargement	  is	  truly	  geographical,	  as	  it	  moves	  the	  borders	  of	  an	  internal	  market	  and	  the	  Area	  of	  Freedom,	  Security	  and	  Justice.	  The	  extension	  of	  the	  Union	  to	  new	  geographical	  regions,	  offer	  both	  challenges	  and	  opportunities	  of	  a	  geographical	  nature	  to	  the	  Community	  in	  the	  security	  realm,	  as	  the	  lines	  between	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internal	  and	  external	  security	  are	  becoming	  increasingly	  blurred	  (Ibraymova,	  2004a:2).	  According	  to	  the	  comprehensive	  security	  concept,	  threats	  to	  modern	  communities	  that	  are	  open	  are	  often	  different	  than	  military	  threats	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  are	  societal,	  environmental,	  human	  or	  individual	  in	  nature.	  In	  the	  European	  Union,	  this	  is	  especially	  true,	  as	  markets	  are	  open;	  the	  flow	  of	  merchandise,	  people	  and	  services	  is	  free	  between	  member	  countries.	  Through	  the	  integration	  of	  the	  European	  Union’s	  political	  cooperation,	  Justice	  and	  Home	  Affairs7,	  or	  the	  intergovernmental	  area	  of	  Freedom,	  Security	  and	  Justice,	  remains	  a	  vital	  part	  of	  the	  political	  union.	  	  	  Enlargement	  in	  the	  light	  of	  internal	  security	  remains	  a	  dilemma,	  because	  it	  both	  increases	  the	  ability	  to	  respond	  to	  threats	  efficiently	  while	  exposing	  the	  Union	  to	  threats	  at	  the	  same	  time	  (Friis,	  1998:17).	  By	  implementing	  the	  acquis	  in	  new	  member	  states,	  and	  applying	  conditionality	  to	  enhance	  the	  rule	  of	  law,	  fight	  corruption	  and	  organized	  crime,	  the	  Union	  may	  respond	  to	  the	  challenges	  more	  effectively,	  and	  their	  influence	  is	  substantial.	  However,	  one	  also	  risks,	  especially	  in	  regards	  to	  premature	  enlargement	  without	  proper	  fulfilment	  of	  the	  criteria,	  of	  internalizing	  the	  very	  same	  threats	  that	  enlargement	  was	  supposed	  to	  deal	  effectively	  with	  (Ibraymova,	  2004b:6).	  This	  represents	  the	  dilemma	  of	  internal	  security	  in	  the	  JHA	  arena	  of	  enlargement.	  The	  principal	  mode	  through	  which	  the	  Union	  tries	  to	  handle	  threats	  which	  are	  trans-­‐national	  in	  nature,	  such	  as	  human	  trafficking,	  organized	  crime	  and	  smuggling,	  is	  through	  the	  transposition	  of	  the	  acquis	  communautaire	  in	  acceding	  member	  countries,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  maintenance	  of	  high	  standards	  in	  terms	  of	  rule	  of	  law,	  the	  fight	  against	  corruption	  and	  organized	  crime,	  and	  border	  security	  (Ibraymova,	  2004a:6,	  7).	  	  	  	  	  As	  Bulgaria	  acceded	  the	  Union,	  their	  readiness	  in	  terms	  of	  fighting	  organized	  crime	  and	  corruption,	  as	  well	  as	  their	  ability	  to	  ensure	  the	  proper	  rule	  of	  law,	  was	  uncertain	  to	  the	  degree	  that	  the	  EU	  Commission	  established	  a	  special	  mechanism	  to	  ensure	  progress	  in	  their	  reform	  efforts	  (The	  EU	  Commission,	  2006).	  While	  other	  CEECs	  reached	  high	  rankings	  on	  the	  Transparency	  International	  Corruption	  Index	  and	  in	  the	  fight	  against	  organized	  crime,	  Bulgaria	  ranked	  at	  the	  same	  level	  of	  Colombia	  in	  2006	  in	  terms	  of	  level	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Hereafter	  referred	  to	  as	  ’JHA’	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of	  corruption,	  and	  the	  impact	  of	  organized	  crime	  remained	  severe	  (Moravcsik,	  2006).	  The	  European	  Security	  Strategy	  identifies	  organized	  crime	  as	  a	  serious	  threat	  to	  European	  security,	  saying	  that:	  	  	   Europe	  is	  a	  prime	  target	  for	  organised	  crime.	  This	  internal	  threat	  to	  our	  security	  has	  an	  important	  external	  dimension:	  cross-­‐border	  trafficking	  in	  drugs,	  women,	  illegal	  migrants	  and	  weapons	  accounts	  for	  a	  large	  part	  of	  the	  activities	  of	  criminal	  gangs.	  It	  can	  have	  links	  with	  terrorism.	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (Solana,	  2003)	  	  Thus,	  the	  security	  rationale	  of	  enlargement	  is	  now	  much	  wider	  in	  scope	  than	  a	  focus	  on	  military	  affairs,	  and	  is	  one	  where	  the	  Union	  has	  capabilities,	  as	  where	  NATO	  does	  not.	  As	  Heather	  Grabbe	  writes:	  “For	  western	  Europe,	  the	  fear	  of	  tanks	  and	  missiles	  arriving	  from	  across	  the	  Iron	  curtain	  has	  been	  supplanted	  by	  fear	  of	  uncontrolled	  immigration	  and	  cross-­‐border	  crime.”	  (Grabbe,	  2000:520).	  	  	  Few	  countries	  faced	  such	  severe	  internal	  security	  challenges	  before	  accession	  as	  Bulgaria	  and	  Romania.	  The	  doubts	  of	  their	  readiness	  were	  evident	  at	  the	  point	  of	  accession,	  and	  the	  Commission’s	  mechanism	  confirmed	  the	  worries.	  The	  interviewees	  were	  more	  cautious	  in	  terms	  of	  labelling	  enlargement	  as	  a	  handling	  of	  internal	  security	  threats	  for	  the	  Union,	  because	  the	  proposal	  is	  two-­‐sided.	  There	  was	  little	  doubt	  that	  they	  thought	  that	  there	  were	  clear	  signs	  that	  the	  EU	  had	  internalized	  some	  very	  serious	  threats	  to	  internal	  security.	  Ambassador	  Benisheva	  admitted	  as	  much,	  as	  we	  approached	  the	  subject	  of	  transnational	  crime	  and	  corruption	  in	  our	  interview:	  “We	  have	  discussed	  the	  geographical	  argument	  as	  an	  argument	  in	  favour,	  and	  now	  we	  discuss	  it	  as	  an	  argument	  against”,	  clearly	  stating	  that	  the	  evident	  threat	  of	  cross-­‐border	  organized	  crime	  and	  corruption	  was	  a	  cost	  for	  member	  countries	  in	  the	  case	  of	  accession	  (Benisheva,	  2013).	  	  	  Mr.	  MacDowall	  expressed	  the	  same,	  when	  I	  asked	  him	  how	  the	  fight	  against	  trans-­‐national	  crime	  played	  into	  the	  decision:	  “It	  may	  have	  been	  a	  factor	  in	  the	  calculations,	  but	  whether	  much	  progress	  has	  been	  made	  is	  extremely	  debatable”	  (MacDowall,	  2013).	  However,	  some	  of	  the	  informants	  expressed	  the	  opinion	  that	  these	  threats	  would	  exist	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even	  if	  the	  EU	  did	  not	  enlarge	  to	  Bulgaria,	  and	  that	  the	  membership	  process,	  as	  well	  as	  conditionality,	  has	  handled	  the	  issue	  to	  a	  much	  larger	  extent	  than	  if	  they	  had	  been	  kept	  out.	  Mrs.	  Popova	  told	  me	  that	  enlargement	  to	  Bulgaria	  has	  a	  disciplinary	  effect	  on	  acceding	  member	  states	  (Popova,	  2013).	  Mr.	  MacDowall	  echoed	  this	  description,	  and	  highlighted	  that	  the	  threats	  would	  remain	  in	  a	  non-­‐enlargement	  scenario:	  	  	   Drugs,	  guns,	  people	  were	  going	  to	  come	  through	  Bulgaria	  and	  Romania	  any	  way,	  so	  I	  think	  that	  if	  they	  hadn’t	  had	  the	  EU	  stick	  and	  carrot,	  that	  the	  flow	  would	  be	  even	  higher	  than	  it	  is,	  because	  of	  the	  resources	  that	  the	  EU	  has	  given	  them	  to	  manage	  their	  borders	  and	  the	  incentive	  to	  crack	  down	  on	  these	  sort	  of	  things	  that	  the	  EU	  has	  provided.	  (…)	  It	  could	  have	  been	  worse.	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (MacDowall,	  2013)	  	  Dr.	  Passy	  described	  the	  same,	  when	  asked	  if	  Bulgaria	  had	  done	  enough	  in	  terms	  of	  battling	  corruption	  and	  organized	  crime	  before	  the	  accession,	  and	  if	  they	  were	  let	  in	  too	  early:	  	  	   Dr.	  Passy:	  The	  earlier	  the	  better.	  Because	  the	  earlier	  you	  invite	  them	  in,	  the	  more	  time	  they	  get	  to	  change.	  There	  are	  forces	  inside	  the	  country	  who	  do	  not	  want	  Bulgaria	  to	  join.	  Leaving	  them	  out	  could	  strengthen	  them.	  It	  is	  easier	  to	  change	  inside	  the	  Union	  than	  outside.	  	  	  Q:	  Would	  you	  say	  that	  leaving	  them	  out	  could	  have	  negative	  consequences?	  	  	  Dr.	  Passy:	  Absolutely.	  Leaving	  them	  out	  would	  be	  counter-­‐productive.	  (…)	  Today,	  they	  speak	  about	  corruption,	  but	  today	  the	  level	  of	  corruption,	  if	  you	  compare	  it	  to	  15	  years	  ago,	  it	  is	  much	  better	  today.	  This	  is	  to	  a	  great	  extent	  because	  of	  our	  membership	  in	  the	  European	  Union.	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (Passy,	  2013)	  	  Thus,	  it	  seems	  that	  when	  facing	  the	  dilemma	  of	  internal	  security,	  the	  EU	  chose	  to	  handle	  the	  situation	  from	  within,	  exerting	  its	  influence	  through	  enlargement,	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  costs	  associated.	  Ambassador	  Benisheva	  reflected	  the	  same	  kind	  of	  arguments	  and	  made	  the	  point	  that	  some	  of	  these	  trans-­‐national	  smuggling	  routes	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  to	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the	  boycott	  of	  the	  Milosevic	  regime,	  when	  the	  economic	  activity	  was	  suspended,	  and	  added:	  “Including	  will	  help	  much	  more	  than	  excluding.	  Because	  that	  is	  the	  extension	  of	  security,	  making	  the	  territory	  [Bulgaria]	  a	  part	  of	  the	  common	  security	  concern”	  (Benisheva,	  2013).	  In	  this	  way,	  by	  bringing	  Bulgaria	  in,	  and	  exerting	  influence	  through	  the	  acquis	  and	  enhancing	  Bulgaria’s	  ability	  to	  handle	  these	  threats,	  enlargement	  boosts	  Europe’s	  ability	  to	  handle	  such	  threats.	  Ambassador	  Skarstein	  expressed	  doubts	  that	  extending	  the	  candidate	  period,	  or	  of	  pursuing	  further	  conditionality	  at	  the	  time	  would	  help	  much	  in	  tackling	  the	  issue:	  	  	   My	  diplomat	  colleagues	  in	  Sofia	  told	  me	  that	  they	  were	  aware	  of	  the	  challenges	  in	  advance	  (…)	  Only	  the	  EU	  can	  do	  something	  about	  Bulgaria	  ...	  They	  will	  never	  be	  able	  to	  handle	  it	  [these	  threats]	  on	  their	  own.	  You	  need	  constant	  pressure	  from	  the	  EU…	  But	  for	  the	  EU,	  they	  were	  balancing	  in	  their	  approach,	  and	  I	  do	  not	  think	  that	  they	  would	  have	  gotten	  much	  further,	  at	  least	  not	  a	  lot	  further	  in	  a	  year	  more,	  and	  I’m	  am	  absolutely	  not	  sure	  if	  they	  would	  have	  made	  more	  progress	  with	  an	  open	  accession	  date...	  Look	  at	  Turkey,	  they	  have	  lost	  all	  motivation.	  	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (Skarstein,	  2013)	  	  Thus,	  as	  Ambassador	  Skarstein	  emphasized,	  the	  other	  worries	  of	  the	  EU,	  and	  their	  balancing	  in	  the	  approach	  towards	  enlargement,	  called	  for	  action,	  even	  if	  that	  meant	  giving	  up	  conditionality.	  In	  addition,	  the	  Union	  still	  preserve	  some	  powers	  of	  conditionality	  in	  this	  particular	  area,	  and	  still	  tries	  to	  exert	  its	  influence	  to	  respond	  to	  internal	  threats	  in	  these	  countries,	  and	  pacify	  others	  in	  their	  accession	  conditions.	  First	  of	  all,	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  Cooperation	  and	  Verification	  Mechanism8	  is	  designed	  to	  keep	  up	  pressure	  on	  Bulgaria,	  and	  to	  ensure	  that	  progress	  is	  done	  on	  the	  issues	  of	  organized	  crime,	  corruption	  and	  rule	  of	  law	  (The	  EU	  Commission,	  2006).	  Secondly,	  Schengen	  membership	  is	  still	  pending	  for	  Bulgaria	  and	  Romania,	  meaning	  that	  they	  are	  still	  outside	  the	  common	  border.	  The	  Schengen	  acquis	  is	  a	  crucial	  part	  of	  the	  transposition	  of	  the	  EU	  acquis,	  as	  it	  aims	  to	  ensure	  high	  standards	  at	  the	  outer	  border	  of	  the	  EU,	  and	  facilitate	  police	  and	  internal	  security	  cooperation.	  The	  EU	  member	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Hereafter	  referred	  to	  as	  ’CVM’.	  The	  Commission	  established	  a	  surveillance	  mechanism	  for	  Bulgaria,	  citing	  a	  lack	  of	  progress	  in	  terms	  of	  fulfilling	  the	  criteria.	  This	  mechanism	  will	  be	  accounted	  for	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	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countries	  have	  vetoed	  their	  accession	  on	  what	  many	  would	  call	  political	  grounds,	  in	  spite	  of	  technical	  readiness	  (EurActiv,	  2011b).	  Many	  now	  suspect	  a	  link	  between	  membership	  in	  Schengen	  to	  the	  progress	  under	  the	  Cooperation	  and	  Verification	  Mechanism,	  though	  this	  is	  unofficial.	  So	  the	  Union	  is	  suspected	  to	  continue	  to	  exert	  conditionality	  for	  Schengen	  membership	  instead	  of	  EU	  membership.	  This	  point	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  Thirdly,	  the	  Union	  addressed	  the	  concerns	  over	  immigration,	  delaying	  the	  freedom	  of	  workers	  from	  Bulgaria	  and	  Romania,	  a	  freedom	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  that	  member	  countries	  are	  at	  liberty	  to	  limit	  if	  they	  wish	  for	  up	  till	  seven	  years,	  based	  on	  concerns	  of	  the	  disruptiveness	  in	  the	  national	  labour	  markets,	  by	  the	  import	  of	  low-­‐cost	  workers	  (The	  EU	  Commssion,	  2013).	  The	  threat	  of	  mass	  immigration	  was	  pacified	  for	  some	  time	  and	  comes	  into	  full	  force	  in	  2014,	  postponing	  the	  cost	  of	  accession	  for	  some	  time	  after	  2007.	  	  	  
4.6 Adding weight to the EU’s power Traditional	  realist	  assumptions	  about	  incentives	  in	  enlargement	  were	  evident	  in	  the	  discussion	  of	  some	  themes,	  and	  less	  so	  when	  discussing	  others.	  A	  core	  assumption	  of	  EU	  enlargement	  in	  realist	  terms	  is	  that	  the	  EU	  adds	  weight	  to	  their	  own	  power	  in	  international	  affairs	  by	  including	  more	  members	  (Schwok,	  1999:161;	  Zielonka,	  2006:49).	  This	  is	  a	  disputable	  claim,	  because	  it	  is	  evident	  that	  far	  from	  all	  member	  states	  want	  the	  EU	  to	  become	  a	  super-­‐state	  (Schwok,	  1999:161).	  However,	  a	  want	  for	  more	  structural	  power	  might	  motivate	  the	  EU	  in	  terms	  of	  taking	  in	  new	  members.	  With	  more	  power,	  and	  more	  countries	  dedicated	  to	  the	  pursuit	  of	  EU	  foreign	  policy	  goals,	  the	  Union	  will	  have	  more	  of	  a	  ‘say-­‐so’	  in	  world	  affairs,	  as	  well	  as	  have	  capabilities	  of	  ensuring	  their	  own	  security	  and	  stability	  in	  their	  neighbourhood.	  A	  few	  of	  the	  interviewees	  gave	  statements	  that	  the	  EU	  were	  trying	  to	  increase	  their	  own	  influence,	  and	  that	  this	  was	  a	  motivation	  for	  member	  states.	  Mr.	  MacDowall,	  when	  asked	  why	  enlargement	  to	  Bulgaria	  was	  important	  for	  the	  Union,	  emphasized	  that	  not	  only	  does	  enlargement	  provide	  this	  opportunity	  to	  Western	  Europe,	  but	  also	  that	  it	  is	  more	  likely	  that	  these	  countries’	  influence	  will	  be	  greater	  if	  the	  CEECs	  are	  liberal	  democracies:	  	   (..	  )I	  think,	  probably	  of	  parallel	  importance,	  is	  the	  strategic	  alliance	  with	  the	  Eastern	  European	  countries	  in	  terms	  of	  diplomacy,	  in	  terms	  of	  Europe	  being	  stronger	  with	  more	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members	  (…)	  from	  the	  aspects	  of	  western	  European	  countries,	  I	  think	  there’s	  an	  aspect	  that	  if	  they	  become	  liberal	  democracies,	  they	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  open	  to	  us	  politically	  and	  diplomatically	  and	  strategically,	  than	  if	  they	  are	  dictatorships,	  particularly	  because	  those	  dictatorships	  are	  leaning	  heavily	  towards	  Russia	  and	  have	  been	  for	  45	  years	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (MacDowall,	  2013)	  	  As	  will	  be	  examined	  further	  in	  the	  next	  chapter,	  the	  EU	  membership	  did	  influence	  Bulgaria’s	  behaviour	  during	  the	  crisis	  in	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia,	  aligning	  them	  to	  Western	  European	  policy	  goals	  at	  great	  domestic	  expense	  for	  themselves,	  and	  membership	  was	  used	  in	  order	  to	  induce	  this	  behaviour	  in	  Bulgaria	  (MacDowall,	  2013;	  Popova,	  2013;	  Skarstein,	  2013;	  Benisheva,	  2013).	  Commenting	  further	  on	  the	  rationale	  for	  enlarging	  the	  EU,	  Mr.	  MacDowall	  emphasized	  the	  importance	  of	  influence	  in	  these	  countries,	  saying	  that	  while	  CEECs	  were	  under	  Soviet	  influence	  for	  many	  years,	  EU	  and	  NATO	  enlargement	  has	  now	  altered	  the	  map	  significantly:	  “Eastern	  European	  countries	  were	  under	  Russia’s	  influence,	  but	  now	  they	  are	  considerably	  more	  under	  Berlin’s	  influence,	  as	  indeed	  Washington’s	  and	  London’s”	  (MacDowall,	  2013).	  	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Bulgaria,	  this	  means	  that	  for	  the	  strategic	  interests	  of	  the	  Union,	  the	  EU	  may	  find	  more	  support	  for	  its	  policies	  and	  that	  Bulgaria	  aligns	  with	  the	  Union.	  In	  terms	  of	  energy	  security	  for	  example,	  this	  may	  result	  in	  the	  support	  for	  diversification	  projects	  such	  as	  Nabucco,	  which	  is	  in	  the	  Union’s	  interests.	  	  In	  the	  long	  term,	  this	  influence	  and	  Bulgaria’s	  alignment	  with	  the	  EU’s	  policy	  agenda	  through	  the	  CFSP9	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  political	  cooperation,	  works	  to	  the	  Union’s	  advantage,	  for	  example	  in	  energy	  security	  and	  internal	  security	  sectors.	  Dr.	  Passy,	  Mrs.	  Popova	  and	  Ambassador	  Benisheva	  all	  expressed	  the	  same	  notion,	  that	  Bulgaria,	  along	  with	  other	  CEECs,	  fully	  supported	  the	  NATO	  operations	  in	  Kosovo,	  the	  operations	  in	  Afghanistan,	  and	  even	  Iraq,	  as	  their	  support	  enhanced	  their	  membership	  bids	  in	  both	  NATO	  and	  the	  EU	  (Passy,	  2013;	  Popova,	  2013;	  Benisheva,	  2013).	  This	  type	  of	  support,	  as	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Kosovo	  in	  the	  next	  chapter,	  enhanced	  their	  bid	  to	  join	  the	  EU,	  because	  they	  lent	  these	  operations	  legitimacy	  and	  capabilities,	  making	  success	  for	  European	  foreign	  policy	  goals	  more	  likely.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  CFSP	  refers	  to	  the	  ’Common	  Foreign	  and	  Security	  Policy’.	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However,	  these	  arguments	  concern	  enlargement	  in	  general,	  and	  would	  be	  easier	  to	  discuss,	  and	  would	  also	  be	  a	  larger	  issue,	  when	  discussing	  the	  full	  Eastern	  enlargement.	  The	  same	  goes	  for	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  were	  extreme	  worries	  about	  how	  the	  enlargements	  would	  affect	  the	  political	  cooperation	  in	  the	  Union,	  according	  to	  Mr.	  Bull,	  and	  that	  widening	  means	  that	  deepening	  might	  be	  a	  lot	  more	  difficult,	  as	  Mr.	  MacDowall	  told	  me	  (MacDowall,	  2013;	  Bull,	  2013).	  Thus,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  discuss	  these	  issues	  when	  only	  studying	  one	  case,	  because	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  one	  case,	  compared	  to	  all	  of	  the	  CEECs,	  is	  marginal	  in	  power	  terms.	  However,	  there	  is	  some	  evidence	  that	  points	  in	  this	  direction	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Bulgaria.	  In	  addition,	  the	  evidence	  presented	  in	  the	  next	  chapter	  regarding	  Bulgaria’s	  role	  in	  regional	  stability	  aspects,	  and	  their	  alignment	  with	  Western	  policies	  towards	  the	  regional	  instability	  in	  the	  Balkans,	  indicates	  that	  maintaining	  influence	  was	  crucial	  during	  the	  course	  of	  the	  accession	  process.	  	  	  
4.7 Theoretical implications of the empirical observations 
regarding the decision to enlarge The	  decision	  to	  enlarge	  to	  Bulgaria	  was,	  as	  the	  evidence	  has	  shown,	  was	  heavily	  influenced	  by	  security	  incentives,	  and	  the	  security	  dimensions	  of	  enlargement	  were	  evident.	  Extending	  the	  security	  community	  and	  injecting	  regional	  stability	  was	  key	  objectives	  for	  the	  EU,	  who	  saw	  it	  as	  being	  in	  its	  interest,	  and	  as	  a	  necessity	  in	  order	  to	  preserve	  a	  peaceful	  and	  stable	  external	  milieu.	  In	  this	  respect,	  the	  study	  finds	  support	  in	  this	  chapter	  for	  the	  utilitarian	  arguments	  behind	  democratic	  peace	  theory,	  and	  finds	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  components	  of	  many-­‐sided	  relations	  as	  a	  promoter	  of	  inter-­‐state	  peace,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  export	  of	  liberal	  democratic	  norms	  and	  values.	  Injecting	  stability	  through	  the	  extension	  of	  membership	  was	  also	  seen	  as	  a	  key	  goal	  of	  enlargement	  to	  Bulgaria,	  given	  their	  volatile	  neighbourhood.	  	  	  In	  this	  respect,	  the	  study	  also	  finds	  support	  for	  the	  geopolitical	  approach	  and	  the	  rationalist	  hypothesis,	  as	  the	  EU’s	  security	  interests	  were	  best	  preserved	  by	  enlargement,	  even	  at	  great	  risks.	  This	  regards	  both	  the	  extension	  of	  the	  security	  community,	  enlargement	  as	  a	  principal	  mean	  to	  inject	  stability	  in	  the	  Balkans,	  as	  well	  as	  containing	  Russian	  influence,	  fighting	  internal	  security	  threats,	  and	  the	  strategic	  aspect	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of	  possibly	  reducing	  energy	  dependency	  through	  the	  establishment	  of	  diversifying	  energy	  infrastructure	  through	  Bulgaria.	  	  	  Three	  key	  findings	  should	  be	  emphasized:	  First	  of	  all,	  democratic	  peace	  theory	  does	  not	  find	  support	  in	  all	  the	  themes	  brought	  up	  in	  this	  chapter,	  and	  is	  too	  one-­‐dimensional	  in	  its	  approach	  to	  successfully	  capture	  the	  security	  dimension	  enlargement	  in	  this	  particular	  case.	  While	  it	  was	  vital	  to	  get	  Bulgaria	  away	  from	  Russian	  influence,	  as	  was	  expressed	  by	  several	  of	  the	  interviewees,	  democratization	  and	  membership	  is	  an	  important	  tool	  for	  aligning	  Bulgaria	  with	  the	  EU,	  and	  not	  necessarily	  an	  end	  in	  itself	  in	  this	  respect.	  The	  EU	  acted	  strategically	  to	  pursue	  their	  own	  interests	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  peace,	  which	  is	  compatible	  with	  democratic	  peace	  theory,	  but	  also	  to	  counter	  other	  threats;	  Russian	  influence,	  internal	  security	  threats,	  and	  to	  some	  degree	  energy	  dependency,	  though	  this	  escalated	  as	  an	  issue	  later.	  Thus,	  democratization	  through	  membership	  was	  wielded	  as	  an	  effective	  instrument	  strategically,	  to	  pursue	  the	  Union’s	  long-­‐term	  interests.	  	  The	  EU	  countered	  these	  threats	  with	  the	  extension	  of	  membership	  to	  Bulgaria,	  because	  this	  was	  the	  tool	  they	  had	  that	  was	  powerful	  enough.	  Another	  example	  is	  the	  energy	  security	  concerns,	  where	  democracy	  is	  not	  an	  end	  in	  itself,	  but	  rather	  a	  guarantee	  for	  stability,	  which	  was	  vital	  for	  establishing	  such	  high-­‐cost	  infrastructure	  projects	  as	  gas-­‐pipelines.	  This	  was	  highly	  accredited	  to	  Bulgaria’s	  membership	  in	  the	  EU	  and	  NATO.	  Democratization	  therefore	  needs	  to	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  tool	  for	  the	  EU	  in	  order	  to	  pursue	  interests,	  but	  security	  interests	  are	  more	  diverse	  than	  merely	  obtaining	  inter-­‐state	  peace	  between	  members,	  and	  the	  enlargement	  tools	  are	  more	  diverse	  than	  merely	  democratization.	  It	  also	  involves	  exerting	  influence	  and	  ensuring	  policy	  position	  alignment,	  as	  well	  as	  ensuring	  control	  over	  geographical	  factors,	  such	  as	  possible	  corridors	  for	  diversifying	  energy	  infrastructure.	  As	  the	  next	  chapter	  will	  argue,	  the	  goal	  of	  reaching	  the	  set	  criteria	  collided	  with	  other	  security	  and	  geo-­‐political	  concerns,	  and	  the	  EU’s	  strategic	  behaviour	  indicates	  that	  they	  knowingly	  gave	  up	  their	  most	  powerful	  instruments	  during	  the	  process,	  because	  geopolitical	  and	  strategic	  concerns	  were	  seen	  as	  more	  important.	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Secondly,	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  logic	  in	  the	  security	  dimension	  that	  confirms	  the	  realist	  hypothesis:	  Most	  of	  the	  interviewees	  gave	  answers	  which	  reflect	  the	  motivation	  of	  the	  EU	  in	  security	  as	  being	  ‘a	  fear	  of	  future	  developments’.	  This	  goes	  for	  all	  themes,	  even	  where	  risks	  had	  to	  be	  accepted	  such	  as	  exposure	  to	  internal	  security	  threats.	  The	  Union	  members	  were	  quite	  willing	  to	  accept	  costs,	  and	  in	  some	  cases	  increased	  security	  threats	  in	  the	  short	  term,	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  decision,	  because	  they	  feared	  the	  alternative.	  It	  was	  vital	  that	  Bulgaria	  aligned	  with	  the	  West	  in	  the	  long	  term,	  and	  did	  not	  fall	  under	  Russian	  influence,	  and	  the	  interviewees	  reflected	  that	  countering	  security	  threats	  may	  become	  more	  difficult	  if	  Bulgaria	  were	  left	  out,	  and	  the	  threats	  might	  become	  worse.	  It	  was	  believed	  at	  the	  time	  that	  including	  Bulgaria	  would	  be	  better	  than	  excluding	  in	  the	  long	  term,	  and	  that	  conditionality	  would	  help	  reduce	  the	  immediate	  costs	  if	  given	  time	  to	  work.	  The	  next	  chapter	  will	  argue	  that	  immediate	  and	  long-­‐term	  geopolitical	  concerns	  and	  security	  risks	  were	  instrumental	  in	  changing	  the	  enlargement	  strategy	  towards	  Bulgaria,	  even	  if	  that	  meant	  giving	  up	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  their	  policy	  instruments,	  and	  endangering	  the	  reforms	  of	  democratization,	  rule	  of	  law	  and	  the	  results	  in	  the	  fight	  against	  organized	  crime	  and	  corruption.	  	  	  The	  general	  criticism	  of	  realist	  hypotheses	  in	  explaining	  EU’s	  policy	  towards	  Eastern	  Europe	  seems	  unfounded	  when	  considering	  at	  the	  empirical	  evidence	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Bulgaria.	  Karen	  Smith	  writes	  in	  her	  book	  that	  realism	  offers	  little	  explanatory	  power	  in	  terms	  of	  EU	  policy	  towards	  Eastern	  Europe,	  because	  balancing	  a	  ‘common	  enemy	  ‘	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  apply	  well	  to	  Russia,	  because	  of	  the	  weakness	  of	  the	  federation	  at	  the	  time	  (Smith,	  2004:13).	  However,	  the	  evidence	  in	  this	  case	  points	  in	  another	  direction.	  This	  rationale	  thus	  fits	  better	  with	  the	  geopolitical	  approach,	  rather	  than	  that	  of	  liberal	  democratic	  peace,	  even	  if	  containing	  Russian	  influence	  might	  contribute	  to	  greater	  chances	  of	  establishing	  democracy	  in	  the	  long	  run.	  However,	  the	  next	  chapter	  will	  argue,	  as	  it	  analyses	  the	  altering	  enlargement	  strategy,	  that	  the	  urgency	  of	  this	  concern	  along	  with	  other	  geopolitical	  factors	  was	  deemed	  serious	  enough	  that	  the	  EU	  even	  altered	  its	  strategy	  on	  this	  basis,	  endangering	  their	  most	  effective	  tool	  of	  democratization.	  	  	  A	  third	  key	  finding	  is	  the	  notable	  absence	  of	  the	  normative	  argument	  of	  democratic	  peace	  in	  the	  recollection	  of	  the	  interviewees,	  unlike	  the	  utilitarian	  argument.	  Out	  of	  the	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components,	  the	  interviewees	  gave	  answers	  that	  reflected	  the	  internalization	  of	  democratic	  values	  and	  norms,	  and	  the	  establishment	  of	  many-­‐sided	  relations	  between	  countries,	  creating	  economic	  interdependence	  as	  a	  necessity	  for	  achieving	  peace.	  While	  the	  statements	  show	  the	  presence	  of	  this	  logic	  in	  the	  EU’s	  decision	  to	  enlarge,	  the	  normative	  dimension	  offers	  less	  evidence.	  While	  almost	  all	  the	  interviewees	  agreed	  that	  democratization	  is	  actively	  pushed	  because	  the	  EU	  has	  interests	  in	  it,	  very	  few	  justified	  democratization	  efforts	  as	  a	  duty,	  moral	  exercise	  or	  solely	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  it	  is	  good	  in	  itself.	  Even	  if	  enlargement	  provides	  security	  for	  both	  parts,	  meaning	  the	  existing	  and	  newer	  member	  states,	  it	  was	  seldom	  sold	  as	  an	  argument	  solely	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  creating	  security	  or	  democracy	  in	  itself	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  acceding	  state.	  Thus,	  enlargement	  was	  not	  justified	  on	  moral	  grounds	  solely	  for	  serving	  the	  acceding	  party,	  but	  rather	  for	  both	  parties.	  Not	  all	  interviewees	  put	  weight	  on	  the	  notion	  that	  membership	  promotes	  democratization.	  Some	  put	  less	  emphasis	  on	  the	  issue.	  Dr.	  Passy	  even	  went	  as	  far	  as	  saying	  that	  enlargement	  is	  not	  about	  democratization	  at	  all,	  peculiarly	  enough	  considering	  the	  accession	  criteria:	  “They	  [the	  EU]	  do	  not	  treat	  enlargement	  as	  an	  instrument	  of	  democratization”(Passy,	  2013).	  While	  it	  might	  be	  that	  most	  of	  the	  interviewees	  see	  democracy	  as	  a	  good	  thing,	  they	  did	  not	  justify	  the	  enlargement	  on	  this	  basis	  to	  the	  same	  degree	  as	  they	  justified	  it	  with	  utility.	  Mr.	  MacDowall	  expressed	  his	  view	  that	  ideological	  factors	  played	  its	  part,	  and	  that	  it	  was	  an	  incentive	  for	  member	  states	  that	  democracy	  was	  good	  for	  Bulgaria:	  	  	   	  	  I	  think	  that	  there’s	  a	  liberal,	  almost	  imperialist	  view,	  that	  liberal	  democracy	  and	  free	  markets	  are	  the	  best	  way,	  and	  that	  these	  countries	  [Bulgaria	  and	  Romania]	  should	  benefit	  from	  them,	  and,	  that’s	  a	  view	  I	  suppose	  I	  happen	  to	  share,	  that	  the	  countries	  are	  better	  off	  as	  liberalized	  economies	  and	  democracies	  than	  they	  were	  under	  totalitarian	  dictatorship	  and	  communist	  systems.	  So	  those	  are	  factors.	  And	  again,	  the	  feeling	  that	  they	  were	  part	  of	  the	  European	  family	  and	  should	  be	  brought	  back	  into	  the	  family.	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (MacDowall,	  2013)	  	  While	  it	  is	  probable,	  and	  almost	  certain,	  that	  most	  of	  the	  interviewees	  happen	  to	  share	  this	  view	  of	  democracy,	  none	  of	  the	  others	  provided	  this	  type	  of	  normative	  concerns	  as	  primary	  concerns	  for	  member	  states.	  Mr.	  MacDowall	  acknowledged	  that	  the	  evidence	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for	  the	  EU	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  normative	  actor	  in	  the	  aspect	  of	  enlargement	  is	  ambiguous,	  and	  that	  a	  level	  of	  hypocrisy	  might	  be	  found	  in	  the	  member	  states’	  approach	  to	  democracy	  in	  their	  neighbourhood	  and	  worldwide:	  	  	   So	  this	  is	  a	  part	  of	  the	  vision	  that	  the	  world	  everywhere	  would	  be	  better	  of	  as	  a	  liberal	  democracy,	  but	  it’s	  also	  abundantly	  apparent	  that	  there	  is	  a	  great	  hypocrisy	  on	  this.	  The	  US,	  the	  UK	  and	  Europe,	  the	  European	  Union	  as	  a	  whole,	  and	  indeed	  most	  of	  its	  allies,	  with	  North	  America	  more	  broadly,	  Japan,	  Australia,	  are	  quite	  happy	  to	  prop	  up	  dictatorial	  regimes	  else	  where	  in	  the	  world.	  	  So	  the	  liberal	  democratic	  movement	  speaks	  with	  a	  forked	  tongue	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  these	  government’s	  actions.	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (MacDowall,	  2013)	  	  Only	  Ambassador	  Skarstein,	  out	  of	  the	  other	  informants,	  expressed	  normative	  concerns	  as	  playing	  a	  part	  in	  the	  decision	  to	  enlarge	  to	  Bulgaria,	  and	  cited	  their	  underdeveloped	  economy	  and	  low	  living	  standards	  as	  unacceptable	  for	  western	  democratic	  states:	  	  	   You	  achieve	  peace	  and	  stability	  through	  economic	  integration.	  In	  addition,	  it	  is	  not	  acceptable	  to	  have	  a	  poor	  backyard.	  Europe	  is	  divided	  in	  two,	  not	  in	  east	  and	  west,	  but	  in	  poor	  Europe	  and	  rich	  Europe	  (...)	  The	  general	  idea	  is	  that	  you	  cannot	  have	  peace,	  stability	  and	  security	  in	  a	  divided	  Europe.	  Either	  geographical	  divisions	  or	  economic	  divisions.	  That	  is	  the	  general	  idea.	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (Skarstein,	  2013)	  	  However,	  this	  argument	  does	  not	  escape	  the	  utility	  dimension	  either,	  as	  raising	  living	  standards	  and	  elevating	  the	  people	  out	  of	  poverty	  in	  Bulgaria	  is	  directly	  connected	  with	  the	  emergence	  of	  peaceful	  relations	  between	  states.	  While	  Western	  leaders	  and	  Western	  publics,	  may	  find	  poverty	  unacceptable	  and	  may	  seek	  to	  change	  this,	  it	  is	  widely	  seen	  as	  being	  in	  their	  interests.	  As	  Mr.	  MacDowall	  told	  me,	  when	  asked	  what	  the	  biggest	  security	  gain	  enlargement	  to	  Bulgaria	  would	  bring	  to	  the	  Union,	  he	  answered	  it	  was	  through	  the	  economic	  development	  that	  EU	  membership	  brings	  with	  it,	  that	  if	  social	  unrest	  in	  Bulgaria	  was	  unlikely	  before,	  it	  certainly	  is	  more	  unlikely	  now	  (MacDowall,	  2013).	  In	  addition,	  according	  to	  Ambassador	  Skarstein,	  the	  economic	  development	  of	  Bulgaria	  pacifies	  the	  threat	  of	  immigration	  to	  some	  degree,	  as	  has	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happened	  in	  other	  CEECs,	  where	  the	  threat	  of	  immigration	  was	  thought	  to	  be	  very	  high,	  but	  did	  not	  materialize	  to	  such	  an	  extent	  (Skarstein,	  2013).	  	  	  In	  this	  way,	  normative	  concerns	  seem	  to	  have	  played	  little	  part	  as	  motivation	  in	  it	  self,	  while	  norms,	  values	  and	  democratization	  was	  actively	  promoted	  as	  an	  instrument	  for	  the	  EU	  in	  order	  to	  pursue	  their	  own	  interest	  in	  peace.	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  normative	  justifications	  and	  concerns	  do	  not	  exist,	  but	  more	  that	  interests	  are	  more	  central	  to	  explain	  the	  approach	  of	  the	  Union	  in	  the	  empirical	  evidence	  of	  this	  particular	  study.	  The	  Union	  did	  wish	  for	  both	  democracy	  and	  peace	  for	  their	  neighbouring	  countries	  and	  soon-­‐to-­‐be	  members,	  including	  Bulgaria,	  but	  it	  is	  evident	  that	  this	  does	  not	  escape	  the	  fact	  that	  peaceful	  relations	  between	  states	  gain	  the	  Union,	  and	  are	  in	  the	  Unions	  interests.	  	  This	  point	  will	  be	  discussed	  further	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  process,	  as	  the	  Union’s	  strategy	  was	  altered	  for	  security	  concerns,	  even	  though	  such	  a	  move	  knowingly	  might	  undermine	  the	  democratic	  reforms	  in	  Bulgaria,	  and	  their	  strive	  towards	  establishing	  rule	  of	  law.	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5 Explaining	  the	  shifts	  in	  the	  EU	  strategy	  The	  reasoning	  behind	  the	  decision	  to	  enlarge	  has	  thus	  far	  shown	  that	  interests	  and	  the	  expected	  security	  gains	  seem	  to	  have	  been	  decisive	  for	  both	  theories’	  ability	  to	  explain	  the	  decision	  to	  enlarge	  to	  Bulgaria.	  Normative	  justification	  has	  not	  shown	  itself	  to	  be	  a	  central	  feature	  in	  the	  explanations	  of	  the	  interviewees	  in	  the	  same	  manner,	  though	  there	  have	  been	  a	  few	  exceptions.	  After	  investigating	  the	  security	  dimension	  in	  the	  initial	  decision	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  which	  kind	  of	  behaviour	  can	  be	  detected	  in	  the	  Union’s	  strategy	  and	  the	  process	  of	  Bulgaria’s	  membership	  bid?	  What	  were	  the	  priorities	  for	  the	  Union	  in	  their	  strategy?	  	  	  The	  geopolitical	  conditions,	  as	  it	  has	  been	  discussed,	  did	  not	  only	  affect	  the	  initial	  decisions	  of	  enlargement	  to	  Bulgaria,	  but	  also	  played	  heavily	  into	  the	  strategy,	  and	  even	  altered	  it,	  as	  it	  was	  changed	  based	  on	  the	  developments	  in	  the	  region	  during	  the	  last	  half	  of	  the	  1990s	  and	  in	  the	  first	  few	  years	  into	  the	  new	  millennium.	  As	  this	  chapter	  will	  argue	  in	  its	  concluding	  remarks,	  it	  was	  even	  altered	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  risks	  of	  undermining	  the	  reform	  efforts	  of	  Bulgaria,	  risking	  the	  results	  of	  the	  democratization	  and	  integration	  process,	  causing	  an	  enlargement	  to	  a	  country	  with	  high-­‐level	  corruption,	  severe	  organized	  crime	  and	  lacking	  standards	  in	  terms	  of	  rule	  of	  law.	  Two	  specific	  events	  are	  analysed;	  the	  1999	  reversal	  of	  the	  initial	  decision	  to	  keep	  Bulgaria	  out	  of	  the	  group	  of	  countries	  that	  opened	  negotiations	  in	  1997	  in	  spite	  of	  not	  fulfilling	  the	  criteria,	  and	  the	  EU’s	  decision	  to	  set	  an	  accession	  date	  in	  2002	  (Varwick,	  2000:157).	  In	  addition,	  post-­‐accession	  conditionality	  will	  be	  discussed.	  The	  chapter	  will	  be	  concluded	  with	  a	  summarizing	  discussion	  of	  its	  findings	  and	  theoretical	  implications.	  	  	  	  
5.1 The decision of 1999 to open membership negotiations While	  Bulgaria	  had	  signed	  the	  Association	  Agreement	  in	  1993	  and	  applied	  for	  membership	  in	  1995,	  the	  Agenda	  2000	  did	  not	  open	  for	  accession	  negotiations,	  as	  all	  the	  criteria	  had	  not	  been	  met	  by	  1997.	  Thus,	  the	  ‘Luxembourg	  six’	  opened	  negotiations,	  leaving	  Bulgaria,	  Romania,	  Latvia,	  Lithuania	  and	  Slovakia	  behind,	  stating	  that	  negotiations	  would	  commence	  once	  they	  had	  made	  progress	  in	  satisfying	  the	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Copenhagen	  Criteria	  (Smith,	  2004:187,	  193;	  Tatham,	  2009:95,	  113;	  Wallace,	  2000:17).	  Thus,	  the	  original	  strategy	  of	  the	  Union	  was	  clear.	  Accession	  conditionality	  was	  meant	  to	  keep	  up	  pressure	  on	  the	  candidate	  countries	  which	  had	  not	  sufficiently	  progressed	  in	  terms	  of	  satisfying	  the	  criteria.	  	  	  The	  strategy	  proved	  insufficient	  after	  the	  events	  of	  1999	  and	  the	  NATO-­‐led	  military	  intervention	  in	  Kosovo,	  as	  fears	  grew	  over	  the	  nature	  of	  political	  development	  in	  the	  region.	  The	  need	  for	  adapting	  the	  strategy	  to	  the	  geopolitical	  environment	  was	  evident,	  and	  therefore	  the	  European	  Union	  changed	  course,	  and	  opened	  for	  negotiations	  with	  all	  countries	  that	  were	  deemed	  to	  have	  made	  sufficient	  progress	  in	  fulfilling	  the	  political	  criteria	  from	  Copenhagen	  (Tatham,	  2009:91,	  92).	  	  	  This	  change	  of	  strategy,	  and	  the	  geopolitical	  causes	  of	  adapting	  a	  new	  approach	  is	  arguably	  one	  of	  the	  geopolitical	  impacts	  on	  enlargement	  that	  have	  the	  strongest	  empirical	  backing,	  and	  was	  equally	  reflected	  in	  the	  interviews.	  There	  were	  several	  reasons	  why	  this	  change	  of	  strategy	  was	  deemed	  necessary:	  First	  of	  all	  there	  was	  a	  distinct	  and	  urgent	  interest	  in	  projecting	  stability	  in	  the	  region,	  and	  an	  inherent	  risk	  of	  leaving	  the	  laggards	  behind	  (Tatham,	  2009:94;	  Skålnes,	  2005:224,	  225;	  Smith,	  2004:186;	  Higashino,	  2004:360,	  361).	  Neill	  Nugent	  writes	  that	  the	  change	  of	  enlargement	  strategy	  was	  a	  direct	  consequence	  of	  violence	  in	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia:	  	  	   …	  the	  NATO	  campaign	  in	  Kosovo	  in	  early	  1999	  highlighted	  the	  continuous	  dangers	  in	  South-­‐East	  Europe	  and	  the	  broader	  dangers	  inherent	  in	  letting	  the	  ‘second	  wave’	  believe	  they	  were	  being	  left	  on	  the	  side.	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (Nugent,	  2004:36)	   	  
	  Ambassador	  Bull	  told	  me,	  when	  asked	  why	  the	  decision	  of	  opening	  negotiations	  and	  setting	  an	  accession	  date	  took	  place	  in	  spite	  of	  Bulgaria’s	  lack	  of	  readiness,	  that	  the	  experience	  of	  recurring	  conflict	  in	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia	  required	  stabilizing	  efforts	  and	  that	  because	  of	  this	  “the	  political	  priorities	  outweighed	  the	  need	  for	  fulfilling	  the	  criteria”	  (Bull,	  2013).	  The	  same	  notion	  was	  reflected	  from	  Ambassador	  Benisheva,	  who	  drew	  on	  both	  the	  instability	  in	  Kosovo	  as	  well	  as	  Chechnya,	  as	  a	  situation	  that	  required	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accession	  for	  the	  countries	  that	  were	  taking	  steps	  in	  the	  right	  direction,	  such	  as	  Bulgaria:	  	  	   In	  1999	  we	  had	  the	  Kosovo	  crisis,	  and	  the	  Chechnya	  crisis,	  and	  for	  political	  reasons,	  it	  was	  clear	  that	  the	  accession	  was	  a	  stabilizing	  factor	  for	  the	  geographical	  region.	  It	  was	  decided	  that	  all	  the	  countries	  that	  fulfilled	  political	  criteria	  would	  start	  negotiations.	  So	  the	  economic	  assessment	  was	  at	  that	  time	  considered	  less	  important,	  compared	  to	  the	  sharing	  of	  common	  values.	  So	  that	  explains	  the	  decision	  of	  1999.	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (Benisheva,	  2013)	  	  	  Though	  Ambassador	  Benisheva,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Commission	  officials,	  justified	  opening	  negotiations	  due	  to	  the	  progress	  on	  the	  political	  criteria,	  there	  is	  cause	  for	  questioning	  this	  assessment	  of	  Bulgaria,	  especially	  in	  the	  area	  of	  rule	  of	  law.	  Indeed,	  several	  of	  the	  interviewees,	  and	  the	  Commission’s	  own	  post-­‐accession	  mechanism	  took	  issue	  with	  the	  assessment	  of	  Bulgaria	  fulfilling	  these	  parts	  of	  the	  criteria,	  at	  both	  the	  opening	  of	  negotiations	  and	  time	  of	  accession	  (The	  EU	  Commission,	  2006;	  Skarstein,	  2013;	  Bull,	  2013).	  Indeed,	  there	  were	  such	  worries	  about	  their	  readiness	  that,	  on	  the	  eve	  of	  accession,	  one	  expert	  commented	  that	  no	  one	  knew	  how	  well	  Bulgaria	  had	  implemented	  their	  reforms,	  commenting	  that	  they	  were	  “EU-­‐compliant	  on	  paper	  only”	  (Moravcsik,	  2006).	  	  	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  need	  for	  projecting	  stability	  in	  the	  region,	  the	  EU	  felt	  a	  need	  for	  rewarding	  Bulgaria	  for	  its	  handling	  of	  the	  crisis	  Kosovo	  and	  its	  display	  as	  a	  key	  diplomatic	  partner	  in	  their	  alignment	  to	  the	  Western	  foreign	  policy	  goals,	  even	  when	  it	  came	  at	  great	  domestic	  expense.	  Bulgaria	  suffered	  staggering	  economic	  losses	  through	  the	  boycott	  of	  the	  Milosevic	  regime,	  and	  the	  NATO	  bombings	  saw	  great	  opposition	  in	  the	  Bulgarian	  public	  (Pantev,	  2008:102).	  The	  fact	  that	  Bulgaria	  was	  seen	  as	  willing	  to	  pay	  the	  price	  and	  align	  with	  the	  West	  was	  crucial	  for	  their	  eventual	  granting	  of	  both	  the	  opening	  of	  negotiations	  and	  the	  eventual	  setting	  of	  an	  accession	  date	  (Papadimitriou	  and	  Gateva,	  2009:161;	  Haughton,	  2007:238).	  As	  Karen	  Smith	  writes:	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..	  given	  the	  instability	  of	  their	  neighbourhood	  -­‐	  and	  the	  support	  they	  had	  given	  to	  NATO	  action,	  simply	  made	  it	  infeasible	  not	  to	  include	  them	  in	  the	  next	  round	  of	  negotiation	  talks.	  	   (Smith,	  2011:311,	  313).	  	  	  Dr.	  Passy	  emphasized	  the	  Kosovo	  crisis	  as	  a	  major	  shifting	  point	  for	  Bulgaria’s	  prospects	  for	  EU	  membership	  during	  our	  interview:	  	  	   1999	  was	  a	  key	  year,	  because	  then	  we	  supported	  the	  operation	  in	  Kosovo.	  This	  was	  a	  very	  important	  image-­‐making	  for	  Bulgaria	  (…)	  Our	  participation	  in	  Kosovo,	  I	  would	  say,	  was	  even	  more	  important	  for	  our	  membership	  process	  in	  the	  EU	  than	  for	  NATO.	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (Passy,	  2013)	  	  The	  same	  type	  of	  reasoning	  was	  reflected	  by	  the	  Foreign	  affairs	  advisor	  to	  the	  President	  of	  Bulgaria	  at	  the	  time,	  Mrs.	  Popova,	  highlighting	  that	  Bulgaria’s	  support	  came	  at	  a	  high	  price	  domestically,	  and	  that	  this	  was	  recognized	  by	  the	  EU:	  	  	   We	  were	  very	  supportive	  during	  the	  crisis,	  in	  spite	  of	  it	  not	  being	  in	  our	  interest,	  for	  economic	  reasons	  for	  example.	  The	  public	  opinion	  was	  not	  supportive	  of	  the	  NATO	  strikes	  and	  the	  intervention	  in	  Serbia	  (…)	  All	  the	  time	  we	  were	  a	  very	  reliable	  partner,	  and	  that	  enhanced	  our	  quest	  for	  membership.	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (Popova,	  2013)	  	  Mr.	  MacDowall	  told	  me,	  when	  asked	  why	  the	  EU	  decided	  to	  open	  negotiations	  despite	  fulfilling	  the	  criteria,	  that	  it	  was	  all	  about	  rewarding	  their	  alignment	  to	  Western	  foreign	  policy,	  even	  if	  that	  meant	  going	  up	  against	  a	  culturally	  similar	  country,	  with	  which	  Bulgaria	  had	  good	  relations,	  as	  well	  as	  religious	  and	  historical	  bonds:	  	  	   Bulgaria	  was	  seen	  as	  very	  willing	  to	  go	  against	  a	  country	  that	  they	  had	  a	  cultural	  allegiance	  [with],	  even	  though	  they	  have	  fought	  bitterly	  over	  the	  past	  century	  over	  Macedonia	  and	  the	  marches.	  Again,	  I	  think	  it	  [the	  EU]	  is	  trying	  not	  to	  reward	  bad	  behaviour.	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (MacDowall,	  2013)	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The	  opening	  of	  negotiations	  thus	  seem	  to	  be	  justified	  of	  geopolitical	  grounds,	  and	  less	  on	  the	  fulfilment	  of	  the	  criteria,	  and	  the	  Union	  willingly	  took	  risks	  in	  its	  decision,	  because	  the	  geopolitical	  environment	  was	  unstable,	  and	  the	  developments	  called	  for	  awarding	  Bulgaria	  for	  the	  progress	  it	  had	  made,	  the	  support	  it	  had	  given,	  and	  reducing	  the	  risks	  of	  alienation.	  	  	  
5.2 Setting an accession date The	  decision	  to	  open	  negotiations	  seems	  to	  have	  geopolitical	  reasons	  that	  outweighed	  the	  need	  for	  fulfilling	  the	  criteria	  at	  the	  time.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  decision	  of	  opening	  negotiations	  in	  1999,	  the	  EU	  faced	  a	  similar	  dilemma	  at	  the	  Copenhagen	  Council	  of	  2002	  when	  deciding	  on	  the	  setting	  of	  accession	  dates.	  While	  the	  pre-­‐ins,	  as	  well	  as	  some	  of	  the	  initial	  laggards,	  had	  fulfilled	  the	  economic	  criteria,	  were	  making	  excellent	  progress	  in	  the	  negotiations,	  and	  were	  well	  underway	  of	  transposing	  the	  acquis	  into	  domestic	  legislation,	  Romania	  and	  Bulgaria	  were	  again	  lagging	  behind.	  The	  Union	  set	  the	  accession	  dates	  for	  the	  new	  members:	  Malta,	  Cyprus	  and	  the	  CEECs,	  except	  Bulgaria	  and	  Romania	  (Smith,	  2004:186).	  Bulgaria	  and	  Romania	  had	  negotiated	  since	  1999,	  but	  had	  not	  succeeded	  in	  completing	  them,	  and	  their	  lack	  of	  readiness	  left	  the	  two	  countries	  in	  the	  slow-­‐lane,	  yet	  again.	  The	  Council	  therefore	  announced	  that:	  	  	   …	  depending	  on	  further	  progress	  in	  complying	  with	  the	  membership	  criteria,	  the	  objective	  is	  to	  welcome	  Romania	  and	  Bulgaria	  as	  members	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  in	  2007.	  	   (Tatham,	  2009:112).	  	  	  This	  was	  a	  development	  few	  had	  foreseen,	  and	  is	  unusual	  because	  the	  EU	  had	  been	  extremely	  careful	  not	  to	  set	  clear	  accession	  dates,	  fearing	  that	  it	  would	  undermine	  the	  reform	  efforts	  of	  the	  countries.	  By	  setting	  a	  date,	  the	  Union	  may	  find	  it	  difficult	  turning	  down	  applicants,	  if	  the	  reforms	  have	  not	  been	  adequately	  carried	  out	  by	  the	  set	  date	  (Smith,	  2004:193).	  However,	  the	  EU	  saw	  too	  many	  risks	  in	  leaving	  Bulgaria	  and	  Romania	  in	  the	  slow	  lane	  again.	  There	  were	  several	  reasons	  why	  the	  EU	  decided	  to	  set	  a	  date,	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  inherent	  risk	  of	  undermining	  the	  efficiency.	  	  	  
	  	   75	  
First	  of	  all,	  the	  need	  for	  rewarding	  their	  efforts,	  given	  their	  geopolitical	  environment,	  was	  evident.	  When	  asked	  why	  the	  EU	  would	  set	  an	  approximate	  accession	  date,	  despite	  the	  inherent	  risks	  of	  undermining	  reform	  efforts,	  Mr.	  MacDowall	  emphasized	  that	  not	  acknowledging	  their	  efforts	  would	  send	  the	  wrong	  message	  to	  an	  already	  unstable	  region:	  	  	   I	  think	  that	  the	  Kosovo	  conflict,	  and	  the	  feeling	  that	  those	  countries	  [which]	  have	  embraced	  democracy	  and	  were	  liberalizing	  their	  economies	  should	  be	  rewarded	  for	  this,	  will	  have	  been	  a	  strong	  aspect	  of	  this.	  In	  2002	  you	  have	  only	  had	  a	  year	  or	  two	  since	  the	  revolution	  in	  Serbia.	  You’re	  still	  in	  a	  state	  where	  Serbia	  is	  a	  fairly	  autocratic	  country,	  very	  much	  in	  a	  transition	  and	  very	  much	  behind	  other	  countries	  in	  Eastern	  Europe.	  You	  have	  Croatia	  recovering	  from	  war	  still.	  Albania	  five	  years	  after	  a	  situation	  that	  was	  very	  nearly	  a	  civil	  war,	  in	  Macedonia	  there	  were	  squirmishes	  that	  almost	  amounted	  to	  civil	  war	  in	  2001.	  So	  with	  the	  western	  Balkans	  still	  troubled,	  congratulating	  or	  acknowledging	  the	  efforts	  of	  Romania	  and	  Bulgaria,	  which	  both	  had	  had	  extremely	  difficult	  but	  obviously	  conflict	  free	  transitions,	  was	  the	  right	  thing	  to	  do.	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (MacDowall,	  2013)	  	  Ambassador	  Skarstein’s	  recollection	  followed	  the	  same	  logic,	  telling	  me	  that	  it	  was	  important	  to	  send	  a	  strong	  message	  of	  hope	  to	  the	  countries	  that	  were	  in	  turmoil,	  that	  progress	  is	  possible,	  and	  EU	  membership	  achievable,	  when	  asked	  why	  the	  accession	  date	  was	  set	  before	  the	  end	  of	  negotiations.	  Thus,	  the	  EU	  was	  exerting	  a	  power	  of	  example:	  	  	   I	  think	  that	  letting	  in	  Romania,	  and	  also	  Bulgaria,	  which	  had	  even	  greater	  challenges,	  would	  give	  hope	  to	  these	  countries.	  Because	  Bulgaria,	  when	  the	  Wall	  fell,	  was	  the	  country	  with	  the	  biggest	  challenges,	  after	  Albania.	  When	  they	  have	  done	  it,	  then	  it	  is	  possible	  for	  everyone	  to	  do	  it.	  So	  that	  is	  the	  logic	  behind	  it.	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (Skarstein,	  2013)	  	  A	  second	  concern	  for	  the	  Union	  that	  ultimately	  resulted	  in	  the	  setting	  of	  a	  target	  accession	  date	  was	  the	  risk	  of	  alienating	  Bulgaria	  and	  Romania	  along	  the	  way.	  For	  a	  long	  time,	  the	  Union	  had	  been	  worried	  that	  if	  they	  exercised	  conditionality	  without	  giving	  carrots	  along	  the	  way,	  the	  applicant	  countries	  might	  fall	  under	  Russian	  influence,	  or	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loose	  interest	  in	  acceding	  the	  Union	  (Smith,	  2004:180).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  as	  Smith	  writes,	  the	  risk	  of	  the	  countries	  returning	  to	  Moscow’s	  sphere	  should	  not	  be	  exaggerated	  because	  of	  the	  weakness	  of	  the	  Russian	  regime,	  even	  if	  Bulgaria	  was	  feared	  to	  be	  considering	  a	  counter-­‐alliance	  with	  Russia	  at	  some	  point	  (Smith,	  2004:180,	  181).	  However,	  Ambassador	  Bull	  expressed	  that	  the	  EU	  was	  warned	  that	  the	  public	  opinion	  might	  be	  lost	  without	  progress	  in	  terms	  of	  membership,	  but	  also	  that	  there	  was	  a	  considerable	  risk	  that	  Bulgaria	  could	  return	  to	  the	  Russian	  sphere	  of	  influence:	  	  	   The	  politicians	  of	  both	  Bulgaria	  and	  Romania	  warned	  all	  along	  that	  if	  they	  did	  not	  join	  quickly,	  the	  development	  might	  turn.	  That	  the	  population	  would	  say	  “we	  have	  had	  enough	  of	  this”	  (…)	  If	  they	  did	  not	  take	  them	  in	  now,	  the	  tide	  might	  turn,	  like	  you	  can	  see	  with	  Turkey	  now.	  There	  were	  worries	  that	  they	  might	  turn	  towards	  Russia.	  	  (Bull,	  2013)	  	  	  There	  was	  a	  general	  feeling	  that	  it	  was	  risky	  to	  keep	  them	  in	  the	  candidate	  period	  forever,	  given	  the	  circumstances.	  Therefore	  it	  was	  important	  to	  set	  a	  target	  date,	  and	  there	  were	  hopes	  that	  the	  development	  would	  pick	  up	  once	  the	  candidate	  countries	  were	  in.	  Ambassador	  Skarstein	  reflected	  over	  the	  setting	  of	  the	  accession	  date:	  	  	   The	  EU	  had	  set	  a	  date,	  January	  2007,	  with	  the	  option	  of	  delaying	  until	  January	  2008.	  What	  would	  happen	  in	  a	  year	  that	  would	  make	  postponement	  worth	  it?	  If	  not	  2007,	  what	  would	  be	  better	  in	  2008?	  So	  the	  EU	  hoped	  that	  if	  they	  joined,	  the	  reforms	  would	  pick	  up	  their	  pace.	  And	  one	  would	  not	  have	  to	  accept	  the	  cost	  of	  saying	  no	  yet	  again.	  It	  was	  a	  vital	  concern	  to	  keep	  them	  from	  Russian	  influence.	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (Skarstein,	  2013)	  	  Thus,	  the	  setting	  of	  a	  date,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  opening	  of	  negotiations,	  seem	  to	  have	  been	  formed	  more	  by	  a	  reactive	  strategy	  based	  on	  geopolitical	  incentives,	  rather	  than	  the	  fulfilment	  of	  the	  criteria.	  The	  EU	  was	  fully	  aware	  that	  they	  risked	  the	  efficiency	  of	  conditionality,	  and	  that	  their	  actions	  might	  undermine	  reform	  efforts.	  The	  risk	  was	  deemed	  too	  great	  not	  to	  give	  Bulgaria	  clear	  promises	  of	  accession.	  And	  so	  Bulgaria,	  along	  with	  Romania,	  acceded	  the	  Union	  on	  the	  1st	  of	  January,	  2007.	  The	  strategy	  of	  the	  Union	  was	  altered,	  despite	  the	  risks	  that	  it	  undermined	  the	  instrument	  of	  conditionality,	  and	  ‘entrapped’	  the	  EU,	  making	  it	  to	  costly	  for	  member	  states	  to	  say	  no	  if	  sufficient	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progress	  was	  lacking	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  set	  accession	  date	  (Smith,	  2004:193).	  By	  the	  same	  logic	  as	  with	  the	  opening	  of	  negotiations,	  a	  fixed	  accession	  date	  might	  undermine	  the	  democratization	  efforts,	  and	  slow	  them	  down,	  rather	  than	  keeping	  them	  up,	  resulting	  in	  a	  premature	  accession	  for	  the	  country	  without	  the	  fulfilment	  of	  the	  criteria.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  Union	  went	  as	  far	  as	  promising	  an	  accession	  date,	  hoping	  that	  additional	  efforts	  would	  be	  made	  in	  order	  to	  grant	  membership	  on	  the	  set	  date.	  	  
5.3 Post-accession conditionality in the case of Bulgaria Even	  before	  the	  accession,	  it	  seemed	  evident	  that	  reforms	  had	  not	  gone	  as	  far	  as	  one	  had	  hoped	  in	  Bulgaria.	  While	  the	  establishment	  of	  institutions	  had	  been	  carried	  out,	  the	  acquis	  had	  been	  transposed,	  and	  the	  formal	  requirements	  fulfilled,	  there	  were	  clear	  indications	  that	  in	  the	  areas	  of	  judicial	  reform,	  rule	  of	  law,	  organized	  crime	  and	  corruption,	  results	  were	  lacking	  (Moravcsik,	  2006).	  As	  one	  expert	  said	  of	  Bulgaria	  and	  Romania	  before	  their	  accession,	  they	  were	  suspected	  to	  be	  “EU-­‐compliant	  on	  paper	  only”,	  and	  that	  “no	  one	  knows	  if	  they	  are	  really	  enforcing	  the	  rules”	  and	  the	  acquis	  (Moravcsik,	  2006).	  This	  resulted	  in	  the	  unprecedented	  establishment	  of	  the	  Cooperation	  
and	  Verification	  Mechanism,	  a	  Commission	  reporting	  mechanism	  for	  setting	  benchmarks	  and	  evaluating	  reforms	  in	  Bulgaria	  and	  Romania,	  within	  the	  areas	  that	  were	  deemed	  to	  be	  below	  par	  in	  terms	  of	  fulfilling	  the	  criteria	  (The	  EU	  Commission,	  2006).	  The	  Commission	  decision	  that	  established	  the	  mechanism	  reads:	  	  	   The	  Commission,	  whilst	  noting	  the	  considerable	  efforts	  to	  complete	  Bulgaria's	  preparations	  for	  membership,	  has	  identified	  remaining	  issues	  in	  its	  Report	  of	  26	  September	  2006,	  in	  particular	  in	  the	  accountability	  and	  efficiency	  of	  the	  judicial	  system	  and	  law	  enforcement	  bodies,	  where	  further	  progress	  is	  still	  necessary	  to	  ensure	  their	  capacity	  to	  implement	  and	  apply	  the	  measures	  adopted	  to	  establish	  the	  internal	  market	  and	  the	  area	  of	  freedom,	  security	  and	  justice.	  (…)	  	  Article	  38	  of	  the	  Act	  of	  Accession	  empowers	  the	  Commission	  to	  take	  appropriate	  measures	  in	  case	  of	  imminent	  risk	  of	  serious	  shortcomings	  in	  Bulgaria	  in	  the	  transposition,	  state	  of	  implementation,	  or	  application	  of	  acts	  adopted	  under	  Title	  VI	  of	  the	  EU	  Treaty	  and	  of	  acts	  adopted	  under	  Title	  IV	  of	  the	  EC	  Treaty.	  (…)	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   The	  remaining	  issues	  in	  the	  accountability	  and	  efficiency	  of	  the	  judicial	  system	  and	  law	  enforcement	  bodies	  warrant	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  mechanism	  for	  cooperation	  and	  verification	  of	  the	  progress	  of	  Bulgaria	  to	  address	  specific	  benchmarks	  in	  the	  areas	  of	  judicial	  reform	  and	  the	  fight	  against	  corruption	  and	  organised	  crime.	  (…)	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  If	  Bulgaria	  should	  fail	  to	  address	  the	  benchmarks	  adequately,	  the	  Commission	  may	  apply	  safeguard	  measures	  based	  on	  articles	  37	  and	  38	  of	  the	  Act	  of	  Accession,	  including	  the	  suspension	  of	  Member	  States'	  obligation	  to	  recognise	  and	  execute,	  under	  the	  conditions	  laid	  down	  in	  Community	  law,	  Bulgarian	  judgments	  and	  judicial	  decisions,	  such	  as	  European	  arrest	  warrants.	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (The	  EU	  Commission,	  2006)	  	  Thus,	  the	  Commission	  established	  a	  yearly	  reporting	  mechanism,	  where	  reforms	  and	  progress	  would	  be	  evaluated,	  and	  benchmarks	  for	  the	  next	  year	  set,	  with	  the	  possibility	  of	  suspending	  vital	  reciprocal	  rights.	  In	  addition,	  the	  EU	  can	  suspend	  structural	  funds	  under	  suspicion	  of	  abuse	  and	  corruption	  with	  the	  funds,	  which	  it	  did	  in	  2008,	  following	  a	  series	  of	  abuse	  in	  infrastructure	  funds	  (Oxford	  Business	  Group,	  2008).	  In	  2012,	  after	  five	  years	  of	  operation	  for	  this	  CVM	  mechanism,	  it	  was	  renewed,	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  Bulgaria	  had	  not	  yet	  fulfilled	  the	  criteria	  properly,	  that	  proper	  rule	  of	  law	  was	  still	  lacking,	  and	  further	  efforts	  were	  needed	  to	  achieve	  the	  standards	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  in	  terms	  of	  fighting	  organized	  crime	  and	  corruption	  (The	  EU	  Commission,	  2012).	  	  	  Bulgaria	  has	  also	  aspired	  to	  join	  the	  Schengen	  area,	  an	  integrated	  part	  of	  the	  Area	  of	  Freedom,	  Security	  and	  Justice,	  with	  an	  original	  target	  accession	  date	  set	  for	  2011.	  However,	  their	  membership	  has	  been	  blocked	  on	  political	  grounds,	  despite	  their	  technical	  readiness.	  Commentators	  and	  politicians	  have	  been	  quick	  to	  tie	  the	  Schengen	  veto	  to	  the	  lacking	  progress	  under	  the	  CVM,	  and	  their	  premature	  accession	  in	  the	  EU	  in	  terms	  of	  readiness	  (EurActiv,	  2011a).	  In	  this	  way,	  some	  of	  the	  interviewees	  with	  knowledge	  of	  the	  Schengen	  membership	  process	  for	  Bulgaria,	  claimed	  that	  the	  CVM-­‐reports	  were	  critically	  assessed	  by	  the	  member	  states	  in	  regards	  to	  Bulgaria’s	  bid	  for	  Schengen.	  One	  interviewee	  who	  wished	  to	  remain	  anonymous	  when	  discussing	  this	  issue,	  linked	  the	  Schengen	  veto	  with	  the	  lacking	  progress	  under	  the	  CVM	  reports,	  and	  told	  me:	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   Frankly	  speaking,	  I	  think	  that	  this	  is	  political	  leverage	  at	  the	  moment	  (…)	  It	  is	  political	  leverage,	  which	  has	  its	  reasons.	  The	  situation	  with	  organized	  crime,	  corruption.	  (…)	  Of	  course,	  it	  is	  politically	  important	  for	  Bulgaria	  to	  be	  in	  Schengen.	  They	  have	  their	  grounds	  to	  do	  this.	  Technically	  Bulgaria	  is	  ready,	  but	  politically	  they	  are	  not	  ready.	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (Anonymous	  informant,	  2013)	  	  	  	  Ambassador	  Skarstein	  told	  me,	  when	  asked	  if	  she	  saw	  any	  connection	  between	  Schengen	  veto	  and	  the	  premature	  accession:	  “Definitely.	  Now	  they	  [the	  EU]	  are	  catching	  up	  what	  they	  did	  not	  manage	  to	  get	  done	  in	  the	  EU	  accession	  process,	  even	  if	  it	  is	  not	  said	  out	  loud”	  (Skarstein,	  2013).	  Thus	  it	  seems	  that	  conditionality	  continues	  after	  accession,	  and	  though	  progress	  has	  been	  made,	  results	  in	  terms	  of	  fulfilling	  the	  criteria	  and	  the	  standards	  of	  the	  Union	  are	  still	  lacking	  (The	  EU	  Commission,	  2012).	  	  	  
5.4 Theoretical implications of the empirical observations 
concerning the altering EU strategy In	  summary,	  one	  can	  argue	  that	  the	  choices	  made	  by	  the	  EU	  member	  states	  during	  the	  course	  of	  the	  accession	  process	  was	  meant	  to	  be	  a	  balanced	  approach	  to	  the	  circumstances	  in	  which	  the	  Union	  found	  itself.	  Though	  the	  European	  Union	  is	  seldom	  described	  as	  a	  strategic	  actor,	  the	  accession	  process	  of	  Bulgaria	  and	  Romania	  might	  prove	  to	  be	  the	  exception.	  In	  the	  face	  of	  geopolitical	  concerns,	  and	  the	  strategic	  environment	  at	  the	  time,	  the	  Union	  tried	  to	  balance	  the	  ‘carrot	  and	  stick’	  in	  their	  approach	  towards	  Bulgaria	  and	  Romania.	  In	  spite	  of	  the	  costs	  of	  giving	  up	  the	  instrument	  of	  conditionality,	  and	  the	  suspected	  risks	  of	  doing	  so,	  the	  Union’s	  decisions	  to	  open	  negotiations	  and	  set	  an	  accession	  date,	  as	  well	  as	  letting	  the	  countries	  accede	  when	  they	  did,	  was	  justified	  by	  the	  fear	  of	  future	  developments,	  namely	  what	  could	  happen	  in	  the	  long	  run	  without	  accession.	  The	  reasoning	  behind	  the	  decisions	  were	  mainly	  the	  fear	  of	  increased	  Russian	  influence	  in	  the	  country	  and	  increased	  structural	  competition,	  the	  fear	  of	  losing	  public	  support	  in	  the	  countries	  if	  they	  were	  kept	  in	  the	  slow	  lane	  for	  too	  long,	  the	  need	  for	  rewarding	  Bulgaria	  for	  aligning	  with	  Western	  policy	  positions	  at	  great	  domestic	  expense,	  and	  to	  stabilize	  the	  volatile	  region.	  Thus,	  the	  EU	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can	  be	  said	  to	  have	  been	  reactive	  in	  their	  approach	  to	  enlargement,	  and	  the	  security	  implications	  of	  enlargement	  brought	  about	  the	  changes	  in	  the	  Union’s	  strategy.	  	  	  What	  are	  the	  theoretical	  implications	  of	  these	  findings?	  First	  of	  all,	  it	  underlines	  the	  finding	  from	  the	  previous	  chapter	  that	  the	  promotion	  of	  democracy	  is	  a	  tool,	  and	  is	  useful	  for	  the	  EU	  member	  states,	  but	  is	  too	  one-­‐sided	  as	  a	  security-­‐policy	  for	  the	  EU,	  as	  security	  for	  the	  EU	  is	  a	  multi-­‐dimensional	  issue.	  Ensuring	  alignment	  and	  influence	  seem	  to	  have	  greater	  clout	  when	  dealing	  with	  the	  decisions	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  process,	  even	  if	  democratic	  regimes	  are	  more	  susceptible	  to	  Western	  European	  influence.	  Thus,	  democracy	  and	  civilizing	  efforts	  are	  tools	  for	  the	  Union,	  but	  they	  are	  not	  the	  only	  ones	  the	  EU	  relies	  on	  in	  the	  face	  of	  threats.	  Secondly,	  democracy-­‐promotion	  as	  a	  tool	  for	  conflict-­‐prevention	  is	  actively	  utilized,	  but	  is	  only	  an	  instrument,	  and	  not	  an	  end	  in	  itself.	  If	  the	  EU’s	  first	  priority	  was	  to	  establish	  rule	  of	  law	  in	  Bulgaria,	  justified	  on	  a	  normative	  basis	  because	  it	  is	  beneficial	  to	  Bulgarians,	  why	  did	  the	  member	  states	  inhibit	  their	  own	  ability	  to	  exercise	  conditionality,	  their	  most	  powerful	  ‘hard-­‐power’	  tool?	  It	  would	  seem	  strange,	  if	  achieving	  satisfactory	  results	  in	  terms	  of	  establishing	  a	  transparent	  and	  uncorrupted	  judiciary,	  proper	  rule	  of	  law	  and	  fighting	  organized	  crime	  and	  high-­‐level	  corruption	  was	  the	  key	  objective,	  one	  would	  give	  up	  their	  own	  ‘civilizing’	  tool.	  	  	  Normative	  concerns	  as	  projected	  by	  the	  democratic	  peace	  theory,	  such	  as	  promoting	  democracy,	  rule	  of	  law	  and	  liberal	  democratic	  values,	  because	  it	  is	  ‘good’	  and	  ‘right’,	  was	  not	  the	  primary	  priority	  for	  the	  Union	  in	  the	  process	  of	  enlargement	  to	  Bulgaria.	  The	  primary	  priority	  was	  ensuring	  that	  Russian	  influence	  was	  contained,	  public	  support	  for	  EU	  membership	  upheld,	  the	  long-­‐term	  stability	  of	  the	  region	  ensured,	  and	  making	  sure	  Bulgaria	  aligned	  itself	  with	  the	  Union	  and	  stayed	  on	  course	  for	  membership,	  and	  rewarding	  them	  for	  this.	  These	  concerns	  were	  primary	  in	  the	  process	  as	  it	  unfolded,	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  and	  transposition	  of	  the	  acquis	  was	  demoted	  to	  ‘second-­‐order’	  concerns,	  when	  primary	  concerns	  of	  security	  and	  stability	  were	  threatened.	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  normative	  concerns	  did	  not	  matter	  for	  the	  Union.	  	  It	  did,	  and	  according	  to	  the	  empirical	  findings,	  the	  EU	  has	  a	  direct	  interest	  in	  promoting	  these	  issues,	  specifically	  because	  the	  EU	  has	  an	  internal	  security	  interest	  in	  handling	  them.	  It	  was	  just	  thought	  less	  important	  than	  concerns	  of	  regional	  stability,	  security	  and	  long-­‐term	  strategic	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objectives	  at	  the	  time.	  	  Thus,	  the	  altering	  of	  strategy	  from	  the	  Union	  seems	  justified	  from	  a	  long-­‐term	  interest	  and	  security	  point	  of	  view,	  something	  that	  is	  compatible	  with	  the	  realist	  hypothesis.	  Democratic	  peace	  does	  not	  explain	  the	  EU’s	  conduct	  in	  the	  process,	  because	  the	  normative	  concerns	  were	  second-­‐order	  concerns,	  and	  the	  security	  threats	  and	  their	  response	  is	  not	  justified	  from	  a	  conflict	  prevention	  standpoint	  alone.	  	  	  However,	  it	  might	  be	  argued	  that	  Bulgaria	  would	  indeed	  be	  worse	  off	  if	  public	  support	  for	  membership	  dropped	  and	  alienated	  Bulgaria	  from	  wanting	  membership,	  if	  it	  fell	  under	  Russian	  influence,	  or	  indeed	  regional	  instability	  spread	  and	  jeopardized	  Bulgaria’s	  territory	  and	  population.	  In	  terms	  of	  succeeding	  with	  reforms,	  there	  was	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  pragmatism	  about	  what	  could	  be	  achieved,	  rather	  than	  what	  should	  be	  achieved.	  	  One	  Commission	  official’s	  statement	  about	  the	  readiness	  of	  these	  countries	  shortly	  before	  accession;	  “Romania	  may	  not	  look	  like	  Sweden	  yet,	  but	  they	  look	  a	  lot	  less	  like	  Azerbaijan”,	  seem	  to	  capture	  the	  essence	  of	  this	  argument,	  which	  is	  just	  as	  applicable	  to	  Bulgaria	  (Moravcsik,	  2006).	  If	  the	  goal	  of	  the	  EU	  was	  primarily	  civilizing	  Bulgaria	  for	  Bulgaria’s	  democratic,	  economic	  and	  security-­‐political	  benefit,	  it	  would	  be	  a	  lot	  more	  achievable	  if	  the	  EU	  avoided	  risking	  the	  alienation	  of	  the	  public	  and	  government,	  avoided	  regional	  instability	  and	  contained	  Russian	  influence,	  even	  if	  the	  EU	  had	  to	  be	  pragmatic	  during	  the	  course	  of	  the	  process.	  	  	  This	  is	  a	  valid	  point,	  and	  some	  of	  the	  evidence	  supports	  this	  line	  of	  reasoning.	  While	  it	  is	  true	  that	  such	  an	  idealist	  argument	  might	  have	  reigned	  as	  well,	  the	  response	  was	  justified	  primarily	  on	  strategic	  grounds,	  and	  based	  itself	  primarily	  on	  the	  situation	  in	  Kosovo,	  and	  geopolitical	  reasoning.	  Thus,	  by	  injecting	  pragmatism	  into	  a	  decision,	  it	  rejects	  idealism,	  and	  the	  EU	  had	  to	  be	  realistic	  about	  what	  could	  be	  achieved,	  and	  would	  be	  achieved,	  while	  still	  prioritizing	  its	  own	  security.	  This	  still	  follows	  a	  strategic	  logic	  of	  
realpolitik,	  that	  resonates	  better	  with	  realist	  theory	  than	  idealist	  approaches,	  because	  idealist	  theory	  would	  project	  that	  the	  EU	  achieves	  what	  is	  the	  desirable	  result,	  while	  realist	  theory	  projects	  that	  one	  would	  achieve	  the	  best	  possible	  results,	  given	  the	  circumstances	  in	  which	  the	  member	  states	  found	  themselves.	  There	  is	  a	  sharp	  distinction.	  The	  empirical	  evidence	  of	  pragmatic	  behaviour	  of	  the	  EU	  during	  the	  course	  of	  the	  process	  thus	  fits	  better	  with	  realist	  theory,	  best	  put	  in	  the	  words	  of	  Hans	  Morgenthau:	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   Political	  realism	  does	  not	  require,	  nor	  does	  it	  condone,	  indifference	  to	  political	  ideals	  and	  moral	  principles,	  but	  it	  requires	  a	  sharp	  distinction	  between	  the	  desirable	  and	  the	  possible	  –	  between	  what	  is	  desirable	  everywhere	  and	  at	  all	  times	  and	  what	  is	  possible	  under	  the	  concrete	  circumstances	  of	  time	  and	  place.	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (Hyde-­‐Price,	  2008:31)	  	  An	  interesting	  aspect	  of	  the	  premature	  enlargement	  to	  Bulgaria,	  is	  why	  there	  was	  agreement	  to	  enlarge,	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  costs	  that	  came	  with	  it.	  While	  this	  particular	  study,	  for	  reasons	  of	  scope	  and	  reach,	  treats	  the	  EU	  as	  a	  macro-­‐entity	  under	  both	  theories,	  one	  can	  presume	  that	  countries	  such	  as	  Ireland,	  or	  Portugal	  or	  Luxembourg	  have	  less	  interest	  in	  enlargement	  than	  other	  larger	  countries	  from	  a	  security-­‐political	  point	  of	  view.	  If	  letting	  in	  Bulgaria	  prematurely,	  meaning	  in	  essence	  that	  it	  was	  free-­‐riding	  as	  it	  had	  not	  accomplished	  what	  others	  had,	  and	  has	  not	  achieved	  the	  same	  standards,	  was	  reasoned	  from	  a	  power-­‐structural	  and	  geo-­‐political	  point	  of	  view,	  why	  did	  these	  smaller	  nations	  agree	  if	  they	  had	  veto-­‐powers?	  Why	  did	  they	  keep	  their	  promises,	  and	  accept	  costs,	  seeing	  as	  they	  are	  not	  neither	  geographically	  close,	  nor	  take	  measure	  of	  themselves	  to	  be	  powerful	  players	  who	  have	  an	  interest	  in	  shaping	  their	  external	  milieu,	  in	  contrast	  to	  Germany,	  France	  or	  Britain?	  Mr.	  MacDowall	  explained	  that	  agreement	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  to	  these	  long-­‐term	  strategic	  benefits	  for	  Europe	  was	  caused	  both	  by	  countries’	  interests	  in	  legitimacy,	  as	  well	  as	  bargaining	  powers:	  	  	   I	  think	  you	  have	  those	  aspects,	  again,	  of	  what	  are	  the	  benefits,	  and	  if	  the	  costs	  outweighed	  the	  benefits.	  As	  far	  as	  every	  country	  was	  concerned,	  even	  if	  there	  were	  countries	  that	  were	  sceptical	  about	  Romania	  and	  Bulgaria,	  the	  cost	  of	  becoming	  a	  diplomatic	  piranha	  at	  Union	  level	  and	  thereby	  blocking	  their	  membership,	  was	  too	  much	  to	  pay	  (…)	  Even	  countries	  that	  saw	  very	  little	  to	  gain,	  or	  even	  thought	  they	  would	  lose	  out	  to	  Bulgaria	  joining,	  I’m	  not	  sure	  there	  were	  any	  countries	  like	  that	  in	  terms	  of	  government	  or	  governmental	  level,	  even	  they	  weren’t	  going	  to	  veto	  it	  because	  they	  saw	  they	  costs	  of	  annoying	  those	  powerful	  countries	  which	  were	  in	  favour	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (MacDowall,	  2013)	  	  Thus,	  power	  matters	  in	  the	  negotiation	  of	  the	  decision	  and	  execution	  of	  strategy,	  and	  countries	  had	  an	  interest	  in	  maintaining	  their	  own	  legitimacy.	  Ambassador	  Skarstein	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reflected	  the	  same.	  She	  emphasized	  that	  breaking	  promises	  is	  a	  cost	  in	  itself	  for	  member	  states	  (Skarstein,	  2013).	  Therefore,	  countries	  do	  not	  keep	  promises,	  nor	  accept	  costs	  in	  this	  case	  because	  it	  is	  good	  or	  right,	  such	  as	  constructivists	  project,	  but	  rather	  because	  they	  have	  an	  interest	  in	  it.	  Thus,	  the	  cohesion	  of	  EU	  member	  states	  in	  their	  decision	  and	  strategy	  fits	  with	  realist	  assumptions	  of	  decision-­‐making,	  meaning	  that	  the	  EU	  is	  a	  vehicle	  for	  member	  state	  interests,	  that	  power	  matters	  in	  bargaining,	  that	  the	  EU	  seeks	  to	  shape	  its	  external	  environment,	  driven	  by	  the	  most	  powerful	  member	  states,	  and	  indicates	  that	  promises	  and	  legitimacy	  is	  directly	  connected	  with	  interests	  and	  power.	  Thus,	  while	  these	  notions	  require	  further	  investigation,	  the	  evidence	  of	  this	  study	  seem	  to	  reject	  ‘rhetorical	  entrapment’	  arguments	  which	  are	  normatively	  justified,	  and	  implicates	  that	  the	  basic	  arguments	  of	  constructivist	  enlargement	  research	  has	  limitations	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Bulgaria.	  	  	  After	  assessing	  both	  the	  empirical	  evidence	  of	  the	  security	  dimension	  of	  enlargement	  in	  the	  decision	  to	  enlarge	  to	  Bulgaria	  and	  the	  altering	  EU	  strategy,	  the	  study	  will	  conclude	  its	  findings	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	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6 Conclusion,	  limitations	  and	  the	  prospects	  of	  future	  research	  After	  investigating	  the	  collected	  evidence	  through	  the	  last	  two	  chapters,	  this	  concluding	  chapter	  will	  first	  briefly	  summarize	  and	  discuss	  the	  main	  findings	  of	  this	  study,	  before	  providing	  an	  answer	  to	  the	  research	  question,	  and	  compare	  the	  hypotheses	  of	  the	  study	  with	  the	  findings	  from	  the	  empirical	  analysis.	  Thereafter,	  limitations	  to	  the	  study	  will	  be	  discussed	  briefly,	  and	  the	  outlook	  for	  further	  research	  and	  the	  impact	  on	  the	  future	  research	  on	  EU	  security	  and	  enlargement	  will	  be	  assessed.	  	  
6.1 Findings and conclusions The	  review	  and	  analysis	  of	  the	  empirical	  evidence	  through	  the	  last	  chapters	  have	  shown	  that	  the	  security	  dimension	  in	  the	  European	  Union	  enlargement	  to	  Bulgaria	  was	  a	  present,	  evident	  and	  influential	  part	  of	  the	  Union’s	  enlargement	  policy.	  On	  the	  whole,	  most	  of	  the	  interviewees	  sighted	  security	  as	  the	  most	  important	  reason	  for	  enlarging	  to	  Bulgaria	  in	  the	  first	  place,	  trumping	  economic	  and	  ideological	  reasons.	  The	  general	  finding	  of	  this	  study	  is	  that	  security	  does	  matter	  in	  enlargement	  policy	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Bulgaria,	  and	  that	  it	  not	  only	  influenced	  and	  motivated	  the	  decision	  to	  enlarge,	  but	  heavily	  influenced	  the	  EU’s	  strategy	  towards	  Bulgaria’s	  accession.	  	  	  The	  first	  and	  primary	  conclusion	  is	  that	  the	  realist	  hypothesis	  is	  confirmed.	  The	  EU	  acted	  strategically	  in	  its	  decision	  and	  strategy	  towards	  the	  enlargement	  to	  Bulgaria,	  prioritizing	  its	  own	  long-­‐term	  security	  and	  strategic	  interests.	  This	  was	  found	  to	  be	  the	  case	  in	  containing	  Russian	  influence,	  where	  the	  argument	  is	  strong,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  EU’s	  direct	  interests	  in	  stabilizing	  the	  Balkans.	  Bulgaria	  was	  seen	  as	  a	  key	  piece	  of	  the	  puzzle	  in	  their	  approach,	  and	  the	  EU	  utilized	  the	  enlargement	  in	  order	  to	  exercise	  a	  power	  of	  example,	  and	  utilized	  its	  influence	  in	  order	  to	  bring	  about	  the	  outcomes	  that	  were	  desired	  by	  the	  Union.	  These	  two	  considerations	  were	  crucial	  factors	  that	  both	  contributed	  to	  why	  and	  how	  the	  EU	  chose	  to	  enlarge	  to	  Bulgaria.	  In	  addition,	  the	  long	  term	  interests	  in	  energy	  security,	  which	  are	  closely	  connected	  to	  limiting	  Russian	  influence	  in	  the	  region,	  as	  well	  as	  prioritizing	  the	  fight	  against	  trans-­‐national	  organized	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crime	  and	  immigration,	  as	  well	  as	  boosting	  its	  own	  power,	  influence,	  reach	  and	  weight,	  were	  evident	  motivations.	  These	  were	  key	  interests	  for	  the	  Union,	  and	  they	  also	  played	  into	  the	  decision	  to	  enlarge.	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  EU	  boosted	  its	  own	  security,	  and	  utilized	  enlargement	  in	  its	  pursuit	  of	  interests,	  prioritizing	  these	  long-­‐term	  considerations	  as	  the	  primary	  concerns,	  and	  even	  accepting	  costs	  in	  doing	  so.	  	  	  Secondly,	  the	  hypothesis	  of	  democratic	  peace	  and	  extending	  the	  security	  community	  can	  be	  partially	  confirmed.	  The	  security-­‐political	  intention	  of	  enlargement	  was	  in	  many	  ways	  evident,	  enlargement	  was	  meant	  to	  be	  the	  primary	  mechanism	  through	  which	  the	  EU	  exports	  liberal	  democratic	  values	  and	  establishes	  many-­‐sided	  economic	  relations	  to	  Bulgaria,	  with	  the	  expectation	  of	  making	  conflict	  far	  less	  likely.	  The	  continuation	  of	  the	  peace	  project	  was	  supported	  by	  many	  of	  the	  interviewees,	  and	  the	  expected	  utility	  that	  the	  EU	  expected	  from	  it	  was	  clearly	  security-­‐political.	  Thus,	  this	  particular	  logic	  coexist	  with	  the	  logic	  of	  realpolitik,	  both	  based	  on	  securing	  EU	  interests,	  its	  population	  and	  industries.	  While	  democratic	  peace	  and	  security	  community	  logics	  are	  one-­‐dimensional,	  the	  approach	  of	  the	  Union	  was	  far	  more	  diverse	  than	  merely	  avoiding	  conflict.	  Its	  take	  on	  security	  in	  enlargement	  was	  multi-­‐dimensional.	  Thus,	  the	  instrument	  of	  democratization	  and	  inclusion	  in	  the	  community	  of	  shared	  values	  should	  be	  considered	  a	  tool	  for	  the	  member	  states’	  utility,	  comparable	  to	  rationalist	  behaviour	  under	  realism,	  and	  not	  a	  normative	  end	  in	  itself.	  	  	  This	  is	  the	  reason	  for	  the	  partial	  confirmation	  of	  the	  hypothesis.	  The	  normative	  justification	  of	  democratic	  peace	  did	  not	  come	  through	  as	  strongly	  in	  the	  evidence,	  unlike	  the	  rationalist	  or	  utilitarian	  justification.	  	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  they	  did	  not	  matter,	  but	  rather	  that	  they	  were	  treated	  as	  ‘second-­‐order	  concerns’.	  Through	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process	  and	  strategy,	  the	  EU	  consistently	  prioritized	  long-­‐term	  interests	  in	  security	  and	  stability,	  and	  knowingly	  undermined	  their	  own	  powerful	  tool	  for	  bringing	  benefits	  to	  Bulgarians	  in	  both	  security	  and	  other	  areas.	  The	  lack	  of	  readiness	  of	  Bulgaria	  displays	  the	  shortcomings	  in	  rule	  of	  law,	  corruption	  and	  organized	  crime,	  which	  are	  serious	  societal	  security	  threats	  for	  Bulgarians,	  and	  indeed	  for	  the	  EU.	  Instead	  of	  employing	  their	  most	  effective	  tool	  to	  keep	  pressure	  on	  the	  candidate	  country,	  the	  EU	  prioritized	  their	  own	  long-­‐term	  interests,	  balancing	  the	  costs	  and	  potential	  for	  worse	  costs	  in	  potential	  non-­‐enlargement	  situations.	  The	  result	  of	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premature	  enlargement	  was	  by	  and	  large	  caused	  by	  the	  EU’s	  fear	  of	  future	  developments	  in	  a	  non-­‐enlargement	  scenario,	  even	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  risking	  reform	  efforts.	  Thus	  normative	  concerns	  were	  demoted	  to	  ‘second-­‐order	  concerns’.	  The	  unfolding	  process	  and	  the	  clear	  priorities	  of	  the	  EU	  thus	  confirms	  a	  strategic	  pursuit	  of	  interests	  more	  compatible	  with	  realist	  theory,	  and	  the	  case	  for	  normative	  justification	  is	  weak	  in	  the	  empirical	  evidence.	  As	  the	  Union’s	  efforts	  to	  implement	  post-­‐accession	  conditionality	  has	  shown,	  the	  Union	  members	  are	  still	  concerned	  about	  these	  issues,	  and	  try	  to	  decrease	  costs	  and	  promote	  normative	  concerns	  after	  accession,	  exactly	  because	  the	  very	  same	  concerns	  had	  to	  give	  way	  for	  geopolitical	  and	  security-­‐political	  interests	  in	  the	  pre-­‐membership	  conditionality	  period.	  	  	  The	  study	  confirms	  that	  security	  is	  much	  more	  than	  the	  absence	  of	  war,	  and	  the	  empirical	  findings	  indicate	  that	  security	  in	  enlargement	  was	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  fraught	  with	  uncertainty,	  and	  the	  Union’s	  policy	  to	  achieve	  security	  was	  more	  than	  a	  mere	  idealist	  pursuit	  in	  search	  of	  enlarging	  a	  free	  and	  prosperous	  security	  community.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Bulgaria,	  there	  were	  clear	  workings	  of	  realpolitik,	  and	  the	  policy	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  reactive	  response	  to	  external	  events	  that	  shifted	  the	  EU’s	  preferences	  along	  the	  way,	  even	  forcing	  the	  Union	  to	  take	  risks,	  undermine	  its	  own	  power,	  and	  expose	  itself	  to	  threats.	  	  	  
6.2 Impact on the current research agenda of EU security and 
enlargement While	  this	  study	  has	  not	  been	  aimed	  at	  explaining	  why	  enlargement	  takes	  place	  per	  say,	  the	  findings	  of	  this	  case	  study	  of	  Bulgaria	  have	  implications	  on	  the	  theoretical	  debate	  of	  enlargement,	  as	  well	  as	  future	  studies	  of	  EU	  as	  a	  security	  actor.	  The	  findings	  of	  the	  study	  implicate	  that	  security	  concerns	  was	  a	  decisive	  factor	  for	  why	  enlargement	  to	  Bulgaria	  took	  place,	  and	  in	  this	  specific	  case,	  also	  contributes	  to	  explaining	  how	  it	  took	  place.	  Thus,	  by	  virtue	  of	  empirical	  evidence,	  this	  thesis	  aligns	  itself	  with	  some	  of	  the	  arguments	  of	  other	  rationalist	  scholars	  of	  security	  in	  enlargement,	  among	  others	  Skålnes	  (2005),	  as	  well	  as	  Vachudova	  (2005)	  and	  Zielonka	  (2006).	  The	  almost	  conclusive	  confirmation	  of	  the	  two	  hypotheses	  shows	  two	  distinct	  security	  logics	  at	  
	  	   87	  
work	  in	  enlargement,	  but	  also	  sheds	  light	  on	  the	  research	  agenda	  in	  terms	  of	  how	  promises,	  norms	  and	  values	  matter.	  The	  results	  of	  this	  study	  have	  implications	  on	  the	  future	  theoretical	  debates	  of	  EU	  enlargement.	  Constructivist	  hypotheses	  of	  ‘rhetorical	  entrapment’	  do	  not	  fit	  with	  the	  findings	  of	  this	  study,	  as	  keeping	  promises	  and	  legitimacy	  must	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  light	  of	  costs	  and	  benefits,	  according	  to	  the	  statements	  of	  several	  of	  the	  interviewees.	  Promises	  were	  kept	  because	  it	  bears	  a	  cost	  not	  to	  comply	  with	  them,	  not	  because	  keeping	  them	  is	  morally	  right	  as	  Helene	  Sjursen	  argues	  (Sjursen,	  2002:508).	  	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  case	  for	  normative	  security	  considerations	  is	  poor	  in	  the	  study	  of	  Bulgaria,	  where	  the	  EU	  member	  states	  at	  several	  occasions,	  even	  at	  short-­‐term	  costs	  to	  themselves,	  prioritized	  long-­‐term	  interests	  and	  security	  concerns,	  rather	  than	  the	  increased	  welfare	  and	  security	  of	  Bulgaria’s	  citizens	  through	  the	  continued	  conditionality	  to	  fight	  organized	  crime	  and	  establish	  rule	  of	  law.	  Thus,	  the	  study	  implicates	  that	  normative	  concerns	  may	  well	  exist,	  but	  is	  nevertheless	  ‘second	  order’	  concerns.	  Rationalist	  and	  utilitarian	  decision-­‐making	  models	  thus	  fit	  better	  with	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  study,	  and	  implicate	  that	  a	  security	  dimension	  should	  indeed	  be	  considered	  a	  key	  factor	  when	  investigating	  enlargement	  of	  the	  EU.	  	  	  This	  study	  has	  not	  invalidated	  the	  arguments	  of	  constructivists,	  which	  say	  that	  enlargement	  is,	  security-­‐politically	  speaking,	  risky,	  like	  Helene	  Sjursen	  argues	  (Sjursen,	  2002:498,	  499).	  In	  fact,	  the	  nature	  of	  security	  in	  enlargement	  to	  Bulgaria	  has	  shown	  that	  it	  is	  fraught	  with	  risk,	  and	  as	  Ambassador	  Bull	  told	  me,	  could	  at	  worst	  threaten	  the	  political	  union	  of	  EU	  (Bull,	  2013).	  So	  Helene	  Sjursen	  asks,	  why	  did	  they	  do	  it	  anyway?	  This	  study	  has	  shown	  that	  while	  costs	  were	  accepted,	  the	  motivation	  was	  a	  fear	  of	  future	  developments,	  and	  a	  distinct	  fear	  that	  the	  EU	  would	  be	  worse	  of	  in	  a	  non-­‐enlargement	  scenario.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  study	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Bulgaria,	  reflects	  Mattli’s	  argument,	  which	  says	  that	  the	  net	  cost	  of	  excluding	  countries	  was	  bigger	  than	  the	  net	  cost	  of	  accepting	  them	  (Vachudová,	  2005:245),	  from	  a	  security-­‐political	  point	  of	  view.	  	  The	  fear	  of	  the	  non-­‐enlargement	  scenario,	  as	  reflected	  by	  Tony	  Blair,	  sums	  up	  these	  fears:	  ”Without	  enlargement	  western	  Europe	  will	  always	  be	  faced	  with	  the	  threat	  of	  instability,	  conflict	  and	  mass	  migration	  on	  its	  borders”	  (BBC	  News	  Online,	  2000).	  This	  argument	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Bulgaria	  might	  provide	  new	  insights	  into	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why	  costs	  were	  accepted	  in	  the	  Eastern	  enlargement	  as	  a	  whole,	  as	  most	  of	  the	  security-­‐political	  arguments	  that	  supports	  this	  statement	  could	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  CEECs	  in	  general.	  	  	  Secondly,	  the	  study’s	  findings	  tells	  a	  story	  of	  the	  EU	  as	  a	  security	  actor	  that	  is	  seldom	  told,	  as	  well	  as	  depicting	  it	  through	  a	  theoretical	  scope	  that	  is	  rarely	  applied	  to	  studies	  of	  the	  EU.	  Primarily,	  this	  study	  shows	  that	  the	  EU	  may	  be	  described	  as	  a	  strategic	  actor	  in	  this	  particular	  case,	  and	  that	  its	  reactive	  behaviour	  and	  considerations	  of	  long-­‐term	  strategic	  goals	  calls	  for	  new	  theoretical	  research	  into	  the	  nature	  of	  EU’s	  political	  cooperation,	  especially	  in	  the	  area	  of	  enlargement,	  where	  the	  EU	  has	  power.	  While	  studies	  of	  other	  areas	  of	  policy-­‐cooperation	  in	  the	  Community	  have	  provided	  bleak	  and	  pessimistic	  notions	  of	  EU	  capabilities	  of	  unity	  and	  willingness	  to	  work	  towards	  a	  common	  goal	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  external	  affairs	  and	  security,	  such	  as	  the	  very	  slow	  development	  of	  the	  Common	  Foreign	  and	  Security	  Policy,	  this	  study	  provides	  a	  very	  different	  description.	  	  	  	  Realist	  models	  and	  geopolitics,	  as	  mentioned	  earlier,	  is	  almost	  never	  applied	  to	  the	  EU,	  and	  is	  commonly	  believed	  to	  have	  little	  explanatory	  power	  in	  explaining	  ‘normative	  power	  Europe’.	  In	  this	  project,	  the	  results	  tell	  a	  different	  tale,	  and	  realism	  and	  geopolitical	  considerations	  do	  explain	  a	  great	  deal	  about	  why	  and	  how	  the	  EU	  went	  through	  with	  enlargement	  to	  Bulgaria,	  and	  even	  functioning	  beside	  the	  logics	  of	  democratic	  peace.	  Thus,	  it	  would	  be	  interesting	  if	  these	  findings	  could	  provide	  a	  renewed	  interest	  in	  applying	  realist	  and	  geopolitical	  frameworks	  to	  the	  study	  of	  both	  enlargement	  and	  the	  EU	  policy	  cooperation	  as	  a	  whole,	  as	  well	  as	  explore	  its	  relationship	  to	  democratic	  peace	  research	  more	  in	  depth.	  	  	  On	  a	  final	  note,	  security	  and	  strategic	  concerns	  should	  not	  be	  viewed	  as	  the	  only	  explanatory	  factor	  in	  enlargement,	  and	  this	  study	  has	  tried	  hard	  not	  to	  portray	  it	  as	  such.	  Indeed,	  the	  interviewees	  also	  emphasized	  other	  explanatory	  factors,	  such	  as	  an	  economic	  rationale	  behind	  it	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  short-­‐term	  costs	  (MacDowall,	  2013;	  Skarstein,	  2013;	  Passy,	  2013;	  Bull,	  2013).	  Other	  factors	  that	  have	  not	  been	  included	  here	  might	  also	  affect	  the	  decisions	  of	  the	  Union	  in	  coming	  enlargements,	  such	  as	  the	  absence	  of	  threats,	  domestic	  opposition	  in	  the	  existing	  member	  countries	  or	  the	  Union’s	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capacity	  to	  absorb.	  Specific	  factors	  may	  affect	  specific	  situations,	  such	  as	  the	  coming	  enlargement	  to	  Croatia,	  or	  the	  stalling	  bid	  of	  Turkey.	  If	  security	  and	  strategic	  concerns	  were	  the	  only	  concern	  for	  the	  EU,	  enlargement	  policies	  would	  look	  a	  lot	  different,	  e.g.	  Turkey	  would	  almost	  definitely	  already	  be	  a	  member	  (İçener	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  In	  the	  case	  investigated,	  the	  security	  situation	  at	  the	  time	  must	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  for	  the	  interpretation	  of	  evidence,	  as	  the	  fear	  of	  future	  developments	  was	  decisive	  throughout	  the	  process	  for	  both	  explanatory	  theories.	  Therefore	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  study	  must	  be	  interpreted	  in	  its	  historical	  context,	  even	  if	  they	  can	  provide	  useful	  insights	  for	  future	  research.	  	  	  
6.3 Limitations While	  this	  project	  has	  tried	  to	  keep	  the	  research	  design	  as	  robust	  as	  possible,	  the	  project	  does	  have	  certain	  limitations	  that	  should	  be	  kept	  in	  mind	  when	  interpreting	  the	  results.	  First	  of	  all,	  the	  study	  has	  reproduced	  general	  trends	  in	  the	  interviews,	  and	  it	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  few	  of	  the	  views	  on	  the	  general	  themes	  were	  shared	  by	  all	  of	  the	  interviewees.	  However,	  I	  have	  weighed	  the	  evidence	  according	  to	  a	  few	  guidelines:	  The	  closer	  the	  interviewee	  was	  to	  the	  decision	  and	  process,	  the	  more	  weight	  I	  put	  on	  their	  statements.	  The	  same	  goes	  for	  objectiveness:	  The	  more	  objective	  the	  person,	  the	  more	  trustworthy	  the	  statement.	  In	  some	  cases,	  the	  interviewees	  might	  have	  prestige	  vested	  in	  the	  enlargement	  process	  and	  its	  outcome,	  and	  would	  seem	  more	  uncritical	  to	  certain	  facts.	  For	  example,	  when	  discussing	  premature	  enlargement	  to	  Bulgaria,	  few	  of	  the	  Bulgarian	  interviewees	  thought	  that	  it	  was	  premature,	  while	  all	  of	  the	  non-­‐Bulgarians	  did.	  Thus,	  for	  the	  people	  who	  were	  political	  appointees	  and	  politicians,	  the	  evidence	  must	  be	  viewed	  in	  this	  light.	  	  	  Secondly,	  as	  previously	  noted,	  the	  external	  validity	  of	  the	  study	  is	  weak,	  as	  the	  case	  study	  is	  poorly	  equipped	  to	  yield	  inferences	  over	  a	  population	  of	  cases.	  While	  this	  very	  specific	  case	  study	  of	  Bulgaria	  may	  not	  generalize	  its	  findings	  over	  all	  the	  CEECs	  in	  terms	  of	  explaining	  and	  understanding	  the	  security	  dimension,	  it	  may	  indeed	  prove	  to	  have	  yielded	  inferences	  that	  may	  be	  utilized	  for	  future	  research	  on	  enlargement	  and	  EU	  security.	  A	  third	  limitation	  for	  the	  study	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  I	  was	  not	  able	  to	  find	  a	  willing	  interviewee	  from	  the	  EU,	  something	  that	  affects	  the	  internal	  validity	  of	  the	  study.	  Better	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and	  stronger	  inferences	  might	  have	  been	  drawn	  from	  the	  study,	  if	  an	  interviewee	  from	  the	  EU	  side,	  or	  from	  the	  member	  state	  side	  could	  have	  been	  included.	  Unfortunately,	  this	  was	  not	  possible,	  and	  the	  study’s	  ability	  to	  withdraw	  inferences	  may	  have	  been	  compromised	  on	  this	  basis.	  A	  fourth	  and	  final	  limitation	  to	  the	  study	  is	  the	  treatment	  of	  EU	  as	  a	  somewhat	  unitary	  actor	  under	  both	  theories,	  though	  the	  theories	  differ	  on	  how	  the	  EU	  acts,	  and	  their	  core	  theoretical	  assumptions.	  Many	  studies	  underline	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  EU	  is	  not	  a	  unitary	  actor,	  and	  that	  this	  is	  a	  challenge	  for	  the	  study.	  However,	  while	  it	  would	  be	  useful	  to	  have	  more	  solid	  evidence	  of	  each	  member	  state’s	  preferences	  and	  security	  concerns,	  the	  strict	  limits	  in	  time	  and	  length	  of	  the	  study	  made	  this	  too	  difficult	  to	  achieve.	  For	  future	  research,	  it	  would	  be	  interesting	  to	  enhance	  the	  understanding	  of	  the	  security	  dimension	  of	  enlargement	  from	  a	  member	  state	  perspective.	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